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ABSTRACT

Website fingerprinting (WF) enables a local eavesdropper to determine which websites a user is
visiting over an encrypted connection. State-of-the-art WF attacks have been shown to be effective even
against Tor. Recently, lightweight WF defenses for Tor have been proposed that substantially degrade existing
attacks: WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie. In this work, we explore the impact of recent advances in deep learning
on WF attacks and defenses. We first present Deep Fingerprinting (DF), a new WF attack based on deep
learning, and we evaluate this attack against WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie. The DF attack attains over 98%
accuracy on Tor traffic without defenses, making it the state-of-the-art WF attack at the time of publishing
this work. DF is the only attack that is effective against WTF-PAD with over 90% accuracy, and against
Walkie-Talkie, DF achieves a top-2 accuracy of 98%. In the more realistic open-world setting, our attack
remains effective. These findings highlight the need for defenses that protect against attacks like DF that use
advanced deep learning techniques.
Since DF requires large amounts of training data that is regularly updated, some may argue that is it
is not practical for the weaker attacker model typically assumed in WF. Additionally, most WF attacks make
strong assumptions about the testing and training data have similar distributions and being collected from the
same type of network at about the same time. Thus, we next examine ways that an attacker could reduce the
difficulty of performing an attack by leveraging N-shot learning, in which just a few training samples are
needed to identify a given class. In particular, we propose a new WF attack called Triplet Fingerprinting (TF)
that uses triplet networks for N-shot learning. We evaluate this attack in challenging settings such as where
the training and testing data are from multiple years apart and collected on different networks, and we find
that the TF attack remains effective in such settings with 85% accuracy or better. We also show that the TF
attack is also effective in the open world and outperforms transfer learning.
Finally, in response to the DF and TF attacks, we propose the CAM-Pad defense: a novel WF defense
utilizing the Grad-CAM visual explanation technique. Grad-CAM can be used to identify regions of particular
sensitivity in the data and provide insight into the features that the model has learned, providing more
understanding about how the DF attack makes its prediction. The defense is based on a dynamic flow-padding
defense, making it practical for deployment in Tor. The defense can reduce the attacker's accuracy using the
DF attack from 98% to 67%, which is much better than the WTF-PAD defense, with a packet overhead of
approximately 80%.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
“Even if you are not doing anything wrong, you are being watched
and recorded.”
Edward Snowden
In recent years, technology has become an integral part of life for many
people around the world. With this integration, personal and meta information are being exposed more than ever. This allows many entities to obtain and
infer a lot of useful and sometimes private information about users. On top
of that, we have learned from Edward Snowden that the Internet surveillance
has been performing by different agencies who were spying on our communications for various purposes [17]. To protect Internet users’ privacy, there have
been privacy enhancing technologies that have been proposed such as I2P [60],
AN.ON [18], Tor [14] and so on. With more than eight million daily users, Tor
has emerged as the de-facto tool to anonymously browse the Internet [3, 32].
Tor is, however, known to be vulnerable to traffic analysis. In particular,
website fingerprinting (WF) is a traffic analysis attack with the potential ability to break the privacy that Tor aims to provide. WF allows the attacker
to identify web pages in an encrypted connection by analyzing patterns in
network traffic. This allows a local and passive network adversary as demonstrated in Figure 1.1, such as a user’s Internet service provider, someone sniffing the user’s wireless connection and so on to identify the websites that the
user has visited despite her use of Tor.
WF exploits the fact that differences in website content (e.g., different
images, scripts, styles) can be inferred from network traffic, even if traffic
has been encrypted. From a machine learning (ML) perspective, WF is a
classification problem: the adversary trains a classifier on a set of websites,
1
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2

Figure 1.1: Possible local and passive network adversary that can perform WF
attacks.
extracting network traffic features that are unique to each website. To deploy
the attack, the adversary uses the classifier to match traces of a victim to
one of those websites. The effectiveness of WF depends heavily on both the
classifier algorithm and the set of features used. Thus, the attacker needs to
perform feature engineering process in which he has to sophisticatedly select,
hand-craft and test the set of features that could possibly be the meaningful
representative features for the data input he would like to classify. Previous
WF attacks use a set of hand-crafted features to represent Tor traffic, achieving
90%+ accuracy against Tor using classifiers such as Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [35], k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) [54], and random forests [20].
In response to these attacks, a number of defenses have been proposed. WF
defenses add dummy packets into the traffic and/or add delays to real packets, aiming to hide features exploited by WF attacks such as traffic bursts and
packet lengths. Notably, Tor Project developers have shown an interest in deploying adaptive padding as a possible defense [38, 39]. Based on this, Juarez
et al. proposed WTF-PAD and showed that it effectively defends against WF
attacks with reasonable overheads, such that it would be practical for deployment in Tor [26] 1 . Recently, Wang and Goldberg proposed another effective
and low-overhead defense called Walkie-Talkie (W-T) [57]. These proposals
raise the question of whether attacks could be improved to undermine the
1
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effectiveness of the new defenses, a question we address in this work.
While the state-of-the-art attacks use classifiers that are popular in many
applications, deep learning (DL) has shown to outperform traditional machine
learning techniques in many domains such as speech recognition, visual object
recognition, and object detection [30]. Furthermore, DL does not require
selecting and fine-tuning features by hand [40]. This has motivated us to
explore whether we can leverage DL to improve classification results against
non-defended and defended Tor traffic and formulated our first and second
research questions (RQ).
• RQ1: How can the WF attack be implemented with DL techniques and
what are appropriate approaches and models of DL that can effectively
improve the performance of the WF attack?
• RQ2: How effectively can the WF attack using DL techniques perform
against undefended and defended traffic in both closed-world and more
realistic open-world settings?
We conducted experimental evaluations to answer RQ1 and RQ2 as described in Chapter 3. We answer the research questions by the key contributions and findings of our work including:
• We propose Deep Fingerprinting (DF) attack, a new state-of-the-art
WF attack based on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) designed
using cutting-edge DL methods. The attack uses a simple input format
and does not require handcrafting features for classification. We describe
how DF leverages advances from computer vision research for effective
and robust classification performance.
• To study the attack in detail, we experiment in a closed-world setting
using a new dataset that we collected with 95 websites and 1,000 traces
per website. We find that our DF WF attack is more accurate against
Tor than the state-of-the-art attacks with 98.3% accuracy. We also show
results for how the number of training epochs and training dataset size
affect the classification accuracy.
• We then show the effectiveness of the DF attack in the closed-world setting against Tor traffic defended with WTF-PAD and W-T. Against
WTF-PAD, the attack reaches 90% accuracy, which is significantly better than all other attacks. Against W-T, the attack reaches 49.7% accuracy, which is better than all other attacks and nearly the theoretical
maximum accuracy [57].
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• To investigate in a more realistic setting, we use an open world with 20,000
unmonitored websites. On non-defended traffic, the attack achieves 0.99
precision and 0.94 recall. On traffic defended with WTF-PAD, the attack
yields 0.96 precision and 0.68 recall. We also examine the possibilities
for attacking weak implementations of W-T.
• Based on our experimental findings, we propose a number of new directions to explore in both attack and defense.
Overall, we find that the new DF WF attack undermines at least one
defense that had been considered seriously for deployment in Tor [38, 39]. We
have disclosed our findings to the Tor Project, and they have expressed their
concerns about WTF-PAD, setting the stage for more exploration of the design
of realistic defenses.
This DF work has accepted to be published and presented in the 25th ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 18) at
Toronto, Canada in 2018 (Acceptance Rate: 16.6%). Moreover, the paper was
selected as a finalist for an Outstanding Paper Award, placing it in the
top one percent of all submitted papers.
However, the research work to answer RQ1 and RQ2 has introduced us
with other interesting and open questions to be further explored. First, we
criticize that even if the results of WF attacks using DL are effective, there
are some interesting viewpoints related to the set of WF assumptions and
the threat models that we used. We realize that these assumptions have
been commonly used in the previous work. However, we are convinced that
the further investigation on the realistically implemented assumptions need
to be addressed. The WF research have made the assumptions that perhaps
provide too simple environments of the attacks and unrealistic advantage to
the attacker. This has motivated us to further study and investigate the WF
attacks with more realistic assumption and formulate the RQ3 which is
• RQ3: How can the WF attacks using deep learning be improved with
more realistic assumptions?
To answer the RQ3, we first examined the set of assumptions used in WF
research, we found that there are three important assumptions that have not
been appropriately made and can be improved including Replicability: the
attacker is assumed to be able to train and test his WF classifier under the
same conditions as the clients in which the training and testing data are in the
same distribution and not vulnerable to data mismatch issue, Bootstrap Time:
the previous work does not include the bootstrap time into its consideration
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which avoid considering the data staleness issue and the practical deployment
of the attack and Flexibility and Transferability: the model does not consider
the case that there are newly add/remove website’s classes and the ability
of using the pre-trained model in WF attacks. We investigated the possible
improvements from these assumptions and defined the WF attacks’s goals of
improvements including:
• Replicability: The improved attacks should be robust against the adverse effect from the data mismatch issue resulted from different distributions of training and testing data.
• Bootstrap Time: The attacker should be capable of training on one
dataset and can be effectively later used for the new dataset, avoiding
the large amount of time for training the new classifier from scratch.
• Flexibility and Transferability: The improved attacks should effectively predict the network traces regardless of the website’s labels used
to initially train the classifier. Moreover, the attacker should be able
to directly adopt the pre-trained model and adjusted it to his new task
without requiring to re-train the whole new model.
• Performance of the attack: Under the above improvements with
more challenging scenarios, the performance of improved attacks can
still remain effective.
We propose the novel WF attack’s framework that can meet the aforementioned goals of improvements, namely, the Triplet Fingerprinting (TF) attack. The attack is based on the implementation of the ML technique called
N-Shot Learning (NSL) with triplet networks. Moreover, we design a set of
comprehensive experimental evaluations and demonstrate that the TF attack
can further improve the WF attacks with respect to the given goal of improvements, also overcome or mitigate the adverse effects under different scenarios
with more challenging limitations. According to our experimental results, we
answer RQ3 according to our findings and contributions as following:
• We show that, under the scenario in which the training and testing
data are similar in term of their distributions, the attacker needs only 5
network traffic examples/website (5-Shot Learning) to re-train the pretrained model with NSL without worrying that whether or not the pretrained model included his monitored websites. The accuracy of this
attack remains very effective with over 92% of accuracy. Thus, the results
at this stage currently demonstrate that the TF attack meets Flexiblity
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and Transferability, Bootstrap Time and Performance of the attack goals
of improvement.
• To evaluate the Replicability improvement, we extensively add more challenging scenario in which the training and testing data are different in
term of their distributions. We show that even if the pre-trained model
using NSL is trained from the dataset collected from the different TBB
versions with over 3-year different period compared to the current time
that the model is adopted to perform WF attacks, the attacker can
use this pre-trained model with only 5 network traffic examples/website
(5-Shot Learning) and achieve moderately effective attacks with almost
85% accuracy.
• In comparison to the traditional transfer learning, we shows that pretrained model with NSL can significantly perform better when the number of available training data is small under the scenario that the training
and the testing data distributions are similar. Moreover, we show that
the pre-trained model with NSL significantly outperforms the traditional
transfer learning in all settings under more challenging scenario in which
the training and the testing data distributions are different. The results
confirm that the TF attack can provide the Replicability improvement
by mitigating the adverse effect of data mismatch issue.
• In more realistic open-world setting, we show that the TF attack still
remain effective. Overall, the performance of the TF attack attains
over 0.9 precision and 0.8 recall when tuned for precision. The results
demonstrate that the TF attack has become the potential threat for the
current Tor’s users since there is no effective WF defense that is now
realistically deployed in Tor.
• We also demonstrate the performance of the TF attack against the WTFPAD defense. The results show that the TF attack cannot undermine the
WTF-PAD defense, however, it can outperform some of the previouslyproposed state-of-the-art WF attacks, setting up the new direction of
research to improve the WF attacks using NSL to undermine the WF
defenses.
• We also report the Top-n and k -Way accuracy to provide more comprehensive evaluations. The evaluations help the attacker to either use this
information to further make the prediction more accurate or gain better
understanding in the changes of accuracy when the size of problem is
changed.
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• Finally, we provide the discussion to demonstrate other benefits of using
NSL to develop WF attacks.
According to our findings, the RQ3 is now answered by our newly-proposed
TF attack that can improve WF attacks with more realistic assumptions and
under more challenging scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first in the WF research who study and evaluate how to apply NSL to improve
WF attacks. Moreover, the results mostly show effective performance of the
attacks, providing promising research’s directions to further investigate how
to apply NSL to develop better WF attacks in the future.
The next RQ that we are interested in is from the answers of RQ2 showing that WF attacks using DL, especially with the DF attack can effectively
undermine the WTF-PAD defense. This raises the question of how we could
improve those defenses against the WF attacks using DL to protect the user’s
Internet privacy. Thus, it formulates the RQ4 which is
• RQ4: How should the WF defenses be improved to maintain a sufficient level of security and remain practical in term of network overheads
against WF attacks using DL?
To answer RQ4, we first conduct an insight investigation to answer the
question why the WTF-PAD cannot effectively defend against the WF attacks
using DL. We analyze the failure cause of the WTF-PAD and found that
the failure of WTF-PAD results from the major advantages of DL that is
the ability to learn the hidden features. Moreover, we further investigate
key challenges and expected designs derived from the failure cause of the
WTF-PAD. We found that it is difficult to use the traditional WF defense
approach by identifying the set of features and trying to conceal them since
those features are hidden in deep neural networks (DNNs). Thus, we propose
the key challenges and expected design of the new WF defense against WF
attacks using DL including:
• Features knowledge: The new WF defense cannot relies on deterministic feature knowledge used for the WF attack since it is hidden inside
the DNN.
• Overhead of defense: The new WF defense need to be lightweight and
require small to moderate bandwidth and latency overhead to ensure the
quality of service in Tor.
• Deployability: The new WF defense should be deployable without
requiring significant changes in Tor. Furthermore, the defense needs to
be more generic in which it can be generally applied to all websites.
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• Transparent interpretable defense: The defense does not only relies
on the accuracy score to justify its performance, but also can explain why
the defense can successfully prevent the WF attack with other additional
explanations.
We propose the novel WF defenses that meet all expected design mentioned
above called the CAM Pad defense. Given by our experimental results, we
answer RQ4 based to the findings and contributions of our work including:
• We show that the design of the CAM-Pad defense does not rely on the
feature knowledge which is hidden in the DNNs. On the other hand, the
defense simply uses the combination of the global relative importance
scores extracted from a visual explanation technique in ML called GradCAM to stochastically add dummy packets. Moreover, the defense is
based on dynamic-flow defense making it practical in term of deployability as it can be applied to any websites in both static and dynamic
ones.
• We evaluate performance of the CAM-Pad defense against the state-ofthe-art WF attacks called the DF attack. In closed-world scenario, the
accuracy of the DF attack significantly drops down from 98.4% to 66.7%
for the CAM-Pad defense. Compared to the WTF-PAD defense, the
CAM-Pad defense is much more effective. Overall, the security comes at
the cost of 83% additional bandwidth overhead and 28% additional latency overhead. In more realistic open-world scenario, the precision and
recall are significantly dropped compared to WTF-PAD defense to the
point that the attacker cannot effectively perform WF attacks anymore.
• We further evaluate the performance of the CAM-Pad defense against
the TF attack designed to perform under more realistic scenario. In
closed-world setting, the accuracy of the TF attack drops down to 10%,
inferring that the CAM-Pad defense is even more robust under realistic
scenario.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who propose to use the
visual explanation technique to provide transparent interpretable property to the WF defense. We show that the Grad-CAM can be effectively
used to provide better understanding about how the characteristics of
relative importance scores are in both successful and failed WF defenses.
Hence, it provides additional measurements to evaluate the effectiveness
of WF defenses and visual explanation about why the WF defenses can
prevent the WF attacks.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

9

According to our findings, the RQ4 is now answered by our newly-proposed
CAM-Pad defense that can effectively prevent the state-of-the-art WF attacks.
Moreover, the results suggest that this approach is competitive against other
efficient defenses, though further work is still necessary. Going forward, it
will be necessary to further explore the trade-off between security and overheads which will help up to design more flexible and tunable WF defenses.
Furthermore, moving this defense out of the realm of simulation to real implementation is necessary to show the full effectiveness of our proposed defense.
Finally, this work was accepted to be published and presented in the 2018
IEEE Western New York Image and Signal Processing Workshop (WNYISPW).
In conclusion, the primary focus of this dissertation is to comprehensively
investigate, develop, and evaluate the use of DL techniques to perform WF
attacks in an accurate, efficient, and more realistic manner. Moreover, we also
propose the study on how to develop the WF defense which is robust to WF
attacks using DL.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as following: Chapter 2
presents the background and literature review. Chapter 3 addresses RQ1
and RQ2 by developing the new state-of-the-art WF attack using DL called
Deep Fingerprinting (DF) that can effectively undermine one the WF defenses:
the WTF-PAD defense which has seriously considered to be deployed in Tor.
Chapter 4 presents the novel WF attack using N-Shot Learning with Triplet
Networks called the Triplet Fingerprinting (TF) attack to further improve WF
attacks with more realistic assumptions which will answer RQ3. Then, Chapter 5 demonstrates the novel WF defenses called the CAM-Pad defense; the
defense utilizes the Grad-CAM: visual explanation technique and can effectively prevent the DF attack which will answer RQ4. We end up with the
Appendices that provides the supportive material and results.

Chapter 2

Background and Literature
Review
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will
not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may
make your victory complete.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In this section, we present literature review including necessary background
and related work. The contents are categorized into subsequent sections. We
explain about Tor anonymity system in Section 2.1, website fingerprinting
(WF) and treat model in Section 2.2, WF attacks in Section 2.3, WF defenses in Section 2.4, deep learning (DL) in Section 2.5, WF using DL in
Section 2.6 and attack performance metrics used in WF in Section 2.7. Note
that this chapter only describes the fundamental background and literature
review to provide the general understanding of WF literature. The additional
background and literature review will be further described in each subsequent
chapter to provide specific background knowledge and literature review for
each research question.

2.1

Tor Anonymity System

Since so much of users’ personal lives is conducted online, privacy for web
browsing has become increasingly important. A widely used technology for
protecting the privacy of users’ web browsing behavior is the Tor anonymity
systems. Tor is one of the low-latency anonymity systems that enables users
to communicate in a manner that is untraceable by adversaries [14]. With
10
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Figure 2.1: Tor Anonymity System.
more than eight million daily users, Tor has emerged as the de-facto tool to
anonymously browse the Internet [3]. Tor seeks to frustrate attackers from
linking communication partners, or from linking multiple communications to
or from a single user. Tor provides anonymity to Internet users by concealing
users location as well as other forms of identifying factors such as Internet
Protocol (IP) address.
Tor is a distributed overlay network mainly designed to anonymize TCPbased applications especially a user’s web-browsing Internet behavior. Its
design is based on the idea of mixes to create a circuit; a private network
pathway, in which a client randomly select three nodes (network relays) that
forward network traffic between the client and a server, then incrementally
establishes a Tor circuit. The circuit is extended one hop at a time to create
a chain of relays including a guard node, a middle node and an exit node
as shown in Figure 2.1. With a telescopic circuit creation and sophisticated
encryption processes, each node along the way knows only which node gave
it data and which node it is giving data to. No individual node knows the
complete path that a data packet has taken. For example, the guard node
only knows the client and the middle node, the middle node only knows the
guard node and the exit node, and the exit node only knows the middle node
and the web server. Therefore, if the adversary can compromise one of the
Tor’s nodes, he cannot link the client to the website she is surfing, thus the
adversary fails to learn the user’s Internet browsing behavior.

2.2

Website Fingerprinting and Threat Model

Among its goals, Tor aims to protect users against local eavesdroppers from
learning what websites the user is going to by concealing the client’s identity
and the website she has visited as mention in Section 2.1. Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks, however, use traffic analysis to undermine Tor’s protections.
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Figure 2.2: The WF attack workflow: Black arrow represents the processes
of creating the WF classifier. Red arrow demonstrates how the adversary
performs WF attack by using the trained classifier that he previously prepared
to predict the website that the client may visit.
Prior work has shown that, under certain conditions, such a local and passive
adversary can identify the pages visited by a Tor user by exploiting patterns
in network traffic [9, 20, 22, 35, 36, 40, 45, 55, 56].
Figure 2.2 demonstrates how to deploy the WF attack, the adversary captures the sequence of packets including the sequence of packets directions
(incoming and outgoing traffic), also known as traffic trace, from each of a
series of his own visits to a representative set of websites, including websites
he is interested in detecting. From each trace, he then extracts features that
are unique to each website. In the WF literature, we find a myriad of such
features: packet size frequencies [22], total transmission time and volume in
both directions [36], edit-distance score [9,55], and the number of traffic bursts
in each direction [36, 54], just to mention a few. As a result, the adversary
obtains several feature vectors for each website that are used to train a supervised classifier that learns how to identify the website from its features as
well-known as the classification problem in machine learning application. Finally, the adversary can collect new traffic traces from the user’s connection to
the Tor network, extract the features, and use the trained classifier to predict
the website to which the client might visit.
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In this work, we assume a network-level adversary that is: local, meaning
that he has access only to the link between the user and the entry node to the
Tor network, and passive, i.e., he can record network packets but not modify,
delay, drop or decrypt them. Potential adversaries that might be in a position
to deploy a WF attack include: eavesdroppers on the user’s local network,
local system administrators, Internet Service Providers (ISP), Autonomous
Systems (AS) between the user and the entry node, and the operators of the
entry node.
The attack scenario as demonstrated in Figure 2.2 is as follows: the client
surfs the set of websites he is interested in detecting over the Tor anonymity
system, then he intercepts the traffic between the client and the Tor network.
We assume the adversary knows the client’s identity and only aims at identifying the website. Note that the adversary can trivially obtain the client’s IP
address as long as he has access to the TLS connection between the user and
the entry node. Beyond the entry node, Tor has stripped a layer of encryption
and the IP of the client is no longer present in the headers of network packets. In addition, there are other possible threat models with different types of
attack for example global adversaries that do traffic analysis can deploy more
effective attacks than WF such as traffic correlation attacks [44, 48, 62] and
fall out of Tor’s original threat model. However, our dissertation will mainly
focus on WF threat model as described above.
Within this scenario, we draw on prior work to make several assumptions
about the attacker goals and capabilities.
Closed- vs Open-world Scenario:
A closed-word scenario assumes that the user can only visit a small set of websites and that the adversary has samples to train on all of them [10,22,23,47].
However, this assumption was criticized for being unrealistic [25, 38], as the
world of websites that can be potentially visited is so large that not even the
most powerful adversaries have the resources to collect data and train for every
website. Subsequent studies have considered an open-world scenario, a more
realistic setting in which the adversary can only train on a small fraction of
the websites the user can visit. We use closed-world experiments for detailed
comparison of different machine learning (ML) algorithms and parameter settings, and we further compare the results of open-world experiments for a
more realistic evaluation of the attack.
In the open world, we follow the terminology used in prior work: the monitored set includes limited set of the websites that the adversary is interested
in detecting, while the unmonitored set are all other websites.

CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

14

Website vs Webpage Fingerprinting:
In an abuse of language, most authors in the field use “website fingerprinting”
to refer to the fingerprinting of only the homepage of those websites. There
is research that has attempted to fingerprint pages that are linked from the
homepage [9], but virtually all studies on website fingerprinting train and
test the attacks on homepages. Although, it is arguable that the user can
arbitrarily visit any web pages inside a particular website, the attacker can
still perform website fingerprinting attacks. In this case, the attacker who
is interested in set of particular web pages in which the set should be more
specific and deterministic, can train the classifier to recognize those set of web
pages instead of the homepage. However, for comparison with prior work, we
make same assumptions by using a homepage of each website used for training
and testing in our evaluation.
Traffic Parsing:
As pointed out by Juarez et al. [25], the attacker is assumed to be able to parse
all the traffic generated by a web visit and isolate it from other traffic (e.g.,
traffic generated by visits in other tabs, non-HTTP traffic over Tor, and so
on). We note that the adversary is able to do so only if he deploys the attack
from an entry node under his control. In that case, the adversary can select
a domain’s traffic by its Tor circuit ID. Concurrent and subsequent visits to
the same domain would still go through the same circuit. If the adversary
is eavesdropping the link between the client and the entry, all Tor traffic is
multiplexed in the TLS connection to the entry. However, recent research has
developed techniques to parse visits from multiplexed TLS traffic [56]. As
with prior work, we assume that such parsing has already been done or is not
needed.

2.3

Website Fingerprinting Attacks

Herrmann et al. were the first to evaluate a website fingerprinting (WF) attack
against Tor [22]. However, they only achieved 3% accuracy in a closed world
of 775 websites. The main problem with their approach was that their reliance
on packet length frequencies – Tor sends data in fixed-size (512-byte) packets
known as cells – which renders this feature useless for classification of Tor
traffic. In 2011, Panchenko et al. devised new features and improved the attack
to 55% accuracy on Herrmann et al.’s dataset [36]. Since then, the success
rate of WF attacks against Tor has been incrementally improved, reaching
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90% accuracy by two classifiers using edit-distances [9, 55]. These attacks,
however, imposed high computational costs on the adversary, which makes
them impractical for real-world deployment.
Recently, a new series of WF attacks have been proposed with advanced
feature sets and more sophisticated classifiers that maintain the accuracy at
90% while reducing the cost of the attack [20, 35, 54]. These attacks have
become the state-of-the-art WF attacks and are used to benchmark other
attacks and defenses. We mainly use these state-of-the-art WF attacks to
perform evaluation for RQ1, RQ2 and RQ4.
k-NN.
Wang et al. [54] proposed the k-NN attack. This approach consists in applying
a k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier, including features such as packet
ordering, number of incoming and outgoing cells and numbers of bursts. These
features are used in combination to form a distance metric (e.g., Euclidean
distance) to measure the similarity between different websites. k-NN exhibits
very good performance: in a closed-world setting with 100 websites, it achieved
91% accuracy, and in an open-world setting with 5,000 websites, it achieved
86% True Positive Rate (TPR) and 0.6% False Positive Rate (FPR).
CUMUL.
Panchenko et al. [35] proposed an attack based on a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier and devised a novel feature set based on the cumulative sum of
packet lengths constructed as follows: the first coordinate in the feature vector
is the length of the first packet in the traffic trace and the i-th coordinate is
the sum of the value in the (i − 1)-th coordinate plus the length of the i-th
packet, where lengths for incoming packets are negative. The attack achieved
91% accuracy in a closed-world setting. In the open-world, they study two
different scenarios: multi-class, where each monitored website is treated as a
different class, and two-class, where the whole set of monitored pages is treated
as a single class. The open world results are 96% TPR and 9.61% FPR for
multi-class and 96% TPR and 1.9% FPR for two-class.
k-FP.
Hayes and Danezis [20] proposed the k -fingerprinting attack (k-FP). k-FP uses
a random forests classifier to extract fingerprints of pages: they train the random forest with traditional features but the actual fingerprint is represented
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by the leafs of the trees in the random forest. The authors argue this representation is more effective for WF than the one based on the original features. To
solve the open world problem, they feed these new feature vectors to a k-NN
classifier. They also analyze the importance of their features and ranked them.
The results show that the top 20 most important features involve counting the
number of packets in a sequence and leak more information about the identity
of a web page than complex features such as packet ordering or packet interarrival time features. k-FP achieved 91% accuracy in a closed-world setting
and 88% TPR and a 0.5% FPR in an open-world setting.

2.4

Website Fingerprinting Defenses

The fundamental strategy to defend against WF attacks is to add dummy
packets and/or delay packets. This cover traffic makes WF features less distinctive, thus increasing the rate of classification errors committed by the adversary. The first defense that used this strategy against WF was BuFLO [15],
proposed by Dyer et al., whose strategy was to modify the traffic to make it
look constant rate and thus remove packet-specific features. However, coarse
features such as total volume, size and time were hard to conceal without incurring high bandwidth overheads [15]. Tamaraw [7] and CS-BuFLO [8] tried
to solve this problem by grouping websites that are similar in size and padding
all the websites in a group to the greatest size in that group. Even so, these
defenses still require more than 130% extra bandwidth than non-defended Tor
and, on average, pages load between two to four times slower [7, 8, 15].
Recently, two lightweight countermeasures have been proposed for deployment in Tor for their low latency overhead: WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie.
WTF-PAD.
Tor developers have expressed a preference for using adaptive padding as a WF
defense [38,39]. Adaptive padding [44] saves bandwidth by adding the padding
only upon low usage of the channel, thus eliminating features originating from
the bursts of traffic. Since adaptive padding was originally designed as a
defense against end-to-end timing analysis, Juarez et al. proposed WTF-PAD,
a system design for deploying adaptive padding for WF defense in Tor [26].
WTF-PAD has been shown to be effective against all state-of-the-art attacks
with relatively moderate bandwidth overheads compared to the BuFLO-style
defenses (e.g. 54%). Plus, since WTF-PAD does not delay packets, it does
not incur any latency overhead.
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Figure 2.3: Autoencoder (AE).
Walkie-Talkie.
Walkie-Talkie (W-T) [57] has the Tor browser communicate with the web
server in half-duplex mode, in which the client only sends a request (such as
for an image file) only after the server has fulfilled all previous requests. As
a result, the server and the client send non-overlapping bursts in alternate
directions. Moreover, the defense also adds dummy packets and delays to
create collisions, in which two or more websites have the same features as used
by the adversary’s classifier. The key idea is that the traces that result from
half-duplex communication can be transformed to create a collision with less
padding than it would with full-duplex traces. W-T provides strong security
guarantees with 31% bandwidth overhead and 34% latency overhead.
Despite the low cost of these two defenses, their evaluations have shown
that each defense can significantly reduce the accuracy of the attacks to less
than 30%.
As of today, WTF-PAD and W-T are the main candidates to be implemented
in Tor. In this project, We will mainly use them to perform evaluations as
they are the main candidates to be deployed in Tor.

2.5

Deep Learning

In our work, we first study on two deep learning techniques that previous work
have shown to be promising for WF attacks.
Stacked Denoising Autoencoders (SDAE)
Vincent et al. [52] proposed SDAEs in 2010 to improve classification performance in recognizing visual data. SDAE leverages the concept of an autoencoder (AE), a simple 3-layer neural network including input, hidden and
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Figure 2.4: Denoising autoencoder (DAE)
output layers. In AE, the input data is first encoded, passing it through a layer
of neurons to a more condensed representation (the hidden layer). The AE
then performs decoding, in which it attempts to reconstruct the original input
from the hidden layer while minimizing error as demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
A Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) then uses the basic concept of AE but
also adds noise (corruption) to the input. Figure 2.4 shows how the DAE
architecture is applied. Given input x, noise qD is added to create x 0 . The AE
then maps x0 to y (via encoder fθ ) and attempts to reconstruct x via decoder
gθ0 , producing reconstruction z (denoising) while optimizing error measured
by loss LH (x, z ). These processes allow the DAE to generalize well and allow
us to make predictions in the future on data the model has never seen. The
DAE tries to reconstruct the original values from the noisy inputs, which helps
it to better generalize and thus handle a wider variety of inputs after training.
SDAE combines (stacks) multiple DAEs by overlapping a hidden layer as an
input of the next DAE.
Vincent et al. showed that SDAE achieves lower classification error rates
for image classification compared to SVM, Deep Belief Networks (DBN), and
Stacked Autoencoders (SAE) [52].
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
CNNs have become the gold standard in image classification after Krizhevsky
et al. won the Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) in 2012 [29].
Schuster et al. recently proposed applying a CNN on encrypted video streams,
and they show that the encrypted stream could be uniquely characterized by
their burst patterns with high accuracy [42]. This suggests that CNNs could
be useful for WF attacks as well. Figure 2.5 shows the basic architecture of
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Classification

Fully Connected Layers

Figure 2.5: A basic architecture of convolutional neural networks (CNN)
a CNN [29, 31]. The architecture consists of two major components: Feature
Extraction and Classification.
In Feature Extraction, the input is first fed into a convolutional layer, which
comprises a set of filters. Each region of input is convolved with each filter,
essentially by taking the dot product of the two vectors, to get an intermediate
set of values. These values are input to an activation function – this is similar
to neurons being activated based on whether or not the filtered input has
certain features. Having more filters means being able to extract more features
from the input. The output of the activation function is then fed into a pooling
layer.
The pooling layer progressively reduces the spatial size of the representation from the feature map to reduce the number of parameters and amount
of computation. The most common approach used in pooling is Max Pooling,
which simply selects the maximum value in a spatial neighborhood within a
particular region of the feature map to be a representation of the data. This
has the advantage of being invariant to small transformations, distortions and
translations in the input, since the largest signals in each neighborhood are
retained.
The final part of the feature extraction component (Optimized techniques
in Figure 2.5) mainly consists of a stochastic dropout function and Batch Normalization that help improve classifier performance and prevent overfitting.
The CNN then passes the output from the convolutional and pooling layers, which represents high-level features of the input, into the Classification
component. In this component, a set of fully-connected layers uses the features to classify the input. During training, the loss value of classification
is applied to not only update weights in the classification component, but
also the filters’ values in the feature extraction. To estimate the loss value,
we use categorical cross-entropy, which is suitable for multi-class classification
problems especially in WF applications.
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Website Fingerprinting using Deep Learning

Many applications have adopted deep learning (DL) to solve complex problems
such as speech recognition, visual object recognition, and object detection in
images [30]. DL does not require selecting and fine-tuning features by hand.
In the WF domain, there are four works that have begun to examine the use
of DL.
Abe and Goto studied the application of Stacked Denoising Autoencoders
(SDAE) [4] to WF attacks. They showed that SDAE is effective with 88%
accuracy in the closed world and 86% TPR and 2% FPR in the open world.
Although most work in deep learning recommends large data sets be used,
their work was successful with only a small dataset.
Rimmer et al. proposed to apply DL for automated feature extraction in
WF attacks [40]. The results show that the adversary can use DL to automate
the feature engineering process to effectively create WF classifiers. Thus, it
can eliminate the need for feature design and selection. In the closed-world
scenario, their CNN-based attack (which we refer to as Automated Website
Fingerprinting, or AWF) trained on 2,500 traces per website could achieve
96.3% accuracy. In their open-world evaluation, SDAE performs the best
of their models with 71.3% TPR and 3.4% FPR when optimizing for low
FPR. However, AWF could not outperform state-of-the-art WF attacks such
as CUMUL.
Recently, Bhat et al. [6] and Oh et al. [34] have released preliminary reports on their explorations of a CNN variant and unsupervised DNNs with autoencoders, respectively. While both papers include interesting contributions,
neither paper reports accuracy rates as high as those shown in our results.
Additionally, neither attack was shown to be effective against WTF-PAD.
For our dissertation, we aim to investigate RQ1 and RQ2 by bridging
this gap by developing a powerful CNN-based deep learning model called deep
fingerprinting (DF) that can substantially outperform all previous state-of-the
art WF attacks. The DF model uses a more sophisticated variant of CNN than
AWF, with more convolutional layers, better protections against overfitting,
hyperparameters that vary with the depth of each layer, activation functions
tailored to our input format, and a two-layer fully connected classification
network. These differences in the architectural model from AWF, which are
described in more detail in Chapter 3, lead to a deeper and more effective
network. We show that the DF model works significantly better than AWF and
all other attacks, particularly against WF defenses and in the more realistic
open-world setting.
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Attack Performance Metrics

In this section, we define and justify the metrics we have used to evaluate the
success of the attacks. There are two scenarios under which WF attacks are
evaluated: closed-world and open-world.

2.7.1

Closed-world Evaluation

In the closed-world scenario, we assume that the user is limited to visiting a
fixed set of websites, and the attacker knows this set and can train his classifier
on it. In this scenario, the success of the attacker is simply measured as the
ratio of the number of correctly classified traces to the total number of traces,
we call this ratio the attack’s accuracy.

Accuracy =

Pcorrect
N

(2.1)

Pcorrect is the total number of correct predictions. A correct prediction
is defined as the output of the classifier matching the label of the website to
which the test trace belongs. N is the total number of instances in the test
set.

2.7.2

Open-world Evaluation

In the open-world scenario, the user may visit any of a large number of websites. Since the attacker cannot effectively train on so many websites, he
selects a relatively small set to train his classifier on (the monitored set). For
experimentation, we model the rest of the Web using a set of websites that
the attacker does not try to identify with WF (the unmonitored set). Note
that the unmonitored set is more larger than the monitored set in our experiments. The main purpose of this evaluation is to examine the capability of
the WF classifier in recognizing a few monitored websites out of a large set of
unmonitored websites, we measure Precision and Recall in this scenario.

P recision =

Recall =
Where:

TP
TP + FP

TP
TP + FN

(2.2)

(2.3)
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• T P is the total number of test samples of monitored websites that are
correctly classified as monitored websites.
• T N is the total number of test samples of unmonitored websites that are
correctly classified as unmonitored websites.
• F P is the total number of test samples of unmonitored websites that are
misclassified as monitored websites.
• F N is the total number of monitored websites that are misclassified as
unmonitored websites.
In addition, the attacker can measure precision and recall to tune the
system. If his primary goal is to reliably determine that a user has visited a
particular monitored website, one can try to decrease false positives at the cost
of true positives and thus increase the precision of the attack. On the other
hand, if the attacker aims to cast a wide net and identify potential visitors to
the monitored web websites, then recall is more important, and the adversary
should tune the system to increase true positives at the cost of additional false
positives.

Chapter 3

Website Fingerprinting
Attacks
“Victory usually goes to the army who has better trained officers
and men.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In this chapter, we aim to answer the RQ1 and RQ2 by presenting our
work that has been done in three stages. The first stage describes the dataset
preparation that was used in the experiments to ensure the validity and ethical consideration in our research. The second stage presents the experimental
evaluations and their results including the design of our newly-proposed WF
attack using deep learning (DL) and the evaluation of website fingerprinting (WF) attacks using DL in comparison to the current state-of-the-art WF
attacks. The evaluation was also extensively performed to measure the effectiveness of WF attacks using DL in more realistic assumption including WF
attacks against a defended dataset and in an open-world setting.
Moreover, we propose the novel state-of-the-art WF attack and its design
called the Deep Fingerprinting Model (DF) attack that can significantly outperform the current state-of-the-art WF attacks. Finally, the third stage provides a discussion and conclusion to demonstrate interesting viewpoints and
observation obtaining from our research and also the answers to our RQ1 and
RQ2. The discussion part constitutes what we are interested in investigating
for RQ3 and RQ4.
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Data Collection

For the closed-world dataset, we visited the homepage of each of the top
Alexa 100 websites 1,250 times and dumped the traffic generated by each visit
separately using tcpdump. We used ten low-end machines in our university’s
campus to collect the data. We have followed prior work’s methodology for
data collection [25, 55]; on each machine, the visits were sequential and were
ordered according to Wang and Goldberg’s batched methodology to control
for long- and short-term time variance [55]. More specifically, we split the
visits to each website in five chunks, so that the websites are accessed in a
round-robin fashion: in each batch we access each website 25 times. As a
result of batching, the visits to a website are spread over time. The rationale
for this is twofold: i) to avoid having our IP addresses banned by the web
servers; and, ii) to capture variants of the websites over time for more robust
training and testing.
We used tor-browser-crawler [25] to drive the Tor Browser to visit websites. This allows for more realistic crawls than using tools like wget or curl
because the setting resembles a real user browsing the Web with Tor. We acknowledge that to be more realistic, our crawler should model user browsing
behavior when crawling websites. However, modeling user behavior in Tor is
challenging, as user statistics are not collected for privacy reasons. Virtually
all existing datasets collected for WF follow the same simplistic user model
we use in this study.
After the crawls were finished, we discarded corrupted traffic traces. For
instance, we removed traces that did not have any incoming or outgoing packets or were too short – less than 50 packets. After removing corrupted traces,
we only kept the websites, or classes, that had at least 1,000 visits. We ended
having 95 websites with 1,000 visits for our closed-world evaluations. We refer
to the set of the data used for closed-world evaluations as the closed-world
dataset.

3.1.1

Open-world dataset.

For the open-world dataset, we visited the websites from Alexa’s top 50,000,
excluding the first 100 websites used to build the closed-world dataset. We
used the same ten machines to collect the data, where each machine collected
the data for 5,000 different websites sequentially. We visited each open-world
website only once and took a screenshot of their homepages. After collecting
the data, we discarded corrupted visits the same way we did for the closedworld dataset. During the crawling of the open-world, we found websites
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Table 3.1: Summary of the dataset used in the experiments
Closed-world data

Dataset

Sites

Instance(s)/site

Sites

Instance(s)/site

95

1,000

40,716

1

WTF-PAD

95

1,000

40,716

1

Walkie-Talkie (W-T)

100

900

40,000

1

Non-Defended
Defended

Open-world data

returning an access denied error message, a timeout error, or a blank page.
Moreover, many of the websites were behind Cloudflare’s CDN, which presents
a CAPTCHA to connections coming from Tor exit relays. We removed those
websites from our dataset by comparing their homepage’s screenshot with each
of: a blank page, an access denied page, a CAPTCHA page, and a timeout
error page. The final dataset has a total of 40,716 traffic traces.

3.1.2

Defended dataset.

To evaluate the defenses, we produced datasets with traces defended by each
defense: for BuFLO, Tamaraw and WTF-PAD, we generate the defended
traces by padding them according to the defense protocols, using the scripts
and simulators provided by the authors [7, 15, 26]. Walkie-Talkie (W-T), however, cannot be completely simulated, as half-duplex communication is hard
to model. We thus performed a new crawl with a Tor Browser in half-duplex
mode. Since the implementation of half-duplex for the original implementation
of W-T was done in an outdated version of the Tor Browser, we had to implement half-duplex in the latest version of Tor Browser at the time of our crawls
(Tor Browser Bundle version 7.0.6). With this modified Tor Browser, we collected closed- and open-world datasets of size similar to the undefended ones.
W-T also requires padding the bursts in the half-duplex traces. To that end,
we followed the mold-padding strategy as described in the W-T paper [57].
Finally, we end up with 90,000 closed-world dataset and 40,000 open-world
dataset for W-T traffic traces which is significantly larger than the original
dataset proposed by Wang et al. [57].
The summary of the dataset used in this section is described in Table 3.1.
Note that some of the dataset will be later used for further evaluation for RQ3
and RQ4.

CHAPTER 3. WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS

3.2

26

Experimental Evaluation

In this section, we first describe how we implement WF attacks using DL and
define data representation to formulate the data input used for training and
testing models. Then, we provide the process of creating our newly-proposed
DF attack and intuitive explanations on each selected model’s architecture and
hyperparameters used in the model. Finally, we comprehensively evaluate the
performance our DF attack to other state-of-the-art WF attacks in closedworld and more realistic open-world scenarios against both non-defended and
defended datasets.

3.2.1

Implementation

Our implementation of the DF model uses the Python deep learning libraries
Keras as the front-end and Tensorflow as the back-end [2]. The source
code of implementations is now publicly available in https://github.com/
deep-fingerprinting/df.
Data Representation
In WF, a website trace is represented as a sequence of tuples <timestamp,
±packet size>, where the sign of packet size indicates the direction of the
packet: positive means outgoing and, negative, incoming.
Prior work in WF has shown that the most important features are derived
from the lengths of traces in each direction [20, 54]. Wang et al. [54] simplified the raw traffic traces into a sequence of values from [−1, +1], where they
ignored packet size and timestamps and only take the traffic direction of each
packet. However, we performed preliminary evaluations to compare the WF
attack performance between using packet lengths and without packet lengths,
i.e., only packet direction, as feature representations. Our result showed that
using packet lengths does not provide a noticeable improvement in the accuracy of the attack. Therefore, we follow Wang et al.’s methodology and
consider only the direction of the packets.
SDAE, DF and AWF require the input to have a fixed length. In order
to find the input length that performs best, we parameterized it and explored
the range [500, 7, 000], which contains most of the length distribution in our
data. Our results show that 5,000 cells provide the best results in terms of
classification accuracy. In practice, most of the traces are either longer or
shorter than that. We padded shorter traces by appending zeros to them and
truncated longer traces after 5,000 cells. Out of 95,000 traces in the closed-
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world dataset, only 8,121 were longer than 5,000 cells and had to be truncated,
while the rest were padded.
SDAE
We reproduced Abe and Goto’s results [4], as described in Chapter 2. Following guidance from the authors, we successfully re-implemented their SDAE
neural network on the same architecture and dataset they used. We achieved
89% accuracy, a slightly higher accuracy than the one Abe and Goto reported
in their paper. We believe that using different Python DL modules (Kera and
Tensorflow ) and randomly initializing the weights accounts for this difference.
Furthermore, we slightly changed their SDAE model’s hyperparameters to
improve its performance in our experiments.
AWF
Rimmer et al. provided us with their source code to re-produce their results.
We strictly followed their proposed hyperparameters and evaluate the model
in our dataset to make a fair comparison for our model and the previous stateof-the-art WF attacks. Although we used smaller open worlds than previous
works, we evaluated all attacks and defenses under the same conditions, which
allows us to compare among them.
DF
To develop our DF model to effectively perform WF attacks on both nondefended and defended dataset, we have followed techniques in the deep learning literature [27, 29, 49] to improve the performance of the model, such as
using the appropriate number of convolutional layers, mitigation and prevention of overfitting [46] and a suitable activation function for our WF input
data [33]. These studies helped us design the sophisticate architecture and
tune our model’s hyperparameters that best fit for WF.
We adapted the base CNN model of DF to our needs, as there are important differences between traffic analysis and traditional applications of CNNbased models such as image recognition. For example, standard activation
functions such as sigmoid and rectified linear unit (ReLU) do not activate on
negative values and thus will not use the information conveyed by the sign of
the input (i.e., cell direction). Activation functions that can handle negative
inputs include tanh, leaky ReLU (LReLU), parametrized ReLU (PReLU) and
Exponential Linear Unit (ELU). Prior work has shown that ELU provides fast
and accurate classification [13, 33]. We compared ELU with other activation
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functions during hyperparameter tuning and it performed the best among all
the functions we tested (see Section 3.2.2). Although the traditional tanh function can also handle negative inputs, it is vulnerable to the vanishing gradient
issue [5], which slows down optimization.
Another difference between traffic and image data is that images are twodimensional, whereas our data is a vector. This means that filter and pool sizes
cannot be two-dimensional (e.g., 2x4) but have to be cast to one dimension
(e.g., 1x4).

3.2.2

DF’s Hyperparameter Tuning

A fundamental process in supervised classification is to tune the hyperparameters of the classification model, such as the kernel used in an SVM or the
number of hidden layers in a CNN. This process involves adjusting the tradeoff between variance, bias and classification performance, so that the model
fits the training data while still generalizing to samples that it has not been
trained on. For DF, however, the large amount of training data and the large
number of hyperparameters the model has render an exhaustive search prohibitive in terms of computational resources. To demonstrate our attacks, we
thus only aim at a good-enough classifier and we acknowledge that someone
with more resources might be able to optimize our model further.
To select the hyperparameters for our models, we perform an extensive
search through the hyperparameter space, in which we build each layer of
the deep learning model block by block. In each building block, we vary the
hyperparameters to estimate the gradient of the parameter and determine
whether we must increase or decrease its value. Once this process is done, we
select the best top-n parameters and use them as the initial parameters for
the optimization in the next block. When all layers are set, we select the best
combination of hyperparameters.
By the transferability property of neural networks [59], WF attacks based
on other models can use the values we found for the DF hyperparamters to
bootstrap the hyperparameters of their model. We thus used the transferability property to find the parameters for the defended datasets from the
hyperparameters found using the undefended dataset. We only needed to
slightly adjust some hyperparameters to optimize our model, significantly reducing the time spent in hyperparameter tuning. We thoroughly illustrate
and explain our design of DF model in Appendix A. The search space as well
as the final selected values are shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Hyperparameters selection for the DF model from the extensive
candidates search method
Hyperparameters

Search Range

Final

Input Dimension

[500 ... 7000]
[Adam, Adamax,
RMSProp, SGD]
[0.001 ... 0.01]
[10 ... 50]
[16 ... 256]
[2 ... 16]
[Tanh, ReLU, ELU]

5000

0.002
30
128
[8, 8, 4]
ELU, ReLU

[8 ... 64]
[32 ... 128]
[64 ... 256]
[128 ... 512]
[Average, Max]
[1 ... 4]
[256 ... 2048]
[0.1 .. 0.8]

[32, 32]
[64, 64]
[128, 128]
[256, 256]
Max
2
[512, 512]
[0.1, 0.7, 0.5]

Optimizer
Learning Rate
Training Epochs
Mini-batch Size
[Filter, Pool, Stride] Sizes
Activation Functions
Number of Filters
Block 1 [Conv1, Conv2]
Block 2 [Conv3, Conv4]
Block 3 [Conv5, Conv6]
Block 4 [Conv7, Conv8]
Pooling Layers
Number of FC Layers
Hidden units (each FCs)
Dropout [Pooling, FC1, FC2]

Adamax

Evaluating Overfitting
Even though deep neural networks (DNNs) are a powerful supervised classification model, they are, as with as most machine learning models, vulnerable
to overfitting. Overfitting occurs when the model errs on samples that it has
not been trained on, meaning that the model cannot generalize. For small
datasets, overfitting can be measured with cross-validation techniques. For
large datasets like ours, however, we can just split the data into three mutually exclusive sets: training, validation and testing, with a ratio of 8:1:1. We
then measure the difference in error rate between different sets. In case of
overfitting, the model would achieve a substantially higher accuracy on the
training set than on the testing set.
During the training of our DF model, we applied Dropout [46] and Batch
Normalization (BN) [24] to prevent overfitting. These are regularization techniques that loosen the model and allow for greater generalization. In dropout,
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the model randomly selects hidden units, including their incoming and outgoing connections, and temporarily removed them from the network while training. BN normalizes the fully-connected and convolutional layers’ outputs and
helps accelerate learning while also reducing overfitting. Moreover, we analyze
the error rates between training and testing datasets during hyperparameter
tuning to ensure that our model is not overfitting.
Figure 3.2 depicts the training and testing error rates. The difference
between training and testing error of the DF model is less than 2%, suggesting
that overfitting is unlikely.

3.2.3

Differences Between DF and AWF

We now explain the significant differences of the DF model compared to the
AWF model proposed by Rimmer et al. [40] that help explain the superior
performance of DF.
Basic Block Design.
The basic block is the group of convolutional layer(s), max pooling layer, filters
and activation layer(s) that perform feature extraction in a CNN. Generally,
the basic block is repeatedly appended to create deeper networks.
We observe that the AWF model is similar to Imagenet [29], one of the
earliest CNN models proposed in 2012. The basic block of this model only
contains one convolutional layer followed by one max pooling layer as shown
in Figure 3.1(a). In contrast, our DF model is inspired by modern large image
classification networks such as VGG [27], GoogleNet [49] and ResNet [21] that
apply at least two consecutive convolutional layers before a max pooling layer
as shown in Figure 3.1(b). Max pooling typically reduces the data to a smaller
size, so it is not possible to have deeper networks when pooling after every
convolutional layer. Adding more convolutional layers in each basic block
thus enables more convolutional layers in total and a deeper network with
more effective feature extraction.
Overfitting Concerns.
Rimmer et al. criticized the CNN model for having a higher risk of overfitting
which was shown in their experimental results. We argue that a more carefully
crafted model can mitigate overfitting. The AWF model includes a dropout
layer before the first basic block as shown in Figure 3.1(a). While dropout
is a common technique to help prevent overfitting, this placement is atypical
in CNN designs, as it may result in the loss of meaningful features extracted
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Figure 3.1: Comparison between AWF and DF models
from the input and may not be sufficient to prevent overfitting. In DF, we
used overfitting-contention mechanisms that are applied in the state-of-the-art
CNN networks for computer vision, including a batch normalization (BN) layer
that is added right after each convolutional layer and a dropout layer after the
activation function, as explained in Section 3.2.2. With these mechanisms, the
DF model shows no evidence of overfitting in our experiments.
Varying Hyperparameters
In the AWF model, the value of some hyperparameters are fixed such as using
32 filters in every convolutional layer. Using a fixed number of filters over
all the layers reduces the capability of the model to learn. In contrast, the
DF model follows the state-of-the-art in computer vision by varying hyperparameter values for different layers [27]. For example, we increase the number
of filters as we get deeper in the network. The intuition behind varying the
values is that the CNN uses hierarchical features in its processing pipeline.
The features in lower layers (close to the input) are primitive, like edge detection, while features in upper layers are high-level abstract features, like
object detection, made from combinations of lower-level features. We increase
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the number of filters at higher layers to improve the ability to encode richer
representations.
Activation Function.
The AWF model only uses the ReLU activation function. ReLU is popular
in CNNs, but it maps all negative values to zero. Our input formats include
negative values that represent incoming packets, so using ReLU in convolutional layers close the input can substantially reduce the information available
to deeper layers in the model. In the DF model, the activation function in the
first basic block is ELU, which can learn a data representation containing negative values to ensure that the model can learn all meaningful representations
from the input.
Fully-connected Layers.
The AWF model directly connects the last max pooling layer to the prediction
layer, a densely connected layer with an output size equal to number of classes.
In more recent CNNs, there are a set of fully connected (FC) layers that
follow the convolutional layers and precede the prediction layer. The FC
layers play an important role in the learning and classification processes of the
model. Essentially, the convolutional layers perform feature extraction, but
that means that it is important to carefully design the classifier that uses the
extracted features, which is the role of the FC layer. In the DF model, we
add two FC layers with the combination of BN and dropout to prevent the
overfitting that normally occurs in FC layers.
Overall, our DF model was specifically designed to effectively perform WF
attacks by leveraging the state-of-the-art techniques from computer vision
research. We provide a thorough explanation on how the DF model was developed and a visualization of the DF model in Appendix A to allow other
researchers to gain better understanding and reproduce our work. Our experimental results confirm that DF performs better than AWF model in defended
and non-defended and on both closed-world and more realistic open-world
scenarios. These results help to illustrate the impact of the DL architecture
design on the performance of the attacks.

3.2.4

Closed-world Evaluation on Non-defended Dataset

We evaluate the performance of the DF attack in the closed-world scenario
on the non-defended dataset, which comprises website traces from the closedworld dataset with no WF defenses in place. Moreover, we compare DF model
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Table 3.3: Closed World: Accuracy on the non-defended dataset for state-ofthe-art attacks.
Classifier
Accuracy

SDAE
92.3%

DF
98.3%

AWF
94.9%

k-NN
95.0%

CUMUL k-FP
97.3%
95.5%

with the state-of-the-art WF attacks: k-NN, CUMUL, k-FP, AWF, and SDAE.
We re-evaluate these attacks on our non-defended dataset and apply k-fold
cross-validation for training their classifiers and testing their performance, as
was done in the papers presenting these attacks [20, 35, 54].
Table 3.3 shows the accuracy results. Our DF model attains 98.3% accuracy, which is better than the other attacks and higher than any previously
reported result for a WF attack in Tor. Our DF model performs better than
AWF. Our results for AWF (94.9%) are a bit lower than the reported results
by Rimmer et al. (96.5%), we believe this is due to the larger dataset used
by them. We observe that CUMUL, k-FP, k-NN and SDAE benefit from the
larger training data set with 2-4% higher accuracies than previously reported
results that used smaller datasets (usually 90 training instances). SDAE was
not as accurate as the other attacks.
Additionally, we investigate how fast the model can learn to distinguish
patterns from the input data, also known as convergence of the model. This
depends on many factors such as the method used for data pre-processing,
the DL architecture and the hyperparameters used to create the model. This
evaluation helps to validate the quality of our hyperparameter tuning method.
Moreover, the attacker can use this to estimate the number of training epochs,
rounds of feeding training data into the classifier, required for the classifier to
reach the expected level of accuracy. Normally, the classifier gradually learns
better with more training epochs. Figure 3.2 shows that with only 10 training
epochs, DF can reach testing accuracy of about 97%, DF consistently improves
with more training epochs, until accuracy levels off after 30 epochs.
Finally, we investigate the impact of dataset size on classifier accuracy.
The results shown in Figure 3.3 indicate that DF and CUMUL consistently
outperform the other attacks for all training sizes. With just 50 traces per
website, both DF and CUMUL achieve 90% accuracy. k-NN, k-FP and AWF
require 250 traces to reach this accuracy, and SDAE requires 750 traces. The
observed accuracies mostly saturate after 550 traces, except for SDAE. The
results show that the various techniques used in the DF model lead to significantly better performance compared to the simpler AWF model.
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Figure 3.2: Closed World: Impact of the number of training epochs on the DF
model’s accuracy and error rate

100

Accuracy

90

80

DF
CUMUL
k-NN
k-FP
AWF
SDAE

70

60

0

200

400
600
Training Size

800

Figure 3.3: Closed World: Impact of numbers of training traces on classification accuracy
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Training Cost

We now examine the training time for WF attacks using DL in comparison to
state-of-the-art WF attacks. We found that with GPU acceleration by using
NVIDIA GTX 1070 with 8 GB of GPU Memory, SDAE required 16 minutes
for training (13 minutes for pre-training and 3 minutes for fine-tuning processes), DF required 64 minutes for 30-epoch training. The relatively simpler
AWF model requires 4 minutes for 30-epoch training. Without a GPU, SDAE
required 96 minutes, DF required approximately 10 hours, and AWF required
1 hour. For training the other attacks, we found it required 12.5 hours for
k-NN, 57 hours for CUMUL (parallelized with 4 processes), and 1 hour for kFP. Overall, SDAE, DF and AWF have reasonable training times, particularly
when using a GPU.

3.2.6

Closed-world Evaluation on the Defended Dataset

We next examine the performance of WF attacks against Tor traffic with
defenses in the closed-world scenario. It is important to note that the attacker
needs to train the classifiers with defended datasets to perform this attack.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several WF defenses have been proposed that
they can reduce the accuracy of state-of-the-art WF attacks to less than 50%.
Notably, WTF-PAD and W-T offer both effective protection and reasonable
overheads, such that they are realistic for adoption in Tor. With our larger
dataset, we conduct an evaluation on SDAE, DF, AWF and prior attacks
against these defenses, as well as BuFLO and Tamaraw.
Table 3.4 shows the overheads of each defense and the accuracy of the attacks against defended datasets. BuFLO and Tamaraw, the two high-overhead
defenses, hold up well with less than 17% accuracy. The attacks also manage
at most 49.70% accuracy against W-T due to symmetric collisions.
A surprising result is that DF achieves over 90% accuracy against WTFPAD. Our tests of WTF-PAD showed 64% overhead, which means that there
was more padding on average than in the Juarez et al.’s study [26], and yet
the attack was successful. More generally, it seems that the larger amount of
traces per website compared to the original WTF-PAD evaluation has played a
role in the higher accuracy attained by the attack. For example, k-FP achieved
nearly 69% accuracy in our experiment, whereas Hayes and Danezis tested kFP against their own implementation of adaptive padding and obtained 30%
accuracy [20].
DF significantly outperforms AWF on the dataset protected by WTFPAD, with a much larger gap in performance than observed on the undefended
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Table 3.4: Accuracy in a closed-world scenario on defended datasets, SDAE,
DF, and AWF vs. the state-of-art WF attacks
Defenses

Overhead

Accuracy of WF attacks

Bandwidth

Latency

SDAE

DF

AWF

k-NN

CUMUL

k-FP

BuFLO

246%

137%

9.2%

12.6%

11.7%

10.4%

13.5%

13.1%

Tamaraw

328%

242%

11.8%

11.8%

12.9%

9.7%

16.8%

11.0%

WTF-PAD

64%

0%

36.9%

90.7%

60.8%

16.0%

60.3%

69.0%

Walkie-Talkie

31%

34%

23.1%

49.7%

45.8%

20.2%

38.4%

7.0%

dataset. We believe that the deeper network is able to better extract useful
features in the WTF-PAD data that the AWF model is unable to find, leading
to this result. The model architecture in DF plays a key role in its flexibility
to generalize to defended traffic.
We note that the overheads for BuFLO and Tamaraw are higher than
reported in prior work at 240% and 328% bandwidth overheads, respectively.
Furthermore, we found that the larger the dataset, the greater the packet
timing variance is, which is fundamental to determine the padding rate. Also,
Tamaraw has higher overheads than BuFLO, which contradicts the purposed
intended with its design and the overheads reported in previous evaluations.
The cause of this is a greater amount of padding after the transmission has
finished in Tamaraw compared to BuFLO. BuFLO stops padding immediately
after the transmission has finished, as long as the transmission has lasted for
longer than ten seconds, which is the case for most of the traces in our dataset.
With such heavy overheads, BuFLO and Tamaraw are not practical to
deploy as a WF defense in Tor. WTF-PAD and W-T have lower overheads, and
Tor Project developers have already shown an interest in deploying adaptive
padding as a possible defense [38, 39]. We thus select WTF-PAD and W-T for
our open-world evaluation.

3.2.7

Open-world Evaluation

We now evaluate the performance of the attack in the more realistic open-world
setting. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the open-world scenario, the adversary
not only classifies traffic traces based on a limited set of monitored websites,
but he must also distinguish whether the trace comes from a monitored website
or an unmonitored one.
In our evaluation, we assess the performance of classifiers in the openworld scenario on each model by showing true positive rate (TPR) and false
positive rate (FPR), but also with precision and recall curves, recommended
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in the WF literature [26, 35] as more appropriate metrics for the open-world
evaluation than TPR and FPR. The sizes of the monitored and unmonitored
sets are heavily unbalanced, so using only TPR and FPR can lead to incorrect
interpretation due to the base-rate fallacy. We also provide ROC curves in
Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
Standard Model.
In previous studies on WF in the open-world setting [20, 35, 54], it has been
assumed that if the attacker included unmonitored traces when training the
classifier, it could help the classifier better distinguish between monitored and
unmonitored traces. This assumption is also common in machine learning, and
we thus call it the Standard model. Fundamentally, the process of training
and creating datasets used during open-world evaluation is the same as in
the closed-world scenario, except that we additionally train on unmonitored
websites traces as another class. To investigate the impact of more training
data on the performance of the classifiers in the open-world scenario, we train
the classifier with different portions of the unmonitored dataset.
In our open-world evaluation, we use the prediction probability to classify
the input traces. In particular, if the input trace is a monitored website trace
and the maximum output probability belongs to any monitored website and
is greater than a threshold, we consider this as a true positive. We used
different thresholds for different WF attacks. We selected the thresholds for
each WF attack such that they have high TPR and low FPR. Figure B.1
shows examples of ROC curves for WF attacks against Non-defended, WTFPAD, and W-T datasets. Following the experimental procedures of Rimmer et
al. [40] and Panchenko et al. [35], we focus on the binary results of whether the
input trace is classified as monitored (predicted to be in any of the monitored
classes) or unmonitored. Note that if the trace is determined to be monitored,
the attacker can then use the multi-class classification to predict which website
the user has actually visited.
k-NN and k-FP attacks use the k-nearest neighbors algorithm in their predictions and do not output the probability of predictions. For these attacks,
we consider the prediction probability of a website as the fraction of the nearest neighbors belonging to that website among the k nearest neighbors. We
explored the performance of these attacks as the value of k varies from 2 to 10.
We found that above k = 5, the TPR and FPR do not change significantly.
For our open-world evaluation, we used k = 6 in both k-NN and k-FP.
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Figure 3.4: Open World: The impact of the amount of unmonitored training
data on TPR and FPR (Non-defended dataset).
Results
We first evaluate efficacy of our WF attack in the Standard model as amounts
of unmonitored training data varies and compare it with other state-of-theart WF attacks on the non-defended traces. Our training set in this experiment contains 85,500 monitored traces (900 instances for each of 95 monitored websites) and we varied the number of unmonitored websites from 900
to 20,000 websites (one instance for each). Our testing set includes 9500 monitored traces (100 instances for 95 monitored websites) and 20,000 unmonitored
traces (one instance for 20,000 unmonitored websites). Note that the 20,000
unmonitored websites in the testing are different from those in the training.
As shown in Figures 3.4a and 3.4b, the TPR tends to slightly decrease
with the reduction of FPR as the size of unmonitored training data increase
for all the WF attacks. The results show that the DF model consistently
performs best on both TPR and FPR, with 0.957 TPR and 0.007 FPR for
20,000 unmonitored training websites. k-NN has the lowest TPR and k-FP
has the highest FPR. The DF, CUMUL and AWF have the same FPR trend
as the training size increases, but DF has higher TPR than CUMUL and AWF
over all the training sizes.
Our results show that as we increase the size of the unmonitored class in the
training, the FPR drops and it reaches its lowest amount at size 20,000. In the
next experiment, we fix the number of training samples for the unmonitored
class to 20,000 and we evaluate the diagnostic ability of WF attacks as the
discrimination threshold is varied. We next perform the experiment on our
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non-defended, WTF-PAD and W-T datasets. As mentioned in Section 3.1,
for W-T, we cannot use the same dataset to W-T traces as it required to
be directly captured from half-duplex connections from Tor browser. Our
training set for the W-T evaluation contains 91,000 monitored traces (910
instances for each of 100 monitored websites) and we varied the number of
unmonitored websites from 900 to 20,000 websites (one instance for each).
Our testing set includes 9,000 traces (90 instances for each of 100 monitored
websites) and 20,000 unmonitored traces (one instance for 20,000 unmonitored
websites). In the following open-world experiments, we mainly focus on the
precision and recall to avoid the base-rate fallacy as mentioned above.
Figure 3.5 shows the precision-recall curves for WF attacks in our nondefended, WTF-PAD and W-T datasets. Precision-recall curves are used to
represent the performance of the classifier as an alternative to ROC curves
in imbalanced datasets. Imbalanced datasets have an impact on precision,
an important metric to measure performance, however, ROC curves do not
take precision into account. This choice is specially relevant in the open-world
evaluation, as the size of the monitored set is typically orders of magnitude
smaller than the unmonitored set and as such it should be represented in our
testing set, thus leading to an imbalance [26].
As we see in the figure, the DF attack outperforms the other state-of-theart WF attacks in all three cases. In the non-defended dataset, it is highly
effective for any threshold. The CUMUL and AWF attacks in Figure 3.5a have
high precision but a very wide range of recall, which means the attacks miss
many monitored visits. For traffic defended by WTF-PAD, Figure 3.5b shows
a reduction of both precision and recall for all WF attacks. The DF attacker
does the best. Tuned for high precision, it achieves precision of 0.96 and
recall of 0.68. Tuned for high recall, it reaches 0.67 precision and 0.96 recall.
All the other WF attacks get close to the baseline (random guessing) as the
threshold decreases. The result shows that the otherwise robust WTF-PAD
is significantly undermined by the DF attack.
Figure 3.5c shows the precision-recall curves for the W-T dataset. The
attacks all perform quite poorly, with all except the DF attack close to the
baseline. The DF attack does moderately better but still has a precision of
less than 0.36 in all cases.
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A Deeper Look at W-T

Top-N prediction for closed-world W-T
Wang and Goldberg explain that any attack using the main features of the
state-of-the-art attacks can get at most 50% accuracy against W-T [57]. In our
closed-world results, the DF attack nearly reached this theoretical maximum.
We now examine prediction probability for DF against W-T. We consider
top-N prediction, in which we look at not only the highest probability (Top1 prediction), but also the top-N probability values. Surprisingly, we only
need to look at the case of N = 2. Top-2 prediction accuracy reaches 98.44%
accuracy. This likely means that DF is correctly selecting the real website and
the decoy website and, as expected, having to guess randomly between them.
We discuss the importance of this result in Section 3.3.
Asymmetric Collision (Closed-World)
W-T requires that the client create symmetric collisions between pairs of websites (website A is molded with website B and vice versa). Since this requires
storing all the pairs, a simpler implementation would ignore this requirement
and have the client random select the decoy website for each access, resulting
in asymmetric collisions. In this setting, the DF attack is much more accurate at 87.2%, compared to 49.7% with symmetric collisions. This shows the
importance of creating symmetric collisions in W-T.
Asymmetric Collision (Open-World)
We next evaluate the scenario that 10% of the users do not follow the W-T
guidelines, in that they visit a non-sensitive website and choose a non-sensitive
website as a decoy instead of a sensitive one, and when they visit a sensitive
website they choose a sensitive website as a decoy instead of a non-sensitive
one. In this scenario, TPR is increased to 0.85 TPR, and FPR is significantly
reduced to 0.23 TPR, compared to the case that all users strictly follow the
procedure to create symmetric collisions which has 0.80 TPR and 0.76 FPR.
Thus, the major goal of W-T to create the confusion between sensitive websites
and non-sensitive websites could be undermined in some scenarios.

3.3

Discussion

The results of our study show that deep learning, and the DF approach in
particular, is a powerful tool for WF attacks against Tor. Further, our results
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against defended traffic show that WTF-PAD is potentially vulnerable against
deep-learning-based WF, with high precision even in the open-world setting.
Based on what we have observed during experimental evaluations, we now
discuss several new directions in both improving the attacks and exploring
designs for more effective defenses.
Improving Open-World Classification.
In our study, we observed that designing the CNN architecture and tuning
hyperarameters are specific to both the environment and input data. For example, the gap in performance between DF and AWF was much larger for the
open-world setting than the closed world. Additional exploration of models in
the open-world scenario, such as the depth and number of convolutional layers, different filter sizes, or different dropout parameters, may yield improved
results beyond what we have found so far. More training data may also help
the classifier better distinguish between monitored and unmonitored pages.
Our simple data format might be extended to include, for example, statistical
timing information that is currently excluded.
Finally, we note that the attacker can perform a targeted attack on users in
a semi-open-world setting, in which the targeted users can be profiled as likely
going to a subset of websites. For example, if the user is known to only read
one or two languages, then many websites in other languages can be eliminated
from the set. Alternatively, a user’s profile can help the attacker identify some
likely websites for her interests, such that the classification of statistically
similar monitored websites may be dismissed as likely false positives.
WTF-PAD.
As DF can break WTF-PAD with over 90% accuracy in the closed-world
setting, we now consider why the defense failed by examining the adaptive
padding algorithm at the heart of WTF-PAD. Adaptive padding aims to detect
large timing gaps between bursts and use padding to make these gaps less
distinctive. While Juarez et al. showed that this is effective against prior
WF attacks [26], DF can still detect patterns that remain after WTF-PAD is
applied. When used in analyzing images, CNN can detect an object (e.g. a
dog) anywhere in an image due to its use of convolutional layers with multiple
filters. Similarly, DF can detect any small region or portion of distinguishing
patterns, no matter where those patterns are located in the trace. Adaptive
padding only randomly disrupts some patterns in the trace, leaving other
patterns relatively unperturbed.
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Walkie-Talkie.
Walkie-Talkie (W-T) has an advantage over WTF-PAD, as it focuses directly
on features used in WF attacks, and it seeks explicitly to create collisions.
Indeed, W-T performed much better than WTF-PAD against DF, which would
seem to make it a strong candidate for Tor. We note, however, that there
are several downsides to deploying W-T that require further investigation to
overcome:
• It requires the directory server to collect and distribute to all clients
a database of website patterns that can be used to set the padding
patterns. The patterns need to be kept up to date to provide effective
plausible deniability.
• Changing from a full-duplex to a half-duplex communication adds to the
latency of fetching a website, 31% according to Wang and Goldberg [57],
which is a direct cost to end-user performance in the Tor’s system that
is already slower than regular browsing.
• According to Wang and Goldberg, the browser is expected to pair sensitive and non-sensitive pages and, ideally, pay attention to issues such as
language to select realistic cover pages. To be most effective, then, the
browser has to have a lot of context about the user and the nature of
her activity, which is hard to build into the system.
• Given that DF achieves very high Top-2 accuracy, the attacker can use
auxiliary information such as language to guess the real website. Further,
if the system does not assign a decoy website to a particular sensitive
website or webpage (e.g. beyond the homepage of the website), then
that website is effectively uncovered, because it will not be used as a
decoy for any non-sensitive websites.

3.4

Conclusion

In this study, we answer the RQ1 and RQ2 by proposing the new state-ofthe-art WF attack using DL called Deep Fingerprinting (DF) attack using a
sophisticate design based on a CNN for extracting features and classification.
We evaluate the performance of the DF attack compared to other state-ofthe-art WF attacks in both the closed-world scenario and the more realistic
open-world scenario. Our closed-world results show that the DF attack outperforms other state-of-the-art WF attacks, especially, the DF attack is the
only one that can effectively undermine WTF-PAD defense with over 90%
accuracy. In open-world experiments, against non-defended dataset, the DF
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attack attains a 0.99 precision and a 0.94 recall, while against WTF-PAD, it
reaches a 0.96 precision and a 0.68 recall. Finally, we provide a discussion on
our results along with suggestions for further investigation.
In summary, we answer RQ1 and RQ2 according to our finding as follow:
• RQ1: How can the WF attack be implemented with DL techniques and what are appropriate approaches and models of DL
that can effectively improve the performance of WF attacks?
The study presents how to implement deep learning techniques and propose the novel and state-of-the-art WF attack called Deep Fingerprint
(DF) attack. The result shows that WF attack can be effectively implemented with DL techniques, especially with the CNN. Moreover, the
findings reveal that, in order to achieve the effective attack with CNN
model, a sophisticated design along with set of appropriately fine-tuned
parameters are required e.g. the deeper networks, the type of activation functions, the variation of numbers of filters and so on. Additionally, we demonstrate how the DF model is created in this chapter and
Appendix A for full detail and discussion. With the DF attack, the
accuracy of the attack on non-defended dataset in closed-world setting
attains over 98% of accuracy, the highest accuracy compared to other
previous state-of-the-art WF attacks.
• RQ2: How effectively can the WF attack using DL techniques
perform against undefended and defended traffic in both closedworld and more realistic open-world settings?
We extensively perform experimental evaluations in more realistic assumptions including WF attacks using DL against defended traffic with
both closed-world and open-world settings. The results show that our
DF attack is the only one that can effectively undermine traffic defended
by WTF-PAD; a defense that is seriously considered as the main candidate to be deployed in Tor. W-T remains effective against all attacks
with less than 50% of accuracy. However, we provide the discussion
about the practical deployment issues for W-T and showed that W-T
could be undermined by the DF attack in some scenarios. Moreover, our
DF model provides the highest performance against W-T compared to
other WF attacks. Overall, the results of WF attacks in more realistic
settings (defended traffic and open-world scenario) emphasize the superiority of the DF attack over other attacks even with in more difficult
circumstances. Thus, the DF attack has become the new state-of-the-art
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WF attack in the WF research establishment. Finally, we have responsibly disclosed our findings to the Tor project and, motivated by our
findings, they have started revising WTF-PAD.
Finally, this work was accepted to be published and presented in the 25th
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
18) at Toronto, Canada in 2018 (Acceptance Rate: 16.6%). Moreover, the
paper was selected a finalist for an Outstanding Paper Award, placing it in
the top one percent of all submitted papers.

Chapter 4

Improved Website
Fingerprinting Attacks
“There are roads which must not be followed, armies which
must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions
which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which
must not be obeyed.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In Chapter 3, we study how website fingerprinting (WF) attacks using deep
learning (DL) can be performed against Tor’s network traffic. We present the
Deep Fingerprinting (DF) attack; the new state-of-the-art WF attack leveraging the convolutional neuron networks (CNN) with a sophisticated design.
The DF attack can achieve the best results in non-defended traffic in both
open-world and close-world scenarios. Moreover, it is the first and the only
one attack that can effectively undermine the WTF-PAD defense which is
considered to be deployed in Tor, rendering WF attacks serious threat to the
privacy of the Tor’s users.
Although, the results of WF attacks using DL are effective even with the
defended traffic, there have been discussions from the previous literature criticizing that the WF attacks may not be effective in the realistic environments [25, 39, 40, 56]. It is important to note that all previous works in WF
have not directly performed in the Tor networks with real Tor’s users due to
the users’ security and privacy reasons. Thus, the researchers need to perform
their experiments under the set of the assumptions. These assumptions render
what the attackers can do and what the limitations they have to handle. Over
the time, the researchers have been revised and improved those assumptions
46
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to be more realistic and still preserve the privacy of the Tor’s users. However,
the revisions and improvements on these assumptions still have other perspectives that worth studying and being further improved. In this chapter, we thus
explore how we could extensively develop an approach to improve WF attacks
from what previous work has done with more realistic and more challenging
scenarios.

4.1

WF Attacks’ Previously-handled Assumptions

In this section, we summarize the current assumptions that have been made
in the literature and mostly used in WF attacks nowadays. We categorize and
summarize the detail of key assumptions as well as their improvements that
have been made from the previous work. This summary allows us to scope
down our study on the set of assumptions that has not been effectively or
appropriately handled yet.

4.1.1

Closed- vs Open-world Scenario

In WF attacks, there are two possible scenarios of the attacks consisting a
closed-world and an open-world scenario. The closed world assumes that there
are only n websites that the client can visit which is, in fact, far from what
it is occurring in the reality as the size of n is vastly smaller compared to the
total number of websites in the wild. Therefore, this scenario was criticized by
Juarez et al. to be unrealistic [25]. However, the closed-world evaluation has
been still reported to measure the quality of machine learning (ML) algorithms
used to develop their proposed WF classifiers. The subsequent research work
in WF attacks then needs to consider the open-world scenario to measure
the attack performance in a more realistic assumption. The improvement of
how to implement the open-world assumption is considered into two different
viewpoints including:
• Size of the open world: The researchers have increased the size of the
unmonitored websites in open-world set to evaluate the ability of the WF
classifier to distinguish between the monitored and unmonitored websites
from unknown traffic traces [20, 35, 40, 45, 54]. The size of unmonitored
website in open-world setting reaches up to 400,000 websites by Rimmer
et al. [40].
• Open-world evaluation model: There are two models used to evaluate the performance of WF classifiers in open world. First, the Standard
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model : The model is assumed that if the classifier includes unmonitored
network traces as an additional label during the training process, it will
substantially improve the performance of the classifier to better distinguish between the monitored and unmonitored websites. This model has
been applied by most of the previous work in WF [20,35,45,54]. Second,
the AWF model : Rimmer et al. [40] proposed the new approach to measure the performance of open-world WF attacks. In their approach, the
classifier is only trained on the set of monitored websites without including the set of unmonitored websites as the additional label. Moreover,
the classifier uses a confident threshold based on the cross-entropy loss
function to make a prediction. They argued that even if the attacker
may gain benefit from including the unmonitored websites, the size of
those unmonitored websites is still not representative of the actual size
of the world of websites.
The revision and improvement on the open-world scenario in term of the
size of the open world and the evaluation model are still open questions in
the WF research establishment and hard to finally find the conclusion. For
example, it is really hard to figure out how large of the size of the open world
should be, whether the larger size can actually demonstrate the ability of the
WF attacks [38, 39], if including the unmonitored websites can actually help
the WF classifier, and how the attacker ensures that the set of unmonitored
websites they selected can be a good representative of the websites. On top of
that, these questions are either impossible to answer or need to study the Tor
users’ Internet browsing behavior which can break their privacy and has the
research ethical issue. Thus, we leave this assumption as the open questions
for the further research and it will not be included in our work.

4.1.2

User’s Internet Browsing Behavior

In WF work [20, 35, 40, 45, 54], they assume that the clients follow a specific
behavior such that they use Tor to browse the website sequentially after the
other and surf the website with only a single tab at a time due to Tor connections which are slower than browsing through regular web browsers, so it
encourages the users to open one tab at a time. However, there have been
studies revealing that the clients are likely to open multiple tabs to surf the
websites [1, 51, 58]. Even if these studies evaluated the general browsers such
as Mozilla Firefox and did not perform the study on the Tor browser. Like
the previous assumptions, the precise user’s model is required to design the
Tor user’s browsing behavior that can effectively reflex the realistic Tor user’s
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Internet behavior which is out of the scope of our research. Thus, we leave
this assumption as the open question for future work.

4.1.3

Traffic Parsing and Background Traffic

As mentioned in the WF treat model in the section 2.2, we assume that the
attacker can parse all the traffic generated by a websites to which the Tor user
has visited and can effectively distinguish them from other traffic connections.
This assumption holds true only when the attacker performs the attack at the
guard node which allows him to extract the specific traffic by using the Tor
circuit ID. However, it is interesting to consider the case that the attacker
performs the attack in between the client and the guard node in which all Tor
traffic is multiplexed in the TLS connection to the guard node. However, recent
work has developed techniques to effectively discriminate the Tor traffic from
multiplexed TLS traffic and split it into corresponding encrypted connections
to each website [56]. Thus, this assumption has been already handled and is
not the focus of our study.

4.2

Possible Improvement of WF Attacks

In this section, we describe possible WF’s assumptions that are important and
can subsequently affect the performance of the attacks. These assumptions
have been discounted and/or alternatively changed to contribute unrealistic
advantages to the attacker in the previous work. We explain how these assumptions have been made, why they are crucial to be studied and investigated
to improve WF attacks with more realistic assumptions.

4.2.1

Replicability

It is assumed by previous WF research that the attacker can train his WF
classifier under the same condition as the victim and we call this type of the
attack as the Targeted attack. Given this assumption, the attacker can replicate the user’s settings including a operating system, a network condition and
a Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) version [25]. This controlled conditions make
the distributions of the traffic used for training and testing a WF classifier
similar. Hence, it provides an unrealistic advantage to the attacker such that
the classifier can train and test on the similarly-distributed datasets. Moreover, in order to perform the targeted attack, the attacker needs to ensure that
he can obtain enough background knowledge about the user to setup a similar
system environment which allows the attacker to train his classifier with the
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Figure 4.1: The WF attack model for the targeted attack in Tor

Figure 4.2: The WF attack model for non-targeted attack in Tor
same configurations as the user has. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the treat model
of the targeted WF attack in which the attacker focuses on a specific user
rendering the environment of the attack easily controllable.
In more realistic assumption, it is better to assume that the scenario of the
attack is a non-targeted type. In this case, the attacker generally targets on
a set of clients such that the attacker has to train the classifier with only one
specific setting which in fact can be different from users. Then, he uses his
trained classifier to generally predict the network traffic generated from any
possible user’s settings as shown in Figure 4.2. This assumption makes the
WF attack more complicated and more difficult scenario because the classifier
needs to deal with variously different-distributed network traffic conditions
e.g. the network traffic that is possibly generated from different versions of
Tor Browser Bundle (TBB), various user’s network conditions and different
users’ operating systems (OS). Juarez et al. showed that if this assumption is
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Table 4.1: The effect on the attack performance obtained by training in one
TBB version and testing in a different version [25].
TBB Version

2.4.7 (Test)

3.5 (Test)

3.5.2.1 (Test)

2.4.7 (Train)
3.5 (Train)
3.5.2.1 (Train)

62.70 % ± 2.80 %
16.28 % ± 4.51 %
6.51 % ± 1.15 %

29.93 % ± 2.54 %
76.38 % ± 4.97 %
66.75 % ± 3.68 %

12.30 % ± 1.47 %
72.43 % ± 3.22 %
79.58 % ± 2.45 %

not held, it could substantially affect the performance of the attacks [25] e.g.
the effect of different TBB versions. They demonstrate that if the attacker had
trained the WF classifier with the network traffic collected from one specific
version of TBB and tested with the network traffic crawled with different TBB
versions, the accuracy of the attack drastically dropped as shown in Table 4.1.
Recent WF research work [20, 35, 40, 45, 54] has assumed that the attacker
perform the targeted attack by crawling a dataset from the a set of similar
machines with the same network condition and use it for training and testing
the classifier. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate that, under a more realistic scenario such as the non-targeted attack, how the attacker can mitigate
the significant degradation of the performance of WF attacks, a question we
are interested to study in this work.

4.2.2

Bootstrap Time

To perform WF attacks, the attacker needs to train the classifier to predict
the unknown traffic captured from the client as described in Figure 2.2. However, we criticize that this threat model does not comprehensively consider the
Bootstrap time. The bootstrap time refers to total amount of time required for
the attacker to come up with the ready-used classifier. Thus, it is not only the
time for training the classifier, but also the time for crawling network traces.
It is important to note that the network traffic used for training the classifier tends to be dynamically and periodically changed due to many factors such
as the differences of TBB versions as mentioned earlier and website’s contents
changed over period of time. Thus, the attacker needs to newly collect the
network traffic to train their WF classifiers to avoid the data mismatch issues
which can subsequently decrease the performance of WF attacks. In contrast,
the training data of each object in image recognition tends to less vulnerable
to be changed in term of its contents, allowing the publicly-large datasets to
be available for the practitioners to directly adopt and use them for training
the their classifiers.
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Table 4.2: Bootstrap time required to create the WF classifier using the AWF
model with GPU utilization. The crawling rate is approximately 2,000 instances/day/computer and the number of instances required for training is
500,000 instances.

Number of
Computers
1
4
8
12
24

Crawling Time

Training Time

Bootstrap Time

250 days
63 days
32 days
21 days
11 days

<1
<1
<1
<1
<1

250 days
63 days
32 days
21 days
11 days

hour
hour
hour
hour
hour

The bootstrap time in WF has been ignored or discounted to be majorly
considered. To the best of our knowledge, there is no WF research that comprehensively considers the bootstrap time. Nevertheless, there are only two
research work [40, 45] that reported the time for training the classifier, however, they did not report the total amount of time required for crawling the
network traffic examples used for training their classifiers. Moreover, they did
not consider it as a critical factor that could affect the performance and the
practical implementation of the attack.
The previous WF work has assumed that the attacker already has his classifier ready for the attack. We argue that the bootstrap time can significantly
affect the capability of the attack due to the data staleness issue. This issue occurs when the dataset used for training the classifier has significantly
changed in term of distribution of the data resulting in the data mismatch
issue especially the highly-dynamic websites which their contents can be frequently changed with up-to-the-minute rate. As reported in Juarez et al. and
Rimmer et al. works, the website’s contents have been variously changed over
period of time and can directly affect the performance of the WF attacks. In
their experiments, the classifier was trained with the crawled network traffic
traces at t = 0 and then tested it with the network traces that have sequentially crawled later over time e.g. testing on the network traces crawled after
n days. The results consistently showed that the accuracy of the attacker has
significantly decreased. For example, the accuracy of the attack by the k -NN
classifier can significantly drop from 80% to 30% with in less than 10 days [25].
In DL-Based WF attack such as SDAE, it can perform better [40], however,
the degradation on the accuracy is still significant e.g. the accuracy is reduced
from 95% to 90% after 10 days, and to 81% after 28 days respectively.
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Therefore, we can infer that if the attacker finishes training his classifier,
the trained classifier will only remain effective in term of its accuracy with only
a few weeks. If the attacker needs to keep the accuracy of the classifier over
longer period of time, he needs to either newly train or re-train the classifier
to ensure that the classifier has expected level of accuracy. We criticize that
the need to re-train the classifier raises the question in term of how much computing resources and total amount of time required for the attacker to collect
the new data. The longer time required to collect the new data, the higher
chance that the dataset will be contained by the staleness dataset. Table 4.2
demonstrates the time required for crawling the data used for training the
classifier for AWF model [40] 1 . As you can see that even if you have 24 computers running, it is required almost two weeks to finish the crawling process
for the large dataset. This emphasizes the question that whether or not the
WF attack is only limited to powerful attackers that have enough computing
power to effectively perform it.
In our work, we are interested in the study and investigation on how to
applied ML with DL techniques to mitigate the negative effect from data staleness issue. Moreover, it is interesting to explore how to apply DL techniques
to develop the WF attacks that are not only limited to the powerful attackers.

4.2.3

Flexibility

WF attack is considered as a traditional classification problem in which the
attacker has a fixed set of the monitored websites (fixed number of labels) to
train the WF attack classifier. During the training process, the classifier is
trained by learning to locally map the input data to the given deterministic
website. These following steps briefly describe the processes of how the attacker trains the classifier and use it to predict the unknown traces captured
from the user as demonstrated in Figure 4.3:
• In the training phase, the attacker determines the set of the websites
he is interested e.g. six most popular websites. He then includes these
websites as his monitored websites and label them as site1, site2, ... ,
site6.
• The attacker trains his classifier by feeding the network traces along with
their corresponding labels to create the WF classifier.
1

The crawling rate mentioned in Table 4.2 is the upper-bound performance measured
from the computers at the Center for Cybersecurity at RIT.
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Figure 4.3: The WF attack model showing the process of training the WF
classifier and using it to predict the unknown network trace.
• In prediction phase, the attacker uses the trained classifier to predict the
unknown network trace captured from the user.
• The possible predicted class will be only limited to one of the six websites
(only site1 - site6) that were previously used for training.
However, there is an interesting perspective in term of the flexibility of the
classifier. For example what if the attacker would like to update his monitored
websites by either including additional monitored websites or completely having the new ones. Typically, the attacker needs to newly train the classifier
to handle the change of the monitored websites every time. Moreover, we
have previously learned about the bootstrap time from the section 4.2.2 that
it requires a large amount of time required for collecting the new dataset used
for training the new WF classifier especially for the non-powerful attacker.
Thus, it raises the important issue about how flexible of the WF classifier is
to handle a new set of monitored websites. In our work, we would like study
and investigate how to apply ML techniques to improve WF attacks that can
effectively and flexibly handle the change of the set of monitored websites.
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4.3

WF Attack’s Goals of Improvements

In the previous section, we have described three possible improvements of WF
attacks including replicability, bootstrap time and flexibility. To improve the
performance of WF attacks with respect to these assumptions, we identify the
key improvement that is from the hearth of the attack tool; the WF attack
classifier. We set up the goals of improvements on how WF attack classifier’s
capability should have including:
• Replicability: The WF classifier should be robust from the data mismatch issue that can be resulted from 1) staleness of dataset resulted
from the change of websites’ contents over time and 2) different distributions of training and testing data occurring from the different client’s
configurations such as different TBB versions.
• Bootstrap time: The WF classifier should be capable of being trained
on one datasets and can be effectively later used for the new dataset. If
it needs to be re-trained, the number of training data required should be
small to reduce the large amount of time for training the new classifier.
• Flexibility and Transferability: The WF classifier should effectively
predict the network traces regardless of the websites’ labels used to initially train the classifier. Moreover, the attacker should be able to adopt
the pre-trained model to flexibly and directly apply to his WF attack’s
task.
• Performance of attack: Under the goals of improvements mentioned
above, the classifier can still remain effective in term of its performance
of the attack.
We propose the study and investigation on the implementation of the ML
learning technique called N-Shot Learning to develop and improve WF attacks
that can support the goals of improvements described above.

4.4

N-Shot Learning

DL has shown to be effective in many domains of applications such as image recognition, speech recognition and also WF attacks as demonstrated in
the Chapter 3. However, the traditional supervised DL algorithms normally
requires 1) a large number examples in the dataset used for training the classifier, 2) distributions of training and testing datasets to be matched or similar.
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Moreover, the predicted results are only limited to the classes included during
the training process to effectively create the highly-accurate classifier.
If we consider the fact that humans can effectively learn new concepts with
a small supervising effort e.g. A person can recognize the face of someone
by only seeing him a few times without requiring a large number of that
person’s faces like what DL systems need. This is a key challenge in DL about
how to build the model which can rapidly learn from very little data. This
challenge has motivated the ML technique that we are interested in studying
and investigating known as N-Shot Learning (NSL) [16, 53].

4.4.1

NSL Implementation

NSL is one of the classes of ML procedure that mainly focuses on learning
to classify things from a small number of examples. More precisely, the NSL
requires only small N examples for the classifier to learn to classify a given
class e.g. N=5 (5-Shot Learning) meaning that the classifier only requires 5
examples/class to perform the classification task. This is in contrast to the
traditional supervised learning which typically requires a very large training
set to build a highly accurate and effective model. NSL has been broadly
implemented in a face recognition task [37, 41]. The reason that makes NSL
a compelling approach for the face recognition task is due to its limitations
including:
• Number training data: The classifier used to perform the face recognition task cannot expect a rich dataset of training data. For example, if
we want to design the face recognition to recognize the employer’s faces
for access control, the system cannot require hundreds of photos from
each employer to effectively build the classifier.
• Ability to update class’ labels: It is a normal circumstance that the
face recognition needs to be able to add/remove class’s labels without
requiring to re-train the whole classifier which can be extremely expensive in term of the cost of training and the availability of the system.
For example, if there are employees retired from the organization or
new-coming employees, the classifier should be still effectively running
without the down time for re-training the classifier.
To achieve these limitations mentioned above, NSL needs to differently
implement the learning process. We summarize the key differences between
the NSL and the traditional supervised learning as following:
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• Learning goal: In NSL, the model is trained to learn how to distinguish
the different objects regardless of the previously trained classes. In contrast, the traditional supervised learning mainly focus on training the
classifier to learn and locally map the input to its corresponding class.
• Prediction output: The major ability of the model used in NSL is
to measure the similarity/dissimilarity between two inputs and predict
if they are belong to the same class or not. Hence, the model is used
as the feature extractor in which a pair of inputs are fed to the learned
model to generate embedded vectors (the vector containing the features
extracted by the learned model). These embedded vectors are used to
measure similarity of the inputs deciding whether or not these inputs are
in the same class. On the other hand, the traditional supervised learning
aims to predict a certain class within the set of training examples as
demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
• Transferability and flexibility: The transferability of the model enables the practitioner to use pre-trained models from others by making
small changes. It is important to note that, to initially train the effective
NSL model, they still require a rich of dataset like the typical supervised
learning needs. However, the NSL is used as the feature extractor without being locally bounded to the certain set of classes, thus, it more
generalize to the newly-changed classes. Moreover, it allows the practitioner to flexibly adopt the pre-trained model from others who have
more computing resources and larger training data without requiring to
train the whole new model for his task from scratch. On the other hand,
if the user needs to adopt the pre-trained model from typical supervised
learning model, the user need to remove the last layer(s) such as softmax
or fully-connected layer, and frequently requires to re-train the model to
locally fit to his dataset that contains different types of classes.
• Number of learning example: In NSL, when the practitioners already trained the model or adopted the pre-trained model, they can use
only a small number of examples to generate the embedded vector for
each class. Whenever the model needs to recognize or classify the unknown input, the system simply feeds the unknown input to the model to
generate the embedded vector used for the distance-base classifier such
as k -NN to accomplish the classification task. The ability to require only
a small number of examples to effectively perform the classification task
enables the user to have newly-collected data within very short period
of time, preventing the adverse effect from the staleness of data issue.
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The compelling properties of NSL over the traditional supervised learning
have motivated us to adopt this learning procedure to improve the WF attacks.
However, to obtain these compelling properties, we needs effective learning
procedures and models. In the next part, we will provide details of how to
create the model from the basic and less effective technique to the advanced
and highly-effective one which will provide a better understanding on how to
apply NSL to improve WF attacks.
k -Nearest Neighbours
The basic implementation to apply NSL is to use a k -Nearest Neighbours (k NN) to directly measure the similarity between two different objects. In this
case, the k is set to be small e.g. k =1 to meet the expected requirements
mentioned above. In 1-NN, the model contains a labelled trained set S, which
has n example(s) and each vector xn of the same dimension with a distinct
label y. xn is vector storing the detail information directly extracted from
each example e.g. the vector of pixel’s values extracted from each image, or
the vector containing the sequence of packet’s directions extracted from each
network trace and so on as shown in the Equation 4.1.

S = (x1 , y1 ), ..., (xn , yn )

(4.1)

To perform classification task, we simply calculate the Euclidean distance
between the given example x̂ and each training example xc and class c belongs
to the set of all training examples S, then choose the closest one C(x̂) as the
predicted class as shown in the Equation 4.2:
C(x̂) = argmin ||x̂ − xc ||2
c∈S

(4.2)

However, Koch et al. showed that using k -NN to directly measure the
similarity of inputs provides ineffective classification performance with only
28% accuracy in 20-way2 with 1-Shot classification (k = 1) on the omniglot
dataset [28]. The intuitive explanation on the ineffective classification performance is due to the fact that the classifier directly calculates the distance
from raw data e.g. using pixel’s values of image to measure the similarity.
Comparing the pixels directly is vulnerable to the variation of different examples such as the rotations of the photos, the different postures, and so on.
2

n-way refers to the size of the problem e.g. 20-way consists of 20 classes in total to be
classified.
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Figure 4.4: Siamese networks using the CNN model for each subnetwork.
This variation is also applied to the network traffic in WF since the network
traffic can be variously changed due to network conditions or the change of
web’s contents over time. Thus, we need the model that can effectively first
extract the meaningfully representative features of the input that are robust
to the variation of input before measuring the similarity metric to perform the
classification task. Moreover, Koch et al. also demonstrated that using DL
as the feature extraction is an effective solution to perform NSL classification
compared to other ML techniques. Thus, our work will mainly focus on how
to use DL as the feature extractor to effectively perform NSL classification
and apply it to the WF attacks task.
There are two deep embedded networks that have been mostly applied in
NSL, especially in the area of images recognition: Siamese Networks [50] and
Triplet Networks [41].
Siamese Networks
Siamese networks are conceptually based on the similarity learning in which
we measure how similar of two comparable objects such as images, network
traces, and so on. The networks try to identify whether these two traces are
either the same classes or the different ones.
Figure 4.4 depicts the example of how to implement the Siamese networks
with two identical CNNs as the subnetworks. Each subnetwork acts as the
feature extractor generating the feature vector (sometimes called the embedded vector) extracted from each network traffic input. These two subnetworks
are identical in the sense that both share the same weights and use the same

CHAPTER 4. IMPROVED WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS 60
CNN’s architecture. Simplistically, each subnetwork is completely duplicated
to each other. The CNN model in the Siamese networks typically consists of
convolutional layers, max pooling layers, fully-connected layer and extracted
feature vector at the last layer as the output. In the Siamese networks, we
remove the softmax layer in the subnetwork which is normally attached to the
end of the traditional CNN for the classification process. The reason behind
this difference is that we use the different loss function in the Siamese networks; the contrastive loss function which is more effective than categorical
cross-entropy loss in the application of similarity learning [28].
To perform the recognition task, we aim to identify if the given unknown
network trace x(1) is actually the claimed website. In this case, the network
traffic x(1) is fed into the Siamese CNN networks to create the embedded
vector F(x(1) ). Then, the system compares the distance to measure the
similarity between the embedded vector F(x(1) ) and the other embedded
vector F(x(2) ). In this case, the F(x(2) ) vector was previously pre-computed
or can be immediately computed, labeled as its signature of known website.
If the distance between the given inputs is smaller than a threshold, it means
that the x(1) is the same website as the claimed one x(2) or otherwise.
In the classification task, we perform a similar approach to the recognition
one. Additionally, we would like to predict the given unknown network traffic captured from the victim to the corresponding class (match the captured
unknown network traffic with the corresponding monitored website). In this
case, we simply perform k -NN classification by repeatedly comparing the embedded vector of the unknown network traffic x(1) to other embedded network
traffic vectors generated as the signature for each monitored website e.g. x(n) .
Likewise, those signatures could be previously pre-computed and stored for
each website in the system. We select the pair of embedded vectors providing
the nearest distance e.g. if the pair between x(1) and x(2) provide the smallest
distance, it will be predicted that the given network traffic x(1) is belong to
the website x(2) .
To train the Siamese networks, the process of training the model is different from the traditional supervised-learning classification. Figure 4.5 demonstrates how the Siamese networks are trained. During training phase, we need
to create two parallel subnetworks sharing the same weights in the sense that
whenever the model performs back-propagation process to update the weights’
parameters, the same updates will concurrently occur in both subnetworks.
Moreover, the loss function used for learning is different, the contrastive loss
is being performed for a learning task to improve the model learning. The
major learning goal of the contrastive loss is not to classify the network traf-
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Figure 4.5: The training phase of Siamese networks and their implementation
for a classification task
fic traces to locally map to the corresponding website, but to differentiate
between them. Thus, the classification loss function such as categorical crossentropy loss function (using softmax) would not be best fit. Generally, the
contrastive loss function is to evaluate how well the network is distinguishing
a given pair of inputs [12, 28, 50]. Therefore, the parallel subnetworks require
a pair of the inputs to formulate the training data to be fed to the networks.
Let x(1) and x(2) be a pair of input vectors shown to the system. Let Y
be a binary label assigned to this pair. Y = 0 if x(1) and x(2) are deemed
similar, and Y = 1 if they are deemed dissimilar. The parameterized distance
function DW to be learned between x(1) and x(2) is the Euclidean distance
between the embedded vectors F(x(1) ) and F(x(2) ) respectively as shown in
the Equation 4.3.
DW (x(1) , x(2) ) = || F(x(1) ) − F(x(2) )||2

(4.3)

The contrastive loss function is in the form of

L=

P
X
i=1

L(W, (Y, F (x(1) ), F (x(2) ))i )

(4.4)
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where (Y , F (x(1) ), F (x(2) ))i is the i-th labeled sample pair.
To shorten the notation, DW (x(1) ,x(2) ) is written as DW . Moreover,
the loss function needs to be designed such that minimizing loss value L with
respect to learning weights W in the model, and result in low values of DW
for similar pairs and high values of DW for dissimilar pairs. Base on this
requirement, the exact loss function is calculated as
1
1
L(W, Y, F (x(1) ), F (x(2) )) = (1 − Y ) (DW )2 + (Y ) max(0, m − DW )
2
2

2

(4.5)
Furthermore, an additional parameter m in which m > 0 is defined as a
margin value. The margin defines a radius around F (x). Dissimilar pairs only
contribute to the loss function in case the computed distance between the pair
is less than m. This margin helps for the learning process of the model as it
will only learn from the hard pairs in which the inputs are in different classes,
but very similar with small distance.
With the contrastive loss function described above, the model formulates
pairs of inputs consisting both similar and dissimilar elements fed into the
model for training. It is important to note that when the model finished
training, we only use one of the subnetwork e.g. 2nd subnetwork as the feature
extractor to perform classification task as shown in Figure 4.5.
Even if the Siamese networks have been applied to many domains of application, the previous work has shown that the Siamese networks using contrastive loss is less effective than triplet networks using a triplet loss function [37, 41]. Moreover, our preliminary results also consistently show that
using the triplet networks provides significantly better performance than the
Siamese networks. Therefore, our work will mainly focus on the use of the
triplet networks to improve a WF classifier with respect to our goals of improvements described in the Section 4.3. It is important to note that although
we will not apply the Siamese networks for our work, the given explanation
about Siamese networks described above helps provide better understanding
for the triplet networks since it is conceptually similar to the Siamese networks. In the next section, we will describe about how the triplet networks
are implemented by extensively explaining from the concept of the Siamese
networks.
Triplet Networks
The triplet networks [37, 41] have adopted the concept of Siamese networks
with extensive improvements. Similarly, the triplet networks contain parallel
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Figure 4.6: The example of how to generate the triplets as inputs used for
training the triplet networks.
and identical subnetworks sharing the same weights and hyperparamenters
as in the Siamese networks. However, the triplet networks consist of three
subnetworks as shown in Figure 4.7. This difference results in the change of
inputs used for training the networks. Instead of using a pair of the examples as the input, the triplet networks use three different inputs called triplets.
The triplets are randomly sampled from the training data to create the array
containing the vectors of three different input examples including Anchor (A),
Positive (P), and Negative (N). Each input is individually fed to each subnetwork during the model training process. To provide better explanation about
the differences between A, P, and N examples used to formulate the triplets, we
assume that the dataset contains network traffic examples from three different
websites including rit.edu, gmail.com and amazon.com. As demonstrated in
Figure 4.6, each website has three examples of its own network traffic. The
following explanation provides the brief method for sampling and generating
triplets used to train the network:
• Anchor Input (A): The anchor input is the selected example used as
the main example or the reference e.g. the 1st network traffic’s example
from rit.edu.
• Positive Input (P): The positive input is chosen from other examples
within the same website as the anchor input e.g. the 2nd network traffic’s
example from rit.edu.
• Negative Input (N): The negative input is sampled from other examples of websites other than the examples from the anchor’s website e.g.
one of any network traffic’s examples from gmail.com, or amazon.com.
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Figure 4.7: The training phase of triplet networks and their implementation
for a classification task.
The formation of triplets is used to allow the triplet networks to learn how
to differentiate between different objects. In the training phase as shown in
Figure 4.7, we feed each of the element in triplet for each subnetwork; anchor
input A for 1st subnetwork, positive input P for 2nd subnetwork, and negative
input N for 3rd subnetwork. Then, the networks measure the similarity of A
with both the embedded vector of P; D(A, P) and the embedded vector of N ;
D(A, P) as shown in Equation 4.6.
D(A, P ) = || F(A) − F(P )||2
D(A, N ) = || F(A) − F(N )||2

(4.6)

To achieve the model’s learning goal, the distance D(A, P) is trained to
be less than or equal to the distance D(A, N). In other words, we expect the
network traffic traces from the same website to be similar to each other (small
distance between A and P ), and network traffic from different websites to
be dissimilar (large distance between A and N ). Figure 4.8 demonstrates the
expected learning process of the model, it shows that, during training process,
the model is learning to move A and P closer to each other, and expanding
the A and N farther in the embedding space as depicted in Figure 4.8. This
learning goal formulates the triplet loss function as shown in Equation 4.7
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Figure 4.8: The learning process during training the model: The triplet loss
minimize the distance of the network traffic examples that are from the same
website and maximize network traffic examples from the different websites.

D(A, P ) + m ≤ D(A, N )
D(A, P ) − D(A, N ) + m ≤ 0

(4.7)

L(A, P, N ) = max(D(A, P ) − D(A, N ) + m, 0)
In the triple loss function, a margin m is also similarly defined as in the
Siamese networks to enforce a margin between each pair of network traces
examples from the same websites to all other network traces examples from
different websites. This helps the network better learn the discriminability to
other websites. Without m, the learning process can easily meet the condition
and stop learning. Moreover, the max in the loss function means that if D(A,
P) - D(A, N) + m is less than or equal to zero, the loss L(A, P, N) is zero.
With this, the loss function will try to minimize the loss value to zero or less
than zero such that the distance between A and P has to be smaller and the
distance between A and N has to be larger as much as they can to minimize
the loss value.
With the triple loss and triple examples, the model starts training and
learning to update the weights’ parameters to improve the model. Once the
model training process is accomplished, we only use one of the subnetwork
as the feature extractor to perform the classification task as shown in Figure 4.7. It is important to note that, the contrastive loss used in the Siamese
networks, the model only learns to maximize A and N and minimize A and P
independently and separately for each pair of inputs. In contrast, the triplet
loss used in the triplet networks learns from three different samples (A, P, N)
at the same time, providing more thorough learning for the model in the latent
space. This is the major advantage of the triplet networks over the Siamese
networks.
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Since the superior performance of the triplet networks over the Siamese
networks and the compelling properties of NSL that can possibly improve WF
attacks based on the goals of improvements as mentioned in Section 4.3. We
propose to apply NSL with the triplet networks to improve WF attacks with
more realistic and more challenging scenarios to answer RQ3. In the next
following sections, we present set of experimental evaluations to investigate
the implementation of NSL with the triplet networks to improve WF attacks.

4.5

Triplet Networks Implementation in WF attacks

We propose the Triplet Fingerprinting (TF) attack to effectively perform WF
attacks under more realistic and more challenging scenarios by using the NSL
technique with triplet networks. Our implementation of the TF attack uses
the Python deep learning libraries Keras as the front-end and Tensorflow as
the back-end.

4.5.1

TF’s Hyperparameter Tuning

To develop the TF attack to effectively perform WF attack, we have followed
the implementation guideline and techniques from the previous work to applying NSL [37, 41, 50]. Moreover, we perform hyperparameters tuning process of
the DL model to evaluate appropriate design and corresponding parameters
that can maximize the performance of the TF attack. We follow the extensive
candidates search method [45] to evaluate and select the final value for each
parameter. The below shows the detail of how we select each parameter during
hyperparameters tuning process.
• Based Model: The based model refers to the CNN model that is used
as the subnetwork in the triplet networks as shown in the Figure 4.7.
We test with previously-proposed state-of-the-art DL models used in
image recognition literature including GoogleNet [49], RestNet [21] and
Xception [11]. Moreover, we also include the DF [45] model; the stateof-the-art WF attack using DL into our candidates. We find that the DF
model can perform better than other candidates with significantly less
training time required. Thus, we choose the DF model as the subnetwork
in the triplet networks.
• Distance Metrics: The similarity metric is used to measure the similarity between a pair of inputs within the triplets. We select two traditional
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Table 4.3: Hyperparameters selection for the triplet networks from the extensive candidates search method
Parameters
Based Model
Similarity Metrics
Mining Strategy

Margin
Optimizer
Batch Size
Embedded Vector’s Size

Search Space

Selected Value

GoogleNet, RstNet,
Xception, DF
Euclidean, Cosine
Random,
Hard-Negative,
Semi-Hard-Negative
[0.0 .. 0.5]
SGD, Adam,
Adamax, RMProp
[32 ... 256]
[32 ... 256]

DF
Cosine
Semi-Hard-Negative

0.1
SGD
64, 128
64

methods including Euclidean distance and Cosine distance to evaluate
the best similarity metric to be used in the triplet networks. We find
that using the Cosine distance can provide better results in comparison
to the Euclidean distance. We believe that what makes the Cosine distance better choice to measure similarity of network traffic comes from
its fundamental property. The Cosine distance is calculated using only
the dot product and magnitude of each vector, and is therefore affected
only by the terms the two vectors have in common, whereas the Euclidean distance has a term for every dimension in either vector. Hence,
the Cosine distance has some meaningful semantics for ranking similarity based on mutual object frequency, whereas the Euclidean distance
does not. Ranking similarity based on mutual object is similar to finding
the common bursts of traffic patterns (the group of network traffic with
in the same direction) which is one of the meaningful features in WF
attacks.
• Mining Strategy: To generate the triplets as the input fed into the
networks, we evaluate three different mining strategies used to select
the examples to formulate the triplets input including Random, HardNegative and Semi-Hard-Negative. The results demonstrate that SemiHard-Negative provides the best results which is consistent with what
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the previous work reported [19, 41].
• Margin: The margin’s value defines a radius around the embedded vector and helps for the learning process. The value is specific for each type
of data’s input, thus, we have to find the best m value that is suitable
for network traffic and provide effective performance to the model. We
find that margin’s value m = 0.1 can provide better results than others.
• Optimizer: The optimizer is a mathematical model used to measure
and update the weights’ learning with respect to the loss model. We
evaluate different types of optimizer used during the training process
including SGD, ADAM , Adamax and RM P rop. SGD performs best
with slightly better performance compared to others, thus we choose
SGD as optimizer used during the model’s training process.
• Batch Size: Batch size is the number of inputs that are sampled to be
fed to the network during the training process. We find that batchsize =
64 and batchsize = 128 can provide the highest accuracy.
• Embedded Vector’s Size: The embedded vectors size is the size of the
last dense layer in each subnetwork. It contains the vectors of the output
after feeding the input through the learned model to extract features.
We find that the embedded vectors size = 64 provides the best accuracy
among other candidates.
Table 4.3 shows the summary of the hyperparameters tuning process including the set of parameters that we mainly evaluate, their searching range,
and the final selected value for each parameter. It is important to note that
other hyperparameters that are not mentioned in the Table 4.3, we adopt the
hyperparamenters from the DF model as previously mentioned in the Section
3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

4.5.2

Semi-Hard-Negative Mining

To optimize and improve the learning process of the model, the mining process
of how to choose the Anchor input (A), the Positive input (P) and the Negative input (N) plays a crucial role in improving a learning process of the triplet
network. Thus, we choose the semi-hard-negative mining since it has shown
to be more effective than others as previously described in Section 4.5.1. Fundamentally, the goal of semi-hard-negative mining is to ensure that the model
does not only learn from easy examples. For example, the pairs of the different
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websites (A and N) frequently returns large distance with loss = 0. Having
zero loss prevents the model from learning, so we need to make sure that a pair
of A and N are difficult enough in which A and N are from different websites
with small distance and return non-zero loss value.
Therefore, we need to generate the set of triplet inputs including arrays of
[A, P, N] examples similar to what it is previously demonstrated in Figure 4.6.
To generate the triplet inputs with semi-hard-negative mining, we first start
generating all possible positive arrays of [A, P] pairs for each website. Thus,
the total number of generated positive pairs for each website is calculated as
the combination of network traffic examples from the given website.
The Equation 4.8, the C(n, r) is the total number of generated positive
pairs of each site, n is the number of examples extracted for each site, and r
is the size of positive array [A, P] which is 2 in this case.

C(n, r) =

n!
(r!(n − r)!

(4.8)

For example, if we use 25 traffic traces as the examples for each site, the
number of positive pairs for each site is C(25, 2) which is 300. Thus, if the
dataset contains 1,000 different websites, in total, the number of positive pairs
across the training data would be 1,000 x 300 which is 300,000 arrays.
Once we have generated [A, P] arrays, we then perform the semi-hardnegative mining to choose negative N examples to create [A, P, N]. We describe
step-by-step procedures to generate the final [A, P, N] arrays as the inputs used
to train the triplet networks as following:
• In each input, we first measure the similarity distance between the given
A and P selected from the previously generated positive pairs called D(A,
P) to compare with the distance between the A and randomly-selected
negative N examples called D(A, N).
• We choose only the given randomly-selected N example to meet the
condition that D(A, P) < D(A, N) + margin, otherwise, we repeatedly select the new N example until the condition is met. Figure 4.9
demonstrates how the expected distance of A, P and N should be in the
embedding space.
In total, the tripets inputs are 3D arrays of [A, P, N] and total number of
those arrays remains the same as the number of positive pairs.
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Figure 4.9: The corresponding location of the expected A, P and N examples
in the embedding space with respect to the semi-hard-negative mining.

4.5.3

Model Training and Testing

The training and testing procedures in the triplet network are different from
the traditional-supervised classification task. Thus, we demonstrate the stepby-step implementation of NSL using the triplet networks to create the TF
attack including how to train the triplet networks (training phase) to generate the pre-trained model and how to use the model perform classification
task in WF attack (testing phase). This demonstration will provide a better
understanding of the following experimental evaluations in Section 4.6.
Training Phase
The attacker creates the tripet networks and uses the DF model as the subnetwork along with fine-tuned hyperparameters. It is important to note that
we remove the last fully-connected (FC) layer with softmax of the DF model
and replace it with the new FC layer used as the embedded vector. In every epoch of training, the system feed the batch of triplet inputs generated
from the semi-hard-negative mining until the training process of the model
is completed as previously demonstrated in the Figure 4.7. The outcome of
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Figure 4.10: NSL classification process (Newly-training)
the training phase is the pre-trained model that can be used later as the pretrained model to perform the classification task in the testing phase.
Testing Phase
In order to perform the NSL classification task from the pre-trained triplet
networks in the TF attack, There are two processes in which the attacker
needs to perform including re-training and testing processes. It is important
to note that we use the newly-training terminology to represent the process
that requires the attacker to newly train his WF classifier from the embedded
vectors generated from the triplet network’s pre-trained model. This helps
prevent the confusion from the training phase which refers to the process of
training the tripet networks to generate the pre-trained model.
The detail of how to perform newly-training and testing process is described below:
• Newly-training process: The process of how the attacker newly train
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Figure 4.11: NSL classification process (Testing)
the WF classifier is demonstrated in Figure 4.10 and step-by-step procedures of how to implement this process are described as following:
– Step 1: The attacker needs to collect N examples from the websites
that he is interested in; the monitored websites. It is important to
note that the number of N examples is generally set to be small to
meet the compelling property of the NSL in which the attacker only
requires a small N examples for training the classifier. For example,
if the attacker performs 3-Shot learning, the attacker will need to
collect 3 network traces for each website.
– Step 2: The collected network’s traffic examples are then fed to
feature extractor adopted from the pre-trained model to generate
corresponding embedded vectors of each website. These embedded
vectors can be considered as each website’s signatures.
– Step 3: The embedded vectors are used to train the k -NN classifier3 to recognize if the captured traffic from the user belongs to
the his monitored websites.
• Testing process: The process of how the attacker tests the performance
of his classifier to classify the unknown traffic captured from the victim is
3
The attacker can use any types of machine learning classifier such SVM, MLP, CNN
and so on. However, our preliminary results show that k -NN significantly outperforms other
classifiers.
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depicted in Figure 4.11 and step-by-step procedures of how to implement
this process are described as following:
– Step 1: The attacker captures the network traffic from the user.
We call this captured traffic as the unknown traffic since Tor conceals the actual website’s label to protect user’s privacy.
– Step 2: The unknown traffic is then fed into the same feature
extractor used during newly-training process to generate the embedded vectors of unknown traffic.
– Step 3: Finally, the attacker uses his trained k -NN classifer from
the newly-training process to predict the embedded vector of unknown traffic to the possible website that the user may visit.
The detail of model’s training and testing phases mentioned above will be
subsequently applied to all experimental evaluations in the next section.

4.6

Experimental Evaluations

In this section, We design a series of experimental evaluations to investigate
how the TF attack using NSL with the triplet networks can be used to improve WF attacks under different scenarios of the attacks with respect to the
goals of improvements including replicability, bootstrap time, flexibility and
transferability.

4.6.1

Dataset

We use different sets of dataset given from the previous works in our experiments. We define the set of dataset as following:
• Wang dataset [54]: The dataset contains both monitored and unmonitored websites. The monitored websites was selected from a list of
blocked websites from China, the UK, and Saudi Arabia. The contents
of these blocked websites are variously ranged from adult contents, torrent trackers, social media, sensitive religious to political topics. On the
other hand, the unmonitored websites were chosen from the Alexa top
sites 4 . The dataset was collected under the Tor’s version 3.X. in 2013.
We define each set of data as following:
4

https://www.alexa.com/topsites
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– Wang100: It includes the set of 100 monitored websites and each
website has 90 examples.
– Wang9000: It includes the set of 9,000 unmonitored websites and
each website has 1 example.
• AWF dataset [40]: The dataset also includes both monitored and unmonitored websites. The list of all websites is obtained from the Alexa’s
top sites. The dataset was collected under the Tor’s version 6.X. in
2016. We categorize the AWF dataset into three different sets of data
including:
– AWF100: It includes the first 100 monitored websites and each
website has 2,500 examples.
– AWF775: It includes the other 775 monitored websites and each
website has 2,500 examples .
– AWF9000: It includes the set of 9,000 unmonitored websites and
each website has 1 example.
• DF dataset [45]: The dataset cosists of both monitored and unmonitored websites. The websites were also crawled from the Alexa’s top
sites. The dataset was collected under the Tor’s version 6.X. in 2016.
We categorize the DF dataset into two different sets of data including:
– DF95: It includes the set of 95 monitored websites and each website has 1,000 examples.
– DF9000: It includes the set of 9,000 unmonitored websites and
each website has 1 example.
We choose to use these three datasets to support the different purposes
of our experiments. The intuitive explanation behind the selection of each
dataset will be later described in each experimental setup.

4.6.2

Statistical soundness

We run the experimental testing 10 times and find the mean and its standard
deviation to report the final performance of the attack. Furthermore, the network traffic examples used for newly training the classifier and for testing the
classifier are randomly shuffled and sampled at every round of the evaluation
to ensure that the results are not evaluated from only specific data points.
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4.6.3

Exp1: WF attacks regardless of website’s labels

The Exp1 aims to evaluate under the attack scenario in which the attacker
trains his classifier on one dataset and test on different dataset regardless
of the websites’ labels. More precisely, the websites’ URLs used during the
training and testing are mutually exclusive or disjointed. For example, the
classifier is trained on network traces from website A and website B and used
to predict network traces from website C and website D. Moreover, in this
scenario, we evaluate the performance of the attack on the dataset with similar
distribution in which the dataset is collected with the same period of time and
same version of TBB (Both training and testing data were collected in 2016
with TBB version 6.X).

Experimental setting
We train the triplet networks by using the AWF775 dataset and test on the
AWF100 in which both data are disjointed in term of their websites’ labels to
support the scenario of the attack mentioned above.
During the training phase, we randomly sampled 25 examples for each website in the AWF775 dataset using the semi-hard mining strategy to formulate
232,500 triplets used to train the tripet networks.
During the testing phase, we use 90 randomly-sampled examples for each
websites from the AWF100 dataset. We separate each site’s examples into
two different chunks with 20 examples for the first chunk and 70 examples
for the second one. The examples in the first chunk are reserved to evaluate
the performance of the classification based on the different N example(s) or
N-Shot Learning that are collected by the attacker to newly-train the k -NN
classifier. In this case, we use different N in which N is either 1, 5, 10, 15
or 20. On the other hand, the other 70 examples used as the testing data
to evaluate the performance of the attack from the trained k -NN classifier.
Finally, we will follow these basic experimental settings for the rest of the
following experiments.

N-ALL vs N-MEV
The original implementation of N-Shot Learning classification is to use N embedded examples to newly-train the k -NN classifiers as mentioned in Section 4.5.3. We propose a new approach to improve the performance of the
k -NN classifier base on the different input representation. Instead of using N
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Table 4.4: The performance of WF attacks regardless of websites’ labels (Accuracy of the attack)
Type of
Experiment

Embedded
Vectors

Disjointed Websites

N-ALL
N-MEV

1

Number of N Example(s)
5
10
15

20

90.9 ± 0.7 93.1 ± 0.2 93.3 ± 0.3 93.9 ± 0.2
79.4 ± 1.6
92.2 ± 0.6 93.9 ± 0.2 94.4 ± 0.3 94.5 ± 0.2

examples for each website, we calculate the mean of all N examples to generate
a Mean Embedded Vector(MEV) used to train the classifier.
We evaluate the classification’s performance resulted from using 1) original
implementation called N-ALL type in which all of N embedded examples for
each website are fed to train the model, and 2) our newly-proposed input
representation called N-MEV in which the embedded vector is generated from
the mean of N embedded examples for each websites.

Result
Table 4.4 shows the performance of WF attacks regardless of websites’ labels
(Disjointed websites) with different N examples used to newly train the k -NN
classifier. Moreover, we also compares the performance of the attack with the
original embedded vector’s inputs (N-ALL) and our newly-proposed inputs
(N-MEV). Overall, the performance of N-MEV vectors consistently provides
better performance in term of the accuracy of the attack. We believe that the
average of vectors in N-MEV helps reduce the noisy condition among different
embedded vectors resulting in providing better performance compared to NALL. Therefore, we will mainly use N-MEV representation to evaluate the
next following experimental evaluations.
Moreover, the results show that the accuracy of the attack could reach
to almost 80% of accuracy with only one example (N=1, 1-Shot Learning).
With growing N, 5-Shot Learning could impressively attain 92% of accuracy.
We observe that the accuracy of the attacks starts leveling off after n >= 15
at 94% of accuracy. Furthermore, the growing on N examples improves not
only the accuracy of the attack, but also reducing the standard deviation of
accuracy, meaning that the performance of the attack remain more consistent
across the different sets of network traffic.
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WF Attack’s Goals of Improvements
According to the results in the Exp1, we summarize how the TF attack can
improve the performance of WF attacks based on the goals of improvements
as following:
• Flexibility and transferability: The results shows that even if the
classifier is trained on one dataset and tested on different dataset in term
of their websites’ labels, the performance still remains effective. Therefore, the attacker can directly performs WF attacks without worrying
about whether or not the websites that he would like to monitor were
included in the classifier during the training process.
• Performance of attack The results demonstrate that the TF attack
can still remain effective with over 90% of accuracy of the attack.
• Bootstrap time: The results reveal that the attacker is requires to collect only 5 examples/website taking approximately 5 minutes/website 5
to newly train the classifier. It supports the cooperation of the attackers in which the attacker with highly-available resource can periodically
train the WF classifier using NSL with triplet networks and other attackers can directly adopt this classifier, newly train his model with
small amount of time to bootstrap the attack without worrying about if
the pre-trained model was previously included their monitored websites
during its training or not.

Possible Advantages of the Attacker
We further investigate the performance of the attack in which the attacker can
perhaps gain advantages in some scenario. The scenario refers to the fact that
the attacker can include some websites that are popular and likely to become
ones of the monitored websites while training the triplet networks. This allows
the triplet networks to train and test with the partial set of websites that the
model has seen before.
However, it is important to note that this case only focuses on the class’s
level, not instance’s level in which training and testing examples are 1) mutually inclusive in term of websites’ labels and 2) mutually-exclusive in term
5
The crawling rate mentioned in Table 4.2 is the upper-bound performance measured
from the use of one computer to collect the network traffic examples (2,000 examples/day)
at the center for cybersecurity at RIT.
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Table 4.5: The impact of including different portions of the websites that the
user may visit during the training phase.
Type of
Experiment

1

Disjointed Websites
25% Inclusion
50% Inclusion
75% Inclusion
100% Inclusion

79.4 ± 1.6
81.2 ± 1.3
79.6 ± 1.9
79.7 ± 1.7
80.6 ± 2.3

Number of N Example(s)
5
10
15
92.2 ± 0.6
92.9 ± 0.6
92.7 ± 0.8
93.0 ± 1.4
93.4 ± 0.9

93.9 ± 0.2
94.3 ± 0.7
94.1 ± 0.9
94.2 ± 0.9
94.6 ± 0.7

94.4 ± 0.3
94.7 ± 0.5
94.7 ± 0.7
94.5 ± 1.1
94.7 ± 0.8

20
94.5 ± 0.2
94.7 ± 0.3
95.0 ± 0.5
95.0 ± 0.8
95.0 ± 0.9

of their network traffic examples. For example, the attacker believe that
www.foxnews.com is one of the commonly-selected monitored websites for
many attackers to identify users’ political viewpoint, he includes examples
of www.foxnews.com while training the tripet networks. During the testing
process, it is interesting to evaluate that whether or not the accuracy of the
attack get improved if some testing data are from www.foxnews.com. We perform experimental evaluations to compare the disjointed websites case with
different percentages of inclusion. The inclusion rates are ranged from from
25% (The classifier train on 25% of websites that the user will visit and includes them during the training phase) to 100%.
As shown in Table 4.5, although the triplet networks has included websites
that the user may visit during the training phase, it does not provide noticeable
improvement in term of the performance of the attack. The results shows the
upside of the triplet networks which has the compelling property such that
the model is not overfitting and locally hinged on the class’s label on which
they trained. We examine the intuitive explanation and find that the tradition
CNN classification using softmax, the model basically tries to learn and locally
maps the given input (network’s trace) to the corresponding class (website’s
label). In contrast, the NSL with triplet networks has the model learn to
differentiate the given pair of input (similar or dissimilar) without locally
mapping to the particular website’s label to be assigned. Hence, it provides
supportive explanation of the effectiveness of WF attacks using NSL in term
of the flexibility and transferability properties.
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4.6.4

Exp2: WF attacks with different data distributions

The major purpose of Exp2 is to extensively include more challenging limitation in addition to the scenario in the Exp1. In this experiment, we evaluate
the performance of the WF attack under a more challenging scenario in which
the attacker not only trains his classifier on one dataset and test on the different dataset regardless of the websites’ labels, but also the training and testing
data are collected from different distributions due to the different Tor Bundle
Browser (TBB) resulted from significantly different period of time of collecting
network traffic.

Experimental setting
We use the same triplet model from Exp1 trained with the AWF775 dataset,
however, we instead use the Wang100 dataset as the testing data to newly train
the k -NN classifier to test the performance of the attacks. The experimental
setting is designed to evaluate the performance of the attack in which the
model that is trained on one specific time and TBB version, and tested on
the other different ones; AWF755 dataset was collected in 2016 with TBB
version 6.X and Wang100 was collected in 2013 with TBB version 3.X. The 3year different period of data collection can ensure that the data distributions
between these two datasets are significantly different. However, we provide
further analysis to evaluate on how different the AWF and Wang datasets are
by using 1) the basic network statistic including the number of packets and
the number of bursts, and 2) the similarity measurement by using the Cosine
similarity. We find that the two datasets show significant difference of the
basic network statistic in both number of packets and bursts. Moreover, the
similarity between the two datasets reveals significant dissimilarity based on
the Cosine distance metric. Thus, the results support the evidence that the
two datasets are likely to be mismatched. The full detail of our analysis and
the results of evaluations are described in Appendix C.
It is important to clearly explain the reason why we train on the dataset
collected in 2016 and test on the dataset collected in 2013 instead of the
other way around. First, it turns out that the performance of the triplet
networks heavily relies on the large number of available classes according to
our preliminary results and the examples from practical implementations such
as face’s recognition system. More precisely, the more various websites you
have, the better the model can learn to differentiate among the websites. Thus,
the AWF dataset which contains largest number of website’s classes (URLs)
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Table 4.6: The performance of WF attacks with different distributions of
training and testing datasets (Accuracy of the attack)
Type of
Experiment

1

Different Distributions

73.1 ± 1.8

Number of N Example(s)
5
10
15
84.5 ± 0.4

86.2 ± 0.4

86.6 ± 0.3

20
87.0 ± 0.3

with enough number of network examples per website in the WF literature is
the best choice for training the triplet networks. Second, the main objective
of this experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the triplet models to
mitigate the adverse effect of accuracy reduction due to the data mismatch
resulted from the significantly different distributions of training and testing
data. Thus, we believe that the order of timing periods of the training and
testing datasets does not affect the validity of our experimental evaluations.

Result
As we see in Table 4.6, the results show that, under more challenging circumstances (Different Distributions) in which model is 1) trained and tested on
different distributions of datasets 2) trained and tesed on mutually-exclusive
datasets in term of website’s labels as in Exp1, the TF attack can still effectively perform WF attacks with fairly-good results. With only 5-Shot Learning, the accuracy can reach up to almost 85%. We observe that the accuracy
of the attack gradually increase up to 87% with 20-shot learning.
Nowadays, the NSL has become one of the active research in the literature.
Likely, the more sophisticated and powerful approaches of how to apply NSL to
improve the performance of the classification task is expected to be proposed
in the future. Hence, it makes our research direction in applying NSL worth
investigating in WF attacks.
WF Attack’s Goals of Improvements
The TF attack initially provides Flexibility and transferability, Bootstrap Time,
and Performance of the attack properties to support WF attack’s goals of
improvements a demonstrated in Exp1. Moreover, the Exp2 shows that the
TF attack can additionally provide another improvement of WF attacks under
more challenging and more difficult scenario which is:
• Replicability: The results demonstrates that the model can be trained
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on the network traffic traces collected from one distribution and tested on
the network work traffic traces collected from the different distribution.
In comparison to the real world application, the WF attack using NSL
allows the attacker to train or adopt the pre-trained model that was not
necessarily trained at the same period of the testing time and can still
perform WF attacks with fairly-good accuracy.

4.6.5

Exp3: Traditional Transfer Learning vs TF Attack

The transfer learning [59] is a machine learning technique in which a model
trained on one task can be effectively re-used on another related task. This
technique has widely shown to be effective in many domains of application
especially in the images recognition. The intuition behind the effectiveness of
the transfer learning results from the ways that DL used to learn features from
the input. For example, in computer vision, DL tries to learn and detect lowerlevel features such as edges in their earlier layers, and higher-level features such
as objects in the deeper layers. This hierarchical learning allows the users to
directly transfer the knowledge of learned features from the early layers and
only fine-tune the deeper layer to fit the model for their tasks. Thus, the user
does not need to re-train the model from scratch which requires large number
of data, high computing resources, and large amount of time for training to
come up with the effective model.
However, there are challenges in applying the transfer learning in the domain of WF attacks. These challenges come from the fact that the distribution
of data used to train the pre-trained and test the model can be likely changed
over period of time due to dynamic website’s contents and different TBB’s
versions. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how effective of the transfer learning in the domain of WF attacks would be under these challenging
scenarios compared to the TF attack.
In fact, the TF attack also provides the transfer learning property in which
the attacker can adopt the pre-trained model from triplet networks to perform WF attacks. To clearly distinguish between the aforementioned transfer
learning and the TF attack using NSL with tripet networks, we will use the
Traditional approach term to represent to the general transfer learning techniques mentioned above and use the TF approach to represent the our TF
attack using N-Shot Learning with triplet networks method.
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Figure 4.12: The process of training and re-training the pre-trained model
(traditional transfer learning approach)
Experimental setting
• The traditional approach: The pre-trained model uses the DF model’s
architecture and is trained with the AWF775 containing 775 websites;
each websites has 1,000 network traffic examples; 775,000 training instances in total. In this approach, we evaluate two different scenarios as
in the Exp1 and Exp2 including:
– WF attacks regardless of website’s labels: The pre-trained
model is re-trained with the AWF100 dataset with the sizes of [1,
5, 10, 15, 20] examples and test with the other 70 examples of
each website. As you can see, we set the portion of network examples used for re-training and testing to be the same as in previous
experiments to make fairly comparable results to the TF attack.
This setting demonstrates the scenario in which the distributions
of training (AWF775) and testing (AWF100) datasets are the same.
– WF attacks with different data distributions: In contrast
to the first scenario, the pre-trained model is re-trained with the
Wang100 dataset, but still maintain the same portions of the sizes
of examples used for re-training and testing. This setting demonstrates the scenario in which the distributions of training (AWF775)
and testing (Wang100) datasets are the different.
It is important to note that, due to size of re-training data is relatively
small, we follow the recommendations in machine learning (ML) to retrain model by freezing the k early layers out of all n layers during the
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Table 4.7: The performance of WF attacks regardless of website’s labels using
transfer learning techniques (Accuracy of the attack)
Approach
Traditional
TF

1
27.9 ± 5.0
79.2 ± 1.3

Number of N Example(s)
5
10
15
87.6 ± 0.4
92.2 ± 0.6

93.4 ± 0.2
93.9 ± 0.2

95.2 ± 0.1
94.4 ± 0.3

20
95.1 ± 0.1
94.5 ± 0.2

re-training process6 . We also test with different k that can maximize
the accuracy of the attack and find that freezing all prior layer except
the last FC layer with softmax provides the highest accuracy. Thus, we
use the setting where we freeze n-1 layers to re-train the pre-trained
model. The demonstration of the process of training and re-training the
pre-trained model for the traditional transfer learning approach is shown
in Figure 4.12.
• The TF approach: We use the same experimental settings for training
and testing processes as described in the EXP1 and EXP2

Result
Table 4.7 shows the performance of WF attacks regardless of website’s labels
using transfer learning techniques. The results show that the TF approach
performs significantly better compared to the traditional approach when the
available number of N examples is small (N = 1 or N = 5). We observe that
after number N examples starts growing up, both approaches similarly perform
well with over 93% accuracy. The results can be inferred that both TF and
traditional approaches meet the goals of improvement including Flexibility and
Transferability and Bootstrap Time. If the attacker has a small dataset used
to re-train the classifier e.g. the attacker who has limited computing resource,
the TF approach is the better choice for this situation. The results also shed
the light of improving WF attack application in which a group of highlyresourceful attacker can periodically train powerful pre-trained models form
large dataset and other attackers can adopt it. On top of that, the transfer
learning property in WF attacks can increase landscape of the attack in WF in
6

http://www.deeplearningessentials.science/transferLearning/
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Table 4.8: The performance of WF attacks with different distributions of
training and testing datasets using transfer learning techniques (Accuracy of
the attack)
Approach
Traditional
TF

1
8.6 ± 1.4
73.1 ± 1.8

Number of N Example(s)
5
10
15
31.1 ± 0.9
84.5 ± 0.4

49.0 ± 0.5
86.2 ± 0.4

52.5 ± 0.4
86.6 ± 0.3

20
56.3 ± 0.9
87.0 ± 0.3

which anyone regardless of the computing power he has can perform effective
WF attacks.
However, the effectiveness of the attacks of the traditional approach has
significantly degraded under more challenging scenario. Table 4.8 shows the
performance of WF attacks with different distributions of training and testing
datasets using transfer learning approaches. The results demonstrates that the
traditional approach significantly gets adverse effect from the data mismatch
issue resulted from the different distributions of training and testing datasets.
In contrast to the TF approach, the performance of the attacks is noticeably
higher than the traditional approach, interpreting that the TF approach can
effectively better mitigate the negative effect from the data mismatch problem.
As we see, with small N examples e.g. N = 5, the TF approach provides 50%
higher accuracy than the traditional approach. Furthermore, even if the size
of N becomes larger e.g. N = 20, the accuracy of attack in the traditional
approach is still held to only 56% compared to the TF approach in which the
accuracy could reach up to 87%.
The results suggest that if the attacker wants to adopt the pre-trained
model and realizes that the dataset used for training the model is likely to
be dissimilar to the dataset he plans to use to perform his WF attack, the
pre-trained model generated from the TF approach is the better candidate.
Otherwise, the attacker may need to either re-train the model with a whole new
dataset in which the larger number of dataset for training model is required
or adopting the pre-trained model that is periodically trained to ensure that
the distributions between training and testing data are not heavily dissimilar.
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4.6.6

Exp4: Open-World Scenario

In the previous experiments, we have explored the performance of the TF attack in different scenarios. However, the results are considered as the closedworld evaluations in which the attacker assumes that the users will always visit
the websites within the set of monitored websites. Thus, it renders the processes of newly-training and testing model to rely only on the set of monitored
websites.
In this experiment, we now evaluate the performance of the TF attack
in the more realistic open-world setting. In the open-world, we measure the
performance of the classifier to recognize the unknown network traffic captured
from the user as monitored or unmonitored website. We apply precision and
recall to evaluate the performance of the attacks.

Experimental Setting
We use the standard model as previously performed in the DF attack [45] in
which we include additional one class’s label as unmonitored website during
the newly-training process. We also measures two different scenarios as in
Exp1 and Exp2. The detail of how we newly train the pre-trained model
adopted from the triplet networks and test the classifier for each scenario is
described as following:
• WF attacks regardless of website’s labels: We use AWF100 dataset
as the monitored websites and AWF9000 as the unmonitored websites.
We newly train and test the model with network traffic examples from
1) AWF100 dataset, 20 examples of each websites are reserved for the
dataset used to newly training the model and the other 70 examples
used for testing. 2) AWF9000 dataset, 1,000 examples used for newly
training the model and the other 8,000 examples used for testing.
• WF attacks with different data distributions: We use Wang100
dataset as the monitored websites and Wang9000 as the unmonitored
websites. We newly train and test the model with network traffic examples from 1) Wang100 dataset, 20 examples of each websites are reserved
for the dataset used to newly training the model and the other 70 examples used for testing. 2) Wang9000 dataset, 1,000 examples used for
newly training the model and the other 8,000 examples used for testing.
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Table 4.9: Open-World: Results when tuned for precision and tuned for recall
for WF attacks regardless of website’s labels
N-Examples
5
10
15
20

Tuned for Precision
Precision
Recall
0.871
0.908
0.891
0.873

0.808
0.788
0.829
0.862

Tuned for Recall
Precision Recall
0.804
0.730
0.692
0.706

0.893
0.948
0.966
0.968

Table 4.10: Open-World: Results when tuned for precision and tuned for recall
for WF attacks regardless with different data distributions
N-Examples
5
10
15
20

Tuned for Precision
Precision
Recall
0.973
0.953
0.944
0.933

0.831
0.879
0.903
0.907

Tuned for Recall
Precision Recall
0.950
0.922
0.908
0.905

0.950
0.971
0.983
0.978

Result
Figure 4.13 shows precision-recall curves in the open-world setting for the attacks regardless of website’s labels scenario, while Table 4.9 shows the results
when the attack is tuned for precision or tuned for recall. The open-world
results are fairly effective with moderately high precision and recall. For example, with N = 10, the attacks could reach to 0.908 precision and 0.788
recall when tuned for precision, and 0.730 precision and 0.948 recall when
tuned for recall. In the case of WF attacks with different distributions as
demonstrated in Figure 4.14 and Table 4.10, the results show highly effective
attacks of the TF attack in the open-world scenario. For example, with N =
10, the attacks could reach to 0.953 precision and 0.879 recall when tuned for
precision, and 0.922 precision and 0.971 recall when tuned for recall. Overall,
the performance of the TF attack dwin both scenarios is effective in which the
attacker can successfully detect large numbers of monitored websites (High
Recall) and correctly identify the unknown traffic as the monitored website
with high confidence (High Precision).
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It is interesting to see that the results of open-world scenarios are conversely different from the closed-world scenario which is not normal situations.
However, there is intuitive explanation behind this circumstance. As mentioned above, the performance of WF attacks in open-world scenario mainly
relies on the ability to distinguish between the monitored and unmonitored
websites. It turns out the monitored and unmonitored websites in Wang
dataset seems to be uniquely different due to the criteria they used to define the list of websites for the sets of monitored and unmonitored websites.
As reported in Wang et al. work [54], the monitored websites are specifically
listed from the set blocked websites from China, the UK, and Saudi Arabia.
We observe that many websites within the list of monitored websites are unique
in term of theirs contents making each website more fingerprintatble. Thus,
we believe the highly fingerprintable monitored websites in Wang dataset is responsible for the inconsistent results between the closed-world and open-world
scenarios.

4.6.7

Exp5: TF Attack agaisnt WTF-PAD Defense

We further evaluate the performance of the TF attack against WTF-PAD
defense; the defense that is the main candidate to be deploy in Tor.
Experimental Setting
To train the triplet networks to perform the attack against the defended
network traffic traces, the model is required to be trained on the defended
traces; the traces after being applied a defense. However, we cannot generate the WTF-PAD defended traces from AWF dataset because it contains
only packet’s directions and WTF-PAD requires the timing information used
for dummy packet’s padding decision. Therefore, we alternately simulated
the WTF-PAD traces from the DF95 dataset which contains both packet’s
direction and its timing information to evaluate the performance of the TF
attack regardless of website’s labels. Furthermore, we use the model trained
on the WTF-PAD DF dataset and simulate WTF-PAD traces from Wang100
as the newly-training and testing dataset to evaluate the performance of the
TF attack with different data distributions.
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Figure 4.13: Open-world: Precision and Recall (WF attacks regardless of
website’s labels)
Result
Tables 4.11 shows the performance of the TF attack against WTF-PAD defense
in two different scenarios. The results reveal that the accuracy of the attacks
in both cases significantly decrease compared to the non-defended dataset in
Table 4.4 and Table 4.6. As we see, it requires at least 15 examples in the case
of WF attacks regardless of website’s label to reach to 60% accuracy. In the
case of WF attacks with different data distributions, the performance is even
worse and can only reach to 50% accuracy with 15 examples.
However, if we compare the performance of the TF attack using small
dataset (15 examples/class) with the previously-proposed WF attacks requiring large dataset (1,000 examples/class) to train the classifier, The TF attack
can similarly perform or outperform those attacks. For example, the TF at-
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Figure 4.14: Open-world: Precision and Recall (WF attacks with different
data distributions)
tack (60.2%) can similarly well in term of the accuracy of the attack compared
to CUMUL (60.3%) and AWF(60.8%) attacks. Moreover, it can outperform
SDAE (36.9%), k -NN (16.0%) and p-FP(57.0%) attacks.
The further study on how to improve the performance of the TF attack
against WF defenses need to be done and we leave it as the future work.

4.6.8

Exp6: Top-n and k -Way Accuracy

• Top-n: The top-n accuracy is the percentage of correct predictions in
which we consider not only the highest probability (Top-1 prediction),
but also the top-n probability values. In WF attacks, using top-n prediction helps the attacker to scope down n possible websites that the
user may visit. The attacker can additionally apply more powerful clas-
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Table 4.11: The performance of the TF attack against WTF-PAD defense
(Accuracy of the attack)
Type of
Experiment

1

5

N-Example
10

15

20

Disjointed Websites 20.5 ± 1.6 54.1 ± 0.7 57.8 ± 0.6 60.2 ± 0.4 61.2 ± 0.4
Different Distributions 15.5 ± 1.7 39.8 ± 0.5 47.2 ± 1.1 50.1 ± 0.4 51.7 ± 0.5

sifier or other different features e.g. timing information to make more
accurate predictions.
• k -Way: The k -Way accuracy is to evaluate how the performance of classification changes when the size of the problem becomes larger or smaller.
For example, we commonly used testing size (number of monitored websites) = 100; 100-way accuracy. It is interesting to investigate that if the
attacker is interested in a smaller number of monitored websites, how
much the maximum accuracy the attack can achieve.

Experimental Setting
In the Top-n and k -Way accuracy, we set n = [1, 2, 5] and k = [100, 75, 50, 25]
to evaluate the performance of the attacks for the all possible combinations of
n and k with different number of N Example(s) used by the TF attack in each
scenario. To effectively demonstrate the impact of top-n accuracy, we fixed
the size of k -Way to be 100. Likewise, we show the impact of k -Way accuracy
by fixing the Top-n where n=1.

Result
• WF attacks regardless of website’s label: As we see from Figure 4.15, we observe that the N-Shot Learning where N >= 5 shows the
consistent improvement in Top-2 and Top-5 predictions. The accuracy
can reach up to 95% accuracy in Top-2 prediction with 5-Shot Learning.
For k -Way results, the smaller size of problem demonstrates the improvement of accuracy e.g. 50-Way with 5-Shot Learning, the accuracy
slightly improves from 100-Way with ∼2%. Moreover, we observe that
1-Shot Learning gains larger increase with with ∼4% accuracy compared
to others.
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Figure 4.15: The Top-n (Left) and the k -Way (Right) accuracy of WF attacks
regardless of website’s labels (Non-defended dataset).

Figure 4.16: The Top-n (Left) and the k -Way (Right) accuracy of WF attacks regardless of website’s with different data distributions (Non-defended
dataset).
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• WF attacks with different data distributions: According to Figure 4.16, we observe that the attacks have larger increase compared
to the WF attacks regardless of website’s label especially with N-Shot
Learning where N >= 5. In term of Top-n prediction, from Top-1 to
Top-2 and from Top-1 to Top-5, the accuracy consistently improves with
∼5% and ∼10% respectively. For k -Way prediction, the accuracy of the
attack gradually improves as k gets smaller except for 1-Shot Learning
that gains significant increase with ∼5% accuracy when k is reduced
from k = 100 to k = 50.
Overall, the results show the consistent increase of the accuracy with the
larger Top-n and smaller k -Way. The improved accuracy form Top-1 to Top2 can be interpreted that the triplet model cannot perform well enough to
move the embedded vector to be closest to the corresponding website in the
embedding space. However, it is closed enough to be in the second closest
neighbor. This suggests that the improvement of the subnetwork or the larger
number of websites used for training model can possibly be the key factors to
substantially improve quality of the model and ultimately increase the performance of the attacks. The results also reveal that if the attacker is interested
in detecting a smaller set of websites, the performance of the attack can be
improved.

4.7

Discussion

It is possible to argue about the actual benefits of having a small n network
traffic examples/website other than the Replicability and Bootstrap time properties. What if the attacker does not seriously worry about the Bootstrap Time
and, for some reasons, he is willing to spend weeks to collect the large dataset
and achieve very high accuracy of the attack.
Actually, there are other key benefits of restricting the number of n network
traffic examples/website to be small including
• WF attacks against interactive websites: It is well-known that
there are many websites that their contents have frequently and dynamically changed at the up-to-the-minute level. Thus, it is challenging and
more difficult task to use the traditional supervised learning that is required a rich of dataset to train the classifier to fingerprint such websites.
On top of that, the network traffic examples collected from these websites
consequentially contain drastically-different patterns within the certain

CHAPTER 4. IMPROVED WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS 93
website’s contents. Thus, it could possibly result in the reduction of accuracy of the attack. In contrast, The TF attack using NSL with triplet
networks allows the attacker to collect mostly up-to-date network traffic
examples and immediately use them to train the WF classifier to predict
the unknown traffic captured from the user since the number of required
examples is small. For example, if N =5 or 5-Shot Learning, it requires
approximately 5 minutes/website for crawling, feed them to newly train
the WF classifier, and can immediately perform the classification task.
• Webpages fingerprinting attacks: The previous work in website fingerprinting attacks has only focused on fingerprinting the homepage of
each websites, not considering all webpages within the website. The
smaller N network traffic examples required for training the classifier to
detect each webpage will allow the attacker to fingerprint a larger number of webpages if we compare side-by-side in term of the cost of time
required for training and testing the WF classifier.
• Landscape of the attack: The ability of using the pre-trained model
with a small N network examples can help the attacker reduce the cost
in term of time and computing power required to train the classifier to
perform the attack. Thus, NSL expands the landscape of the attack in
which the attack is not only limited to the attacker with highly-capable
computing resources, but also anyone who can gain access to the pretrained model.

4.8

Conclusion

In this work, we answer the RQ3: How can the WF attacks using DL
be improved with more realistic assumptions?. We review and analyze
the previously-applied WF assumptions to explore the ones that need to be
addressed to improve WF attacks.
We find the set of assumptions that have not made and handled properly including Replicability, Bootstrap Time, Flexibility and Transferability.
According to these assumptions, we set up the WF attacks’s goals of improvements as the expected properties for our newly-proposed WF attacks described
as follow:
• Replicability: The improved attacks should be robust against the adverse effect from the data mismatch issue resulted from different distributions of training and testing data.
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• Bootstrap Time: The attacker should be capable of training on one
dataset and can be effectively later used for the new dataset, avoiding
the large amount of time for training the new classifier from scratch.
• Flexibility and Transferability: The improved attacks should be effectively able to predict the network traces regardless of the website’s
labels used to initially train the classifier.
• Performance of the attack: Under the above improvements with
more challenging scenarios, the performance of improved attacks can
still remain effective.
We propose the novel WF attack’s framework that can meet the aforementioned goals of improvements, namely, the Triplet Fingerprinting (TF) attack.
The TF attack is based on the implementation of the ML technique called
N-Shot Learning (NSL) with triplet networks. Moreover, we design a set of
comprehensive experimental evaluations and demonstrate that the TF attack
can further improve the WF attacks with respect to the goals of improvements, also overcome or mitigate the adverse effects under different scenarios
with more challenging limitations. According to our experimental results, we
answer RQ3 based on our findings:
• We show that, under the scenario that the training and testing data are
similar in term of their distributions, the attacker uses only 5 network
traffic examples/website generated by the TF attack’s pre-trained model
to newly train the WF classifier. The accuracy of the attack remains very
effective with over 92% of accuracy. Thus, the attacker who performs the
attack under this scenario, does not need to be worried that whether or
not the pre-trained model includes his monitored websites. The results
at this stage currently demonstrate that the TF attack meet Flexiblity
and Transferability, Bootstrap Time and Performance of the attack.
• To evaluate the Replicability improvement, we extensively add more challenging scenario in which the training and testing data are different in
term of their distributions. We shows that even if the pre-trained model
using NSL is trained from the dataset collected from the different TBB
version with over 3-year different period compared to the current time
that the model is adopted to perform WF attacks, the attacker can use
this pre-trained model with only 5 network traffic examples/website and
achieve moderately effective attacks with almost 85% accuracy.
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• In comparison to the traditional transfer learning, we shows that pretrained model in the TF attack can significantly perform better when
the number of available training data is small under the scenario that
the training and the testing data distributions are similar. Moreover, we
shows that the pre-trained model in the TF attack can hugely perform
better than the traditional transfer learning in all settings under more
challenging scenario in which the training and the testing data distributions are different. The results confirms that the TF attack can provide
the Replicability improvement by mitigating the adverse effect of data
mismatch issue.
• In more realistic open-world setting, we show that the TF attack still
remains effective. Overall, the performance of the TF attack attains
over 0.9 precision and 0.8 recall when tuned for precision. The results
demonstrate that the TF attack has become the potential threat for the
current Tor’s users since there is no effective WF defense that is now
realistically deployed in Tor.
• We also demonstrate the performance of the TF attack against WTFPAD defense. The results shows that the TF attack cannot effectively
undermine the WTF-PAD defense, however, it can outperform some of
the previously-proposed state-of-the-art WF attacks, setting up the new
direction of research to improve the TF attack to undermine the WF
defenses.
• We also report the Top-n and k -Way accuracy to provide more comprehensive evaluations. The evaluations help the attacker to either make
the prediction more accurate or gain better understanding in the trends
of accuracy when the size of problem is changed.
• Finally, we provide the discussion to demonstrate other benefits of using
NSL to develop WF attacks.
According to our findings, the RQ3 is now answered by our newly-proposed
TF attack that can improve the WF attacks with more realistic assumptions
and under more challenging scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first in the WF research group who study and evaluate how to apply NSL
to improve WF attacks. Moreover, the results mostly shows effective performance of the attacks, providing promising research’s directions to further
investigate how to apply NSL to develop better WF attacks in the future.

Chapter 5

Website Fingerprinting
Defenses
“The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot
fathom our real intent.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
It appears that our work in website fingerprinting (WF) attacks using deep
learning (DL) with deep fingerprinting (DF) model can effectively undermine
WTF-PAD; the defense that had been considered seriously for deployment in
Tor [45]. This finding highlights the need for WF defenses that can effectively
protect against the WF attacks using DL and can be practically deployed in
Tor. Thus, it has motivated us to further study about how the WF defenses
should be improved to maintain a sufficient level of security and remain practical for deployment in the real Tor network in term of network overheads as
mentioned in RQ4.
In this chapter, we propose the study, investigation and evaluation about
how to apply ML techniques to develop WF defenses that can be robust to
the state-of-the-art WF attacks using DL.

5.1

WF Defenses Mechanisms and Frameworks

The major goal of WF defense is to confuse the classifier by distorting the network traffic examples to conceal their distinguishable features used to identify
each website. The fundamental mechanisms to distort the patterns of traffic traces is to introduce the dummy packets and/or delay the packets. If
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Figure 5.1: The supersequence defenses framework example (Walkie-Talkie)
we consider the lightweight WF defenses which are preferable in term of network overheads, there are two types of frameworks that basically applied these
mechanisms to create effective WF defenses including:

5.1.1

Supersequence Defenses

The concept of this framework is to create collisions between the set of websites. The collision means that at least two different network traces are transformed by adding dummy packets to make them look exactly the same. For
example, website A (Subsequence) and website B (Subsequence) are transformed to look like website C (Supersequence). Once the collision occurs, the
classifier cannot accurately predict the actual website to which the given network trace should belong e.g. if the classifier predicts that this network trace
should be website C, the classifier needs to deal with uncertainty as the predicted website C could be either the website A or the website B or the website
C. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the example of the lightweight WF defense; the
Walkie-Talkie (W-T) [57] that applies this framework.
However, W-T has the issues in term of the deployability in Tor as we provided the discussion and criticism in Chapter 3. Thus, this type of framework
is not the focus of our study since we would like to develop the WF defense
that could be practically deployed in Tor.

5.1.2

Adaptive-flow Defenses

The basic mechanism of an adaptive-flow framework is to change the patterns
of network sequences by designing a procedure to sophisticately figure out how
to pad dummy packets and/or delay packets. The defense that is applied this
method is WTF-PAD [25]. Figure 5.2 depicts the procedure based on the
concept of Adaptive Padding [44] that aims to only add the dummy packets
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Figure 5.2: The adaptive-flow defenses framework example (WTF-PAD)
upon low usage of the channel such as large gap between the bursts, thus
masking traffic bursts and their corresponding features.
The major advantage of this framework is practicality and deployability in
Tor. In comparison to the supersequnce framework, the adaptive-flow framework does not need a database of websites and the change of network communication protocol as required in the W-T defense. Moreover, Tor developers
have expressed a preference for using the adaptive-flow framework over the
suppersequnce one. Thus, our research work will mainly focus on developing
the WF defense based upon this framework.

5.2

WF Defenses against WF attacks using DL

In this section, we provide the intuitive explanation about why the adaptiveflow defense such as WTF-PAD is undermined by WF attacks using DL. We
then describe the key challenges of the design of WF defenses that need to
handle to prevent WF attacks using DL. This will provide a navigation to our
proposed method to use ML techniques to create the new WF defense in the
next following sections.

5.2.1

Failure Cause of WTF-PAD

All of the previous WF defenses are based on hiding the features in which the
classifiers use to predict the websites. The traditional WF attacks that do not
apply DL such as k -NN [54], CUMUL [35], k -FP [20] are generally trained to
classify the websites with respect to the hand-crafted and deterministic set of
features such as the burst of sequences, cumulative sum of packets’ size, and
so on. Thus, the previous WF defenses mainly target these features and try to
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conceal their distinguishable features by applying WF defenses mechanisms.
In WTF-PAD, it targets the large gap between the burst and dynamically add
the dummy packets resulted in distorting these given features. The results of
WTF-PAD against the traditional WF attacks have shown to be effective by
significantly reducing the accuracy of the attacks from WF classifiers using
hand-crafted set of features from over 90% down to lower than 30%.
However, WTF-PAD is effectively undermined by the WF attacks using
DL; the DF attack [45]. The explanation behinds the failure cause of WTFPAD against the DF attack is due to the advantages of DL over the traditional
ML. These advantages including:
• DL can learn the hidden features from the network traffic. Thus, there
are still left-over hidden features that the researchers cannot easily figure
out to use them for training effective WF classifier to perform the attack.
• DL can detect any small region or portion of distinguishing patterns, no
matter where those patterns are located in the trace. Moreover, DL is
more robust to the small distortion of the data e.g. a small shifting of
packet’s sequence from adding dummy packets.
We now consider why WTF-PAD fails against the DF attack by examining
the adaptive padding algorithm at the heart of WTF-PAD. Adaptive padding
which is the fundamental padding protocol for WTF-PAD that aims to detect
large timing gaps between bursts and use padding to make these gaps less
distinctive. However, due to the advantages of DL classifier over the classifiers
using hand-crafted features mentioned above, the DF model can still detect
patterns that remain after the WTF-PAD is applied. Moreover, adaptive
padding only randomly disrupts some patterns in the trace with light-weighted
additional overhead, leaving other patterns relatively unperturbed.

5.2.2

Key Challenges and Expected Design

Previous WF defenses were mainly designed to hide distinguished patterns
based on the deterministic set of features. However, we have learned from the
previous section that the failure cause of WTF-PAD against the DF attack is
due to the ability of detecting the hidden features. This raises the questions
that what the key challenges of the design for the new WF defenses that need
to deal with in order to be robust against WF using DL are. We summarize
the key challenges as following:
• Features Knowledge: The WF defenses cannot rely on the deterministic features knowledge that used to be the main reference for the
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design of previous WF defenses anymore since the DL can still extract
the hidden features. Moreover, exploring the new set of features that can
possibly hide the distinguished patterns from DL may not be a sustainable solution. The reason is that trying to identify the hidden features
is complicated task and time consuming.
• Overhead of Defenses: The effort of heavily adding bandwidth overhead by padding a huge number of dummy packets may finally make
the network traffic mostly indistinguishable. However, the defenses will
be no longer practical in the Tor as it will cause unacceptable network
overhead resulting in the bad quality of services.
• Deplayability: The new defenses need to be able to deploy without
requiring the significant changes in the Tor network communication protocols, and can be implement directly on Tor in both client and the Tor’s
nodes. Thus, the defenses framework is limited to the dynamic-flow defense as WTF-PAD proposed.
Therefore, the expected design of the new WF defense needs to have the
ability to conceal the distinguished patterns of the network traffic without
requiring the design of the new features and can still effectively mitigate the
accuracy of the WF attack using DL. Moreover, the new defense should provide
moderate additional bandwidth and latency overhead to the Tor system to
ensure the quality of services. Finally, the defenses need to be practically
deployed and applied on the Tor without requiring the major change in the
system for both client’s side and Tor’s nodes.

5.2.3

Transparent Interpretable Defense

As described in the previous section, our expected design of the new WF
defense mainly focuses on the performance of WF defense and its practical
deployment. However, there is another additional expected design that we
would to include to our new WF defenses which is the Transparent interpretable property.
The transparent interpretable property requires the system to have the
process to explain how the model makes such a decision. The Neural Network
Follies 1 is a classic example that is well-known to explain the importance of
having this property. In this example, the Pentagon wanted to harness the
neuron networks to identify military tanks by training the model with 100
1

https://neil.fraser.name/writing/tank/
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photos of tanks behind the trees, and 100 photos of trees without tanks. The
performance of the system was perfect with 100% accuracy. However, after
investigation, it turns that images with tanks were taken on a cloudy day, and
images without tanks were taken on a sunny day. Thus, the real ability of this
system was not to detect the tank, but to detect the whether it was cloudy or
not. Therefore, if the system has the mechanism to explain why the system
makes such a decision and not only rely on the accuracy of the classification,
it could prevent this scenario from happening.
In WF attacks and defenses, transparent interpretable property can substantially help the research to gain better understanding on why a particular attack is successful/failed on a particular defense, not only depending on
the accuracy of the attack. On top of that, the WF defenses’ designer can
use this information demonstrating how the model predicts what it predicts
as a reference to effectively develop the WF defenses. Therefore, we add the
Transparent Interpretable Defense property into the last expected design
of our WF defenses. The detail of how the transparent interpretable property
is applied in WF defenses will be subsequently described in the section 5.3
and 5.4.

5.3
5.3.1

WF Defenses through Visual Explanation
Visual Explanation for Images

The effort to identify the hidden features used to make a prediction is difficult
since the process of learning features happens inside the hidden layers. Thus, it
prevents the WF defenses from identifying particular distinct features used for
the prediction. To overcome this limitation, we propose the new perspective
to differently handle the difficulty of exploring the features by using a ML
techniques to perform visual explanation in deep neural networks (DNNs).
The visual explanation is one of the studies to explore the techniques that can
help build the transparent models to answer the question that “why the model
predict what it predicts”.
The technique that we investigate is the Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) [43]. Grad-CAM is originally developed from the
technique called Class Activation Mapping (CAM) [61]. The CAM is used to
identify discriminative regions used by a restricted class of image classification.
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the high-level process of how apply the Grad-CAM
technique to provide visual explanation for the given DL model. As we see, if
we have the DL model that is trained on a set of objects. Once, we applied the
Grad-CAM, we just simply feed the particular input, and the model will then
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Figure 5.3: The process of how the Grad-CAM technique can be applied to
provide visual explanation for the given DL model
extract the higher level features to the last convolutional layer that contains
the feature maps. Then, the Grad-CAM will use gradient of the predicted
value with respect to each element in the feature maps to generate new value
of each element. These values represent how important of the region in these
feature maps is. The compelling property of these feature maps is that they
have the same spatial representation as the input, e.g. the top right in the
feature map is corresponding to the top right of the input as well. Thus, if
we can identify which parts of the feature maps are more important for the
prediction of the model than others, we can effectively visualize which parts
of the input that the model used for a certain predicted result. Finally, the
output of the Grad-CAM is the overlay heatmap that demonstrate important
regions of the input used for the model for its predicted result.

5.3.2

Motivation

The visual explanation technique used to generate heatmaps allows humans
to understand how the DNNs make their predictions. We observe that the
heatmaps are comparable to the area on which the human’s eyes focus and
use to identify what the object is or what the activity is happening in the
images. Similarly, the eyes of the classifiers heavily emphasize only on the
particular region to make their predictions. Thus, it has motivated us to
possibly utilize the Grad-CAM for WF defenses in two different directions:
• Grad-CAM as examiner: We evaluate the possibility to use the
Grad-CAM to examine the network traffic examples from the previouslyproposed WF defenses to gain better understanding about why they were
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Figure 5.4: The work diagram demonstrating how to use the DF model with
the Grad-CAM technique to generate a visual representation of the relative
importance score’s graph from each network traffic trace
failed/successful to prevent WF attacks. Grad-CAM will help us gain insight information in more visually meaningful ways. Moreover, what we
learn from this examination will help us to visually examine our newlyproposed WF defense compared to the previous WF defenses and will
promote the transparent interpretable property of our defense.
• Grad-CAM as controller: We evaluate the possibility to use the
Grad-CAM to control the padding mechanisms to create the new WF
defense with respect to the temperature of the heatmaps. In this case,
we call the intensity of the temperature as the relative importance score
representing how important of each input’s element is; the higher value,
the more importance it is. Therefore, the degree of perturbation (adding
dummy packets) will be stochastically assigned with respect to the importance score of the heatmap on a particular area.

5.3.3

Grad-CAM Implementation in WF

As the original Grad-CAM implementation is based on the image’s data, we
first study how to implement the Grad-CAM in WF in which the data is
network traffic. We find that there are differences due to the data input’s
formats between image’s data and network traffic data. Thus, we need to
revise and adjust the implementation to be appropriate for WF. First, the
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Figure 5.5: Relative Important Score/Website’s Traces: The work diagram of
generating the Grad-CAM relative importance score’s graphs from the overall
network traffic inputs of the given website
input data of network traffic is a 1D array containing the sequence of packet’s
directions in which +1 represents an outgoing packet and -1 represents an
incoming packet. In contrast, the original implementation of the Grad-CAM
is for image’s data in which the data input’s format is the 2D array including
the sequence of value pixels’ intensity. Second, the network traffic is not
interpretable and understandable by the human’s perceptions, thus, using the
heatmaps may not be appropriate to show the degree of importance.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the process of generating a relative importance
score from a given network traffic example. Each network traffic input is
fed into the Grad-CAM applied to the DF model and the output will be the
relative importance score for each point of data in the input. As you can see
that we improve the visualization and the interpretation of the importance
score, instead of using the heatmap overlaying the input as it used to be in
Figure 5.3, we derive the importance score into the Relative Importance Score
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graph. The relative importance score is a normalized heatmap’s score into the
float number in the range between [0.0, 1.0]; 1.0 represents the score of the
most important region. A packet number in the X axis represents the sequence
of the data point (ith packet sequence) within the given input (network traffic
example). In this case, the size of input is fixed to be 5000, thus, the packets
number are ordered from 0th to 4999th . The new visualization technique we
propose help us acquire more meaningful representation about which part of
the network traffic is more/less important for the WF classifier to make its
prediction e.g. as we see from Figure 5.4, there is a wide range from packet
sequence 1200th to 3500th where their relative important scores are very high
with the values closed to 1.0. Thus, we can infer that the classifier mainly
uses this range of packet sequence as one of the main parts for its prediction.
Moreover, we improve our representation of the relative important score
from each instance level to each website level. This improvement comes from
the fact that WF attacks using DL normally use many examples to train the
classifier to recognize the particular website. Having overall relative important
score/website’s trace provides more general idea about how relative important
scores would be, not only for a particular trace, but also for many traces within
the website used to train the classifier. Figure 5.5 demonstrates the process
of generating the relative importance score’s graphs from the overall network
traffic inputs of the given website. Each green point that are sequentially
lined up represent the score for each data point. Note that, the green lines
are overlay with 800 network traffic examples from same website which is the
website number 85. The darker of the green is, the higher importance of the
data points is. Furthermore, we generate the average of the relative importance
score across 800 examples for each website to help improve interpretability of
the data. For example, we can interpret that website number 85 has the highly
distinguishable area from the 400th to 600th packet’s sequences in which the
blue line is at peak.
We then evaluate capability of the Grad-CAM for network traffic traces
in the WF implementation. We test by generating relative importance scores
from the DF dataset containing 95 different websites, each of website uses
800 network traces to generate their corresponding relative importance scores
being shown in the graphs. The main purpose of this evaluation is to preliminary check whether each of website has unique importance scores compared
to other different websites. Moreover, we check whether the network traces
within the same website are commonly shared the same importance scores.
This evaluation helps us ensure the viability of implementing Grad-CAM on
network traffic traces in two folds:

CHAPTER 5. WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING DEFENSES

106

• Differences among websites: If the Grad-CAM can reveal the important regions that are uniquely different among the websites, it will confirm the capability of the Grad-CAM to effectively differentiate the different websites. The different websites should have different distributions of
relative importance scores since they will be used as the unique features
representing their identity for discrimination. Simplistically speaking,
the classifier can have distinct area of focus used to classify the different
objects e.g. the region of human’s face used to identify ears is different
from the one used to identify nose.
• Common regions of importance: If the relative importance scores of
network traces within the same websites are commonly shared (mostly
overlap), it will ensure that the Grad-CAM can extract a good representation of the important regions of the inputs from the same class.
Simplistically speaking, the classifier use the same area to make a same
prediction e.g. to classify a nose, the classifier should focus on the central
region of the face across the different examples of the pictures labeled as
nose.
The results of our evaluation show that the implementation of the GradCAM on network traffic traces from different websites can provide both two
folds mentioned above: 1) the uniqueness of the importance scores for each
website among the different websites and 2) the commonly-shared importance
scores within the same websites as shown in Figure 5.6. It clearly shows that,
among different websites e.g. website 47 and website 85, their distributions
of relative importance scores for those websites are clearly different. Moreover, we observe that even if relative important scores of all network traffic
within the same class are not completely overlap, however, they are still commonly shared in different regions (darker green) and can be used as a good
representation of the website.

5.4
5.4.1

Grad-CAM as examiner
Relative Importance Scores Characteristic

Before we start designing the new defense, we use the Grad-CAM to learn
characteristics of relative important scores extracted from the previous WF
defenses. It is interesting to examine how the characteristics of relative importance scores extracted from previously-proposed WF defenses are. These
characteristics can be used as references for the design in which the new WF
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Figure 5.6: The examples of importance scores among different websites
defense should have similar characteristics to the successful WF defense. We
initially test with three different cases including:
• Non-Def (Base case): We use the Tor’s network traffic traces without additional defensive mechanisms called the Non-Def dataset. The
previous work shows that DF attack could attain 98% accuracy of the
attack. We use the Non-Def dataset as the base case.
• WTF-PAD (Failed defense case): We apply WTF-PAD defense to
the Tor’s network traffic traces to create WTF-PAD dataset. Due to the
fact that the DF attack can effectively undermine WTF-PAD defense
with over 90% accuracy, we use the WTF-PAD dataset as the failed
defense case.
• W-T (Successful defense case): We apply W-T defense to the Tor’s
network traffic traces to create W-T dataset. Without considering the
deployability issue, W-T provides security guarantee to the Tor’s networks and can hold the theoretical maximum accuracy of any attack to
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Figure 5.7: The comparison between characteristics of relative important
scores extracted from Non-Def, WTF-PAD and W-T dataset.
be at most 50%. We use the W-T dataset as the successful defense case.
Figure 5.7 shows the comparison between characteristics of relative important scores extracted from Non-Def, WTF-PAD and W-T datasets. It
turns out that there is a clear distinction between the failed defense and the
successful one. We observe that the relative important scores of the WTFPAD dataset (failed defense) tends to share the similar characteristics such
that there are many commonly-shared regions of importance within the given
website as in the base case. Thus, it could be inferred that the defensive
mechanism in WTF-PAD fails to hide these distinctive patterns, thus, the
DF attack can still detect very similar area of importance as in the Non-Def
(Base Case). In contrast to the W-T (successful defense), the distribution of
all relative importance scores tends to be dispersed and drastically different
from the base case and the failed defense case. Therefore, characteristic of
the relative importance score for the new defense should tend to output the
dispersed importance scores similar to W-T.
Moreover, the visual representation of the relative importance scores provides a new method to evaluate and to gain better understanding on the
performance of WF defenses in addition to the of accuracy alone. Thus, it
initially provides transparent and interpretable property to the design of WF
defense.
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Figure 5.8: The notations used to calculate FP-SD to measure the fingerprintability score of each website

5.4.2

Fingerprintability Score

Examining the characteristics of relative importance scores provides more intuitive guideline and reference to a design of a new WF defense. However,
when a number of websites are growing up, using only human’s eyes to justify
the characteristics of relative importance score is not an effective way and
vulnerable to human’s errors.
We develop the quantitative measurement to evaluate the fingerprintability score (FP score) of each website’s derived from the relative importance
scores. The fingerprintability refers to how distinctive of each website’s trace
is, the more distinctive, the higher chance that WF classifier can classify.
We preliminary evaluate different statistical measurements to select the most
appropriate choice used to calculate FC scores from the relative importance
score. We select FP-SD which is calculated from the standard deviation (SD)
of the mean of relative importance scores for the given website. The detail of
how to calculate FP-SD is shown in Figure 5.8 and described below.
We first calculate standard deviation σ for each website
r
X (X − µ)2
σ=
(5.1)
N
In this case, we replace the notations in the Equation 5.1 with respect to the
ones in Figure 5.8 so that X will be represented as the sequence m containing
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Figure 5.9: The FP-SD scores for each website with different datasets
the vector of [m0 , m1 , m2 , ... , m4999 ] in which mp is the mean of all relative
importance scores (s) at packet sequence p, and µ will be represented as the
mean of all elements in vector m. Thus, the new formula to calculate σ for
each website will be:
v
uN −1
u X (mp − µm )2
σ=t
(5.2)
N
p=0

where p = [0, 1, 2, ..., 4999] (Size of packet sequence P)
Equation 5.2 provides the FP-SD score to measure the fingerprintability
score of each website. Figure 5.9 demonstrates the FP-SD scores for each
website calculated from Non-Def, WTF-PAD and W-T datasets. The graphs
shows that most of the FP-SD scores in the failed defense case is close to the
base case (Non-Def) which is consistent to the high accuracy to which the DF
attack could attain (Failed to defend against WF attacks). In contrast, the
FP-SD scores in W-T dataset shows the significantly lower scores compared
to the others and farther away from the base case. Thus, it can be inferred
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Table 5.1: The overall FP-SD scores measuring the average FP-SD scores of
all websites with in the Non-Def, WTF-PAD and W-T datsets
Performance Measurements

Non-Def

WTF-PAD

W-T

Accuracy
FP-SD

98.4%
0.1999

90.4%
0.203

49.7%
0.102

that FP-SD scores can be used to measure the fingerprintability of each websites in which the higher the FP-SD score of each website is, the higher the
figerprintability of each website is.
To provide the overall fingerprintability of all websites in each dataset,
we calculate the overall FP-SD score by averaging the FP-SD scores from
all websites within the dataset. Table 5.1 shows the overall FP-SD scores
measuring the average FP-SD scores of all websites with in the Non-Def, WTFPAD and W-T datasets. The results show that the FP-SD scores from NonDef and WTF-PAD are closely similar and consistently represent the case of
failed WF defenses. On the other hand, The FP-SD score from W-T which
represents the successful WF defense case provides significantly different with
almost 100% lower score compared to the failed WF defenses case.
As you can see, we provide both qualitative (Relative importance score
characteristic) and quantitative (Fingerprintability score) measurements to be
additionally used for the design of WF defenses. Both measurements provide
a better understanding and can be used as the pre-assessment to provide
the references in term of what the new WF defense they design should be
with respect to the both measurements. We will definitely perform the postassessment on our newly-proposed WF defense to ensure the validity and the
transparent interpretable property of our WF defenses.

5.5

CAM-Pad WF Defense

We propose a novel WF defense called the CAM-Pad defense that provides
effective performance against WF attacks using DL with preferable deployability in Tor. In the next following sections, we will describe our initial design of
the CAM-Pad defense, the obstacles we have learned, and the improvement we
we have made until we finally and successfully create the CAM-Pad defense.
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Figure 5.10: The example of the padding mechanism base on the relative
importance scores.

5.5.1

Initial Design: CAM-Pad as Controller

Originally, we proposed a framework to apply the relative importance scores to
develop the novel WF defense. The mechanism of our defense is to use CAMPad as controller in which we simply apply random padding to the Website A’s
traffic based upon relative importance scores of Website A extracted from the
CAM-Pad. For example, if the given relative importance score of the particular
network traffic region is high, the chance of padding dummy packet(s) in this
region will be relatively high.
Figure 5.10 demonstrates the tentative example of how the WF defense
randomly pads dummy packet(s) with respect to the relative importance score
e.g. the probability of padding dummy packet(s) at the 1st and 400st packet
sequences are 0.4 and 0.6 respectively. The results of padding dummy packets
directly distort the recognized patterns of network traffic. It is important to
note that we apply the stochastic mechanism by randomly padding to add
more uncertainty and randomization of the perturbation across the network
traces. Thus, it makes the WF attacks classifiers even more difficult to learn
the distinguished patterns used to make a prediction.
However, when we consider the deployability factor, we find the serious
problems of the initially-designed framework including:
• Tor’s nodes and clients need to keep the updated version of relative importance scores for all websites to be used as the reference for performing
the padding mechanisms. It is impossible to generate and update all rel-
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ative important scores for all website’s around the world making this
framework impossible to be deployed in the Tor’s system.
• The Tor’s node that is acting as the defending node (the node that is
responsible for applying padding mechanisms) needs to be assumed to
know which website the client will visit before hand so that it can correctly choose the set of relative important score with respect to the given
website. Thus, Tor needs to additionally design the protocol to securely
inform which website that the user is visiting without compromising the
privacy of the Tor’s user.
Due to the deployability issues mentioned above, it turns out that using
local relative important scores for particular website is not an appropriate
way to design our new WF defense. In the next section, we propose the use of
Grad-CAM as controller in more generic and more practical which can improve
the deployability of the defense in Tor.

5.5.2

More generic CAM-Pad Defense

To overcome the deployability issue, we improve the design of the CAM-Pad
defense to be more generic and practical in term of implementation and deployability. The improved defense needs to be able to perform without requiring
extremely-large and up-to-dated datasets. We propose to use the global relative important scores as the references for performing padding mechanisms.
The processes of generating the global relative important score used for
padding mechanisms in the CAM-Pad defense are described as following:
• We first divide all the network traffic traces in our dataset into subsets of
similar length. In this case, we categorized them into 30 different sets.
For each set, we then average the packet’s relative importance scores
across network traces within the same set. This allows us to create
one global importance scores for each set of similar trace’s lengths e.g.
[GlobalScore1, GlobalScore2, ... GlobalScore30].
• Out of 30 global relative importance scores, they are re-categorized into
three different groups base on the length of websites
– Short-length websites [GlobalScore1 - GlobalScore10]
– Medium-length websites [GlobalScore11 - GlobalScore20]
– Long-length websites [GlobalScore21 - GlobalScore30]
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Figure 5.11: The example the final sequence of global relative important scores
used for performing padding mechanisms in the CAM-Pad defense.
• In each of three length-based group, one global score is randomly selected
to create vector of randomly-selected global scores e.g. [GlobalScore5,
GlobalScore15, GlobalScore26].
• We finally shuffle the randomly-selected global scores to generate the
final sequence of the global scores that will be combined to generate the
final global relative important scores used to apply for the defense e.g.
[GlobalScore26, GlobalScore5, GlobalScore15].
• The transition period between two different global scores is set to slightly
overlap with the random length ranged from (0-100) before the end of
each global score. Figure 5.11 shows the example of the final global
relative important score used for performing padding mechanisms in the
CAM-Pad defense.
According to the processes of generating global scores mentioned above,
they provide two important benefits to the CAM-Pad defenses including:
• Higher level of randomization is added via multi-level randomization
making it harder for the attacker to cancel the randomization out. For
example, 1) at the level of combining global scores, there are over thousands of possible combinations of the global scores. 2) at the level of
probability score with respect to different value of important score for
each point of packet’s sequence.
• The client and defensive-operating Tor’s node need to store only 1.2 MB
(30 Global Scores) without requiring the frequent update of the scores.
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Moreover, the final global score can be applied to any websites without
requiring to know the length of website the user is visiting beforehand.
Thus, it provides the practical implementation and deployability to the
CAM-Pad defense.

5.5.3

CAM-Pad Defense Design

The key idea of our defense is simple: we apply random padding to the traffic,
where the frequency of the padding is set to match the relative importance
score of that part of the trace as indicated in the global relative importance
score. Purely random padding is unlikely to be very effective, however, as that
would essentially add a noisy mask over parts of the trace. DL models have
been shown to remain effective despite random noise, except when the amount
of noise is very high, which would require high levels of padding overhead.
Furthermore, some random packets could be detected as obvious padding if
they do not follow the usual patterns of web traffic.
Since bursts of traffic have been used in several attacks as the primary
basis for creating effective hand-crafted features, we assume that burst characteristics remain important to DL-based attacks. We thus apply padding
such that it directly effects bursts in the trace. As in prior work using handcrafted features, we define a burst as a set of consecutive packets in a single
direction, incoming or outgoing. A website trace can then be thought of a
sequence of bursts, outgoing followed by incoming followed by outgoing and
so on until the trace ends. To modify a burst B, we can either extend the
burst by adding padding to B or break the burst by adding a fake burst F in
the opposite direction that splits B into two real bursts B1 and B2 , with F in
between them.
To evaluate these techniques, we have developed a simulator which operates
the CAM-Pad defense in two modes: Random Extend Bursts (REB) and
Random Break Bursts (RBB). A visual description of these algorithms is
shown in Figure 5.12.
The REB and RBB algorithms evaluate padding on a packet-by-packet
basis. In order to determine when padding should be applied, we compare
the relative importance score for the current packet sequence number to a
uniformly generated random value between zero and one. If the random value
is below the relative importance score of the packet in the CAM-Pad chart,
a burst of dummy packets is sent. To avoid back-to-back padding, we skip
padding on several packets after each evaluation. The number of packets
ignored is determined by sampling from a uniform distribution for a selected
interval f . When the algorithm decides to pad, the number of dummy packets
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Figure 5.12: Visual explanation of Extend Bursts and Break Bursts padding.
The direction of the arrow represents the direction of the packet, incoming or
outgoing.
sent is determined by sampling from a uniform distribution for a selected
interval l; the direction of padding is determined by the mode of operation.
The optimal intervals for f and l were determined by sweeping a reasonable
range of possible values for one while keeping the other constant.
The CAM-Pad defense using REB mode can be implemented with minimal
additional overhead, since packets need only be added at the end of a burst.
For the CAM-Pad defense using RBB mode, however, delay must be added
during the original burst B to enable the new fake burst F to arrive during
the break.

5.6
5.6.1

Evaluation
Dataset

When evaluating the effectiveness of a ML-based attack, it is important to
discuss the dataset used to train the model. The large dataset collected by
Sirinam et al. [45] was chosen for this purpose. This dataset contains traces
collected from the homepages of the top 100 websites ranked by Alexa. From
each website, 1,250 traces instances were collected. After discarding traces
with corrupt traffic, the final dataset includes 95,000 instances from 95 websites.
The CAM-Pad defenses on both REB and RBB modes are simulated using
this dataset. Given a website trace, our simulator adds fake packets and delays
according to the defense’s random choices. Delaying a packet by δ leads to
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Table 5.2: Deep Fingerpinting attack accuracy against WF defenses. Results
for all expect the CAM-Pad defense using REB and the CAM-Pad defense
using RBB are sourced from Sirinam et al. [45].
Overheads

Defense

Accuracy

Bandwidth

Latency

Non-Def
Tamaraw
WTF-PAD
Walkie-Talkie

0%
328%
64%
31%

0%
242%
0%
34%

98.3%
11.8%
90.7%
49.7%

CAM-Pad using REB
CAM-Pad using RBB

83%
83%

0%
28%

95.3%
66.7%

adding δ delay to all subsequent packets to ensure that the order remains the
same. Note that this may lead to more delay than in a real implementation,
though the exact effects are difficult to predict.

5.6.2

Closed-World Results

We mainly choose the DF attack which is the state-of-the-art WF attack using
DL to evaluate performance of the CAM-Pad defense.
In a closed-world setting, we discover that the CAM-Pad defense using
REB mode is largely ineffective against the DF model at reasonable overheads.
REB can only increase the size of existing bursts; the number of bursts does not
change and every large burst remains a large burst in the same sequence as the
original trace. On the other hand, the CAM-Pad defense using RBB changes
the burst sequence more dramatically. It not only adds fake bursts to the trace,
but also, it can make long bursts into multiple smaller bursts. Assuming that
long bursts are important to the classifier, RBB removes them as a possible
feature and masks their location relative to each other. This explains why RBB
can reduce classification accuracy significantly with reasonable overheads.
Compared to WTF-PAD, the CAM-Pad defense using RBB is much more
effective and can reduce the accuracy of the attack against the DF attack
down to 67%. This security comes at the cost of 19% additional bandwidth
overhead and 83% additional latency overhead in comparison to the network
traffic without defense (Non-Def dataset). We will further explore the tradeoffs in security and overheads in the future work.
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Figure 5.13: The comparison between characteristics of relative important
scores extracted from Non-Def, WTF-PAD, W-T and CAM-Pad datasets
Moreover, we additionally evaluate the CAM-Pad defense using RBB with
other state-of-the-art WF attacks using hand-crafted features including CUMUL, k -NN and k-FP attacks for comprehensive comparisons. The CAM-Pad
defense shows effective performance against those attacks holding the accuracy
of these attacks to be 51% for CUMUL, 16% for k -NN, and 25% for k -FP attacks.

5.6.3

Revisit: CAM-Pad as Examiner

As previously mentioned in Section 5.4, the WF defense designers can use
Grad-CAM as Examiner, not only for the pre-assessment, but also for the postassessment to validate the WF defense they have designed. In this section, we
evaluate the characteristics of the relative importance scores and the FP-SD
scores of the CAM-Pad defense to check whether or not our newly-proposed
CAM-Pad defense has the similarity to the successful defense.
We find that the characteristic of relative important scores extracted from
the dataset after applied the CAM-Pad defense is noticeably more diffuse and
looks similar to the successful defense case (W-T dataset) as shown in the
Figure 5.13. Thus, it indicates that the model has struggled to find consistent patterns in the traces of the same website. Moreover, we quantitatively
calculate the FP-SD score for each website as shown in Figure 5.14. We can
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Figure 5.14: The FP-SD scores for each website with different datasets (CAMPad dataset included)
Table 5.3: The overall FP-SD scores measuring the average FP-SD scores of
all websites with in the Non-Def, WTF-PAD, W-T and CAM-Pad datasets
Performance Measurements

Non-Def

WTF-PAD

W-T

CAM-Pad

Accuracy
FP-SD

98.4%
0.1999

90.4%
0.203

49.7%
0.102

67.7%
0.135

see that FP-SD scores of W-T and CAM-Pad defenses for each website are
mostly clustered within the same bottom group. On the other hand, the FPSD scores of WTF-PAD are frequently clustered and closed to the Non-Def
dataset. If we look at the big picture in term of the overall FP-SD across
all websites within the CAM-Pad dataset, Table 5.3 shows that FP-SD score
of the CAM-Pad dataset is at 0.135 and closed to the W-T dataset which is
considered as the successful defense.
Having not only the accuracy score, but also the qualitative and quantitative measurements directly extracted from the Grad-CAM contribute more
confidence for the WF defenses designer about the WF defense they have just
designed. In summary, the CAM-Pad defense can successfully provide effec-
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Table 5.4: Open-World: Results when tuned for precision and tuned for recall
for the DF attack against Non-Def, WTF-PAD, W-T and CAM-Pad datasets
Defense
Non-Def
WTF-PAD
W-T
CAM-Pad

Tuned for Precision
Precision
Recall
0.985
0.967
0.358
0.949

0.932
0.667
0.662
0.165

Tuned for Recall
Precision Recall
0.937
0.683
0.349
0.575

0.991
0.961
0.923
0.939

tive performance against the state-of-the-art WF attacks and the transparent
interpretable property to users as well.

5.6.4

Open-World Results

Having explored the performance of the CAM-Pad defense against the stateof-the-art WF attacks in the closed-world setting, we now evaluate our defense
in a more realistic open-world scenario.
The performance of the attack in the open-world setting is to measure the
ability of the WF classifier to correctly recognize unknown network traffic as
either a monitored or an unmonitored website. Against the WF defense, the
scenario has become even more difficult as the dummy packets were added
to make the WF classifier hard to recognize the actual websites resulted in
misclassification of one website to the other one. True positive rate (TPR) and
false positive rate (FPR) have been commonly used in evaluating WF attacks
and defenses in the open-world setting [20, 40, 54]. These metrics, however,
could lead to inappropriate interpretation of the attacks’ performance due to
the heavy imbalance between the respective sizes of the monitored set and
unmonitored set. Thus, as recommended by Panchenko et al. [35] and Juarez
et al. [25], we use precision and recall as our primary metrics.
In our experiments, we use the standard model, in which an additional
class label for the unmonitored set is trained on and then used in predicting
test traces. This helps the classifier to better distinguish between the monitored and unmonitored websites. An alternative to the standard model was
proposed by Rimmer et al. [40], in which the unmonitored set is predicted
when the classifier shows low prediction confidence. While both models have
been applied in ML applications, the standard model has been more common
in the previous work on WF [20, 35, 45, 54]. We trained the WF classifier by
using the DF attack [45] as the base model with Non-Def, W-T, WTF-PAD
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Figure 5.15: Precision and Recall curves of the CAM-Pad defense compared
to other WF defenses
and CAM-Pad datasets and mainly use the packet directions as the main data
representation.
It is important to note that the attacks can be flexibly tuned with respect
to the attacker’s goals as demonstrated in Table 5.4. If the attacker’s primary
goal is to be highly confident that a user predicted to be visiting a monitored
website truly is doing so, the attack will be tuned for precision, reducing false
positives at the cost of also reducing true positives. On the other hand, if
attacker’s goal is to widely detect any user that may be visiting a monitored
website, the attack will be tuned for recall, increasing true positives while
accepting more false positives.
Figure 5.15 shows precision-recall curves for the attacks in the open-world
setting, while Table 5.4 shows the results when the attack is tuned for precision
or tuned for recall. For the Non-Defended dataset, the results show that
the attack can attain high precision and recall, WTF-PAD defense is also
undermined by the DF attack with 0.964 Precision and 0.667 Recall when
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Table 5.5: The performance of the CAM-Pad defense against the DF and TF
attack
Defense
Non-Def
WTF-PAD
CAM-Pad

Accuracy against
DF Attack TF Attack (5-Shot)
98.3%
90.7%
66.7%

92.2%
54.1%
10.7%

tuned for precision. W-T is the good example of the defense that can effectively
prevent the DF attack as it can hold the precision to lower than 0.4 at all
thresholds meaning that the attacker cannot make a prediction with the high
confidence. For our CAM-Pad defense, it is interesting to see that the defense
can be tuned with the high precision, but drastically reduce the recall in return
e.g. 0.949 Precision and 0.165 Recall. It could be inferred that the CAM-Pad
defense makes the attacker fail to detect many monitored websites. Even if
we tune for the high recall for the CAM-Pad defense, it turns out that the
precision is dropped down to less than 0.6. Thus, it could be interpreted that
the attacker can detect many monitored websites, but most of detection is not
accurate and tends to be wrong.

5.6.5

CAM-Pad Defense against TF Attack

In the previous research project, we propose the Triplet Fingerprinting (TF)
attack with effective performance of the attack under more realistic and more
challenging scenarios. It is important to note that, the performance of the
attack is typically degraded in the realistic scenario. Thus, it is interesting to
evaluate performance the CAM-Pad defense against the TF attack.
We evaluate and compare the performance of the TF and DF attacks under
a closed-world setting. Table 5.5 clearly shows that, under more realistic and
more challenging scenario in which the TF attack is designed for, the CAMPad defense can effectively and significantly reduce the performance of the TF
attack to only 10% making this defense stronger against the attacks especially
under more realistic scenario.
Moreover, when the CAM-Pad defense is realistically deployed in the Tor,
the drastic reduction of the TF attack which designed to be performed under
more realistic attack provide interesting viewpoint in term of the design of WF
defenses. We can expect that the bandwidth and latency overhead required
to maintain the sufficient level of security in the realistic scenarios may be less
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than the one expected under the DF attack designed under the lab condition.
Therefore, the study and evaluation on the trade-off between the security and
the actual network overhead under realistic deployment in Tor is required and
we leave them as the future work.

5.7

Conclusion

In this work, we aim to develop the new WF defense that is effective against
WF attacks using DL to answer the RQ4: How should the WF defenses
be improved to attain a sufficient level of security and remain practical in term of network overheads against WF attacks using DL?.
We fist analyze and determine the key challenges and expected design of the
new WF defense against WF attacks using DL including:
• Features knowledge: The new WF defense cannot relies on deterministic feature knowledge used for the WF attack since it is hidden inside
the DNN.
• Overhead of defense: The new WF defense needs to be lightweight
and requires small to moderate bandwidth and latency overhead to ensure the quality of service in Tor.
• Deployability: The new WF defense should be deployable without
requiring significant changes in Tor. Furthermore, the defense needs to
be more generic in which it can be generally applied to all websites.
• Transparent interpretable defense: The defense does not only relies
on the accuracy score to justify its performance, but also can explain why
the defense can successfully prevent the WF attack with other additional
explanation.
We propose the novel WF defenses that meet all expected design mentioned
above called CAM-Pad defense. According to our experimental results, we
answer RQ4 based to our finding as following:
• We show that the design of the CAM-Pad defense does not rely on the
feature knowledge which is hidden in the DNN. On the other hand, the
defense simply uses the combination of the global relative importance
scores extracted from Grad-CAM to stochastically add dummy packets.
Moreover, the defense is based on dynamic-flow defense making it practical in term of deployability as it can be applied to any websites in both
static and dynamic ones.
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• We evaluate the performance of the CAM-Pad defense against the stateof-the-art WF attacks called the DF attack. In closed-world scenario,
the accuracy of the attack drops down from 98.4% for the Non-Def to
66.7% for the CAM-Pad defense, compared to the WTF-PAD defense,
the CAM-Pad defense is much more effective. The security comes at
the cost of 83% additional bandwidth overhead and 28% additional latency overhead compared to the network traffic without defense. In
more realistic open-world scenario, the precision and recall are significantly dropped compared to WTF-PAD defense to the point that the
attacker cannot effectively perform WF attacks.
• We further evaluate the performance of the CAM-Pad defense against
the TF attack designed to perform under more realistic scenario. In
closed-world setting, the accuracy of the TF attack drops down to 10%,
inferring that the CAM-Pad defense is even more robust under realistic
scenario.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who propose to use the
visual explanation technique to provide transparent interpretable property to the WF defense. We show that Grad-CAM can be effectively
used to provide better understanding about how the characteristics of
relative importance scores are in both successful and failed WF defenses.
Hence, it provides additional measurements to evaluate the effectiveness
of WF defenses and visual explanation about why the CAM-Pad defense
can prevent the WF attacks.
According to our findings, the RQ4 is now answered by our newly-proposed
CAM-Pad defense that can effectively prevent the state-of-the-art WF attacks.
Moreover, the results suggest that this approach is competitive against other
efficient defenses, though further work is still necessary. Going forward, it
will be necessary to further explore the trade-off between security and overheads which will help up to design more flexible and tunable WF defenses.
Furthermore, moving this defense out of the realm of simulation to real implementation is necessary to show the full effectiveness of our proposed defense.
Finally, this work was accepted to be published and presented in the 2018
IEEE Western New York Image and Signal Processing Workshop (WNYISPW).
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Appendix A

DF Model’s Architecture
One of the compelling properties for CNN is the transferability of the model.
The transferability refers to the ability of the model to be used as a base
model for similar tasks. Instead of training an entire CNN from scratch, the
researcher can adapt the model to a similar task, specifically with a similar
input format.
In WF research, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first who provide
the full technical details, guidelines and suggestions on how to implement our
CNN-based DF model to perform WF attacks. In this section we provide
details for our DF architecture and its hyperparameters to create our model,
and to allow other researchers to apply it in their future work (see Figure A.1):
Input Data.
The input data for our DF model is the vector of packets’ directions with
length 5,000 (1 x 5,000). We initially tried adjusting the input dimension
to be a matrix of shape similar to the matrices typically fed into CNNs for
image recognition tasks (e.g., 50 x 100 pixels). The accuracy for 2D input
was reasonably good, but slightly lower than 1D input. The major difference
is training time: 1D input is significantly faster than 2D input, even though
the total number of data points is the same for both input dimensions. We
presume this difference results from tensor operations that have to deal with
higher dimensions of data. We suggest that for the WF task, it is more
appropriate to use 1D input as it is faster for training and provides better
classification performance
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Convolutional Layers (Block 1).
Figure A.1 describes the architecture of our DF model divided by blocks, where
a block comprises a set of convolutional layers, a batch normalization layer, a
max pooling layer and a dropout layer. The first block in the DF is specially
important due to its proximity to the input.
As we mentioned in Section 3.2, since the nature of our input is different
to inputs considered in image recognition, we had to find an activation function that fits our input values. We chose the Exponential Linear Unit (ELU)
because prior work has shown that it provides fast and accurate classification
with negative inputs [13,33]. The results obtained from hyperparameters tuning suggested that applying ELU in the first two convolutional layers followed
by ReLU with the rest of convolutional layers provides the best accuracy compared to only using ReLU. This suggests that ELU plays an important role in
extracting hidden features from the input data.
Dropout Regularization.
CNN-based models are specially vulnerable to overfitting, an issue that might
be easily overlooked by the developer. We applied a dropout technique to
mitigate overfitting in the design of our DF model. Our strategy to apply
dropout was to embed in between feature extraction (Blocks 1-4) and classification (Fully-connected layers) using different rates. In feature extraction,
we deployed dropout right after the max pooling layer in each block with 0.1
dropout rate. In addition, we added a dropout layer after each fully-connected
layer with rate 0.7 and 0.5, respectively. As we observed from the hyperparameters tuning, the overfitting mostly arises at the fully-connected layers, and
it is less problematic at the convolutional layers. Thus, we adjusted different
dropout rates appropriately according to this observation.
Batch Normalization.
We studied the technique to accelerate model learning called Batch Normalization (BN) [24]. This technique provides benefits to improve the classification
performance in order to, for instance, learn faster while maintaining or even
increasing accuracy. Moreover, it also partially serves as a regulation method
as well. Thus, we applied BN and dropout regularization together and obtained a boost in both performance and generalization. However, adding BN
layers requires additional training time. We observed that it added around
100% training time for each epoch compared to the model that did not apply
BN. Yet, we believe it is worth applying BN, as the additional training time
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is compensated with a faster learning rate (it requires less number of epochs
to reach the same level of accuracy) and can ultimately achieve higher testing
accuracy. In our model, we applied BN right after every convolutional and
fully-connected layers.
In conclusion, the researcher can apply this model and our suggestions to
develop their own CNN-based model for WF. There are other details that we
cannot describe here due to limit space including number of filters, kernel size,
stride size and pool size. However, we will ensure that our implementation details, along with the source code and data used in this study, will be published
on a website upon publication of this paper, so that researchers can reproduce
our results.
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Figure A.1: Our design of DF model’s architecture used in WF attacks

Appendix B

Open-World ROC curve
We plot the ROC curve for all the WF attacks against non-defended, WTFPAD and W-T datasets using a standard model in open-world scenario as
shown in Figures B.1a − B.1c. Note that ROC curve is only demonstrated
for supportive results since we mainly use precision and recall as the main
measurements for the open-world setting to avoid misinterpretation of result
from base-rate fallacy.
The attacker can effectively use the ROC curve to evaluate the classifier
and optimize the trade-off between TPR and FPR. For example, the best
overall results for DF against non-defended traffic might be the optimization
for TPR, with 0.98 TPR and 0.03 FPR, and the optimization for FPR, with
0.94 TPR and 0.004 FPR.
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Appendix C

Dataset’s Distribution
Analysis
In Chapter 4, we study the performance of the triplet fingerprinting attack
under more challenging scenarios. One of the experiments that we aim to
evaluate is the performance of the attack against the adverse effect causing
from a data mismatch issue. The issue happens when the distributions of
training and testing datasets are significantly different. We use two different
datasets including 1) AWF dataset collected in 2016 using Tor browser version
6 as the training data, and 2) Wang dataset collected in 2013 using Tor browser
version 3 as the testing data.
Even if the three-year gap of different periods and three different versions
of Tor browsers between AWF and Wang datasets can presumably ensure
the significant difference in term of their distributions, we provide further
investigation to evaluate how significantly different between these datasets
are. We provide evaluations based on two metrics including the basic network
traffic statistic and the similarity measurement.

C.1
C.1.1

Basic Network Traffic Statistic
Common Websites in Wang and AWF datasets

We analyze the network traffic statistic on websites that are commonly listed
in the Wang and the AWF datasets. We first evaluate the number of incoming
and outgoing packets which directly represents the change in each website’s
contents in term of the size of the website over periods of time. Table C.1
demonstrates the average numbers of outgoing and incoming packets for each
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website. The results show that there are significant changes in term of the
number of outgoing and incoming packets in most of the websites.
Moreover, we take a closer look on the burst-level packets statistic by
measuring the number of incoming and outgoing bursts. It is important to
note that the number of bursts is commonly used by WF classifiers to measure the distinctive patterns of the traffic and the network’s activities such as
the total number of objects from which the user needs to fetch (number of
requests and responds for each given website). Table C.2 demonstrates the
significant changes in term of the number of incoming and outgoing bursts for
common websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets. Therefore, the significant changes of the basic network statistic and bursts for the common websites
in the Wang and the AWF datasets reveals the likelihood of mismatched data.

C.1.2

Aggregation Analysis of Wang and AWF datasets

We further investigate aggregation analysis of the basic network traffic statistic in all websites from both datasets. Instead of focusing on the common
websites, we measure the traffic statistic for all 100 websites of each dataset.
The results of the aggregation analysis provide the statistical analysis for the
whole datasets used for training and testing the classifier. Table C.3 and Figure C.1- C.2 show the significant difference on both the number of network’s
packets and the number of the traffic’s bursts. The results support the evidence that there is a mismatch of the AWF dataset used for training and the
Wang dataset used for testing the classifier.

C.2

Similarity Measurement

We extensively analyze the difference of the two datasets by using a similarity
measurement. The similarity measurement is used to evaluate how similar of
two network traffic’s vectors in the latent space. We apply the Cosine distance
to calculate the distance between a pair of network traffic; the smaller distance
represents the higher similarity of the given pair of network traffic.
In the set of common websites in both Wang and AWF datasets, we first
measure the intrasimilarity in which the Cosine distance is calculated for all
possible pairs of the same website. Moreover, we additionally measure the
intersimilarity in which we calculate the Cosine distance for all possible pairs
of network traffic examples from website A in the Wang dataset and network
traffic examples from website A in the AWF dataset. The illustration of how
the pairs of network traffic examples are used to measure the similarity is
demonstrated in Figure C.3.
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Table C.1: The comparison between the average number of incoming and
outgoing packets for common websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets

Websites
nicovideo.jp
youtube.com
rakuten.co.jp
dropbox.com
xvideos.com
excite.co.jp
nikkeibp.co.jp
archive.org
twitter.com
t.co
scribd.com
facebook.com
appspot.com
vimeo.com
soundcloud.com
drtuber.com
imgur.com
fc2.com
wordpress.com
imdb.com
xhamster.com
xing.com
extratorrent.cc

Number of Packets
Wang Dataset
AWF Dataset
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
307
4016
255
2584
153
1896
291
3094
48
478
382
4617
142
2457
436
4286
165
2983
139
1536
356
3346
414
2504
413
3250
423
4572
26
87
118
1421
59
717
163
2214
17
48
22
47
376
3896
354
2791
75
866
101
795
63
314
74
255
203
3318
425
4574
176
2043
673
3115
289
3322
329
4119
160
568
366
4340
125
1255
131
1042
103
988
347
1367
268
1886
427
4550
211
2180
173
1723
80
740
208
878
237
2028
259
2836
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Table C.2: The comparison between the average number of incoming and
outgoing bursts for common websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets

Websites
nicovideo.jp
youtube.com
rakuten.co.jp
dropbox.com
xvideos.com
excite.co.jp
nikkeibp.co.jp
archive.org
twitter.com
t.co
scribd.com
facebook.com
appspot.com
vimeo.com
soundcloud.com
drtuber.com
imgur.com
fc2.com
wordpress.com
imdb.com
xhamster.com
xing.com
extratorrent.cc

Number of Bursts
Wang Dataset
AWF Dataset
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
116
116
131
131
69
68
157
157
21
21
200
200
68
67
233
233
72
72
70
70
131
131
208
207
120
120
247
247
8
8
62
62
32
31
103
102
9
9
11
11
147
146
168
168
32
32
53
53
32
32
40
40
92
92
231
230
72
72
293
292
88
88
185
184
59
59
197
197
55
55
70
70
46
45
165
164
81
80
225
225
59
59
86
86
38
38
99
98
91
91
144
144

APPENDIX C. DATASET’S DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

143

Table C.3: The aggregation analysis of the basic network statistical analysis
for all websites in Wang and AWF datasets (the average of the number of
incoming and outgoing packets vs. the average of the number of incoming and
outgoing bursts)
Dataset
Wang
AWF

Number of Packets
Outgoing Incoming
156
1532
315
2735

Number of Bursts
Outgoing Incoming
59
59
160
160

Figure C.1: The box plot of the basic statistical analysis in term of the number
of packets for all websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets
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Figure C.2: The box plot of the basic statistical analysis in term of the number
of bursts for all websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets

Figure C.3: Similarity measurement by using the intrasimilarity and the intersimilarity based on the Cosine distance metric
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Table C.4 demonstrates the intersimilarity and the intrasimilarity resulted
from the average of similarity from all pairs of network traffic examples. The
results show that there are significant reductions of the intersimilarity in many
common websites compared to the intrasimilarity of them. Thus, it can be
inferred that the similarity for the same website in different datasets has significantly decreased in the latent space supporting the evidence that the common
websites in Wang and AWF dataset are likely to be mismatched.
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Table C.4: The comparison between the intrasimilarity and the intersimilarity
for common websites in the Wang and the AWF datasets
Websites
nicovideo.jp
youtube.com
rakuten.co.jp
dropbox.com
xvideos.com
excite.co.jp
nikkeibp.co.jp
archive.org
twitter.com
t.co
scribd.com
facebook.com
appspot.com
vimeo.com
soundcloud.com
drtuber.com
imgur.com
fc2.com
wordpress.com
imdb.com
xhamster.com
xing.com
extratorrent.cc

Intrasimilarity
Wang AWF
0.7
0.7
0.64
0.63
0.74
0.73
0.8
0.66
0.66
0.68
0.62
0.49
0.6
0.7
0.52
0.72
0.76
0.57
0.33
0.32
0.66
0.63
0.69
0.64
0.52
0.4
0.71
0.69
0.72
0.5
0.71
0.72
0.38
0.72
0.71
0.62
0.66
0.42
0.56
0.69
0.74
0.69
0.71
0.43
0.55
0.65

Intersimilarity
Wang - AWF
0.56
0.55
0.19
0.57
0.53
0.51
0.55
0.11
0.49
0.2
0.56
0.62
0.35
0.61
0.56
0.65
0.19
0.6
0.45
0.39
0.6
0.48
0.54

